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The United States and Erdogan's Turkey: Exploring Relations of Diverging Interests

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Dedication

I dedicate my humble work to the closest people to my heart:
To my source of life and hope who scarifies to my happiness and success

My dear Parents, Mom and Dad

Whom I pray to God to guard and protect them

My dear Grandmother whom God gives her good health and long life

My dear Brothers Salah, Mohamed, Zakaria, and Youcef

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Amani, And my nephew Hala, Ayman, and abouda.

To all my friends and everybody I love and respect.

Abstract

The Turkish-American political relationship is product of the Soviet Union threats of expansion. The U.S.-Turkish strategic alliance plays a main role during the Cold War in 1945. The American relationship contributes in Turkey's modernization and westernization process throughout the containment policy. The U.S. assistants help in the stabilization of Turkey's economy and strengthening the military force. Turkey preserves the American Partnership despite the collapse of SU in 1989. Turkey depends on the Secularism ideology and Orientation in its relation with America. This thesis aims to study the effects of Islamic rooted party, Justice and Development Party (AKP), election on of Turkey's politics. This Study relies on the analyses of AKP government reaction towards the regional and international issues. According to the study investigation results, the AKP government foreign policy decisions lead to a conflict of interest between Turkey and United States. The U.S.-Turkey divergent positions tens reach a serious confrontation threats their strategic partnership.

Key Words: United States, Turkey, Justice and Development Party, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, conflict of interest.

المخلص

العلاقة السياسية التركية الأمريكية هي نتاج تهديدات توسع الاتحاد السوفيتي. لعب التحالف الاستراتيجي الأمريكي التركي دوراً رئيسياً خلال الحرب الباردة في عام 1945. ساهمت العلاقة الأمريكية في عملية تطوير تركيا وتغريبها من خلال سياسة الاحتواء. ساهمت المساعدات الأمريكية في استقرار الاقتصاد التركي وتعزيز القوة العسكرية. حافظت تركيا على الشراكة الأمريكية رغم انهيار الاتحاد السوفيتي في عام 1989. كما اعتمدت تركيا على أيديولوجية العلمانية في علاقتها بأمريكا. تهدف هذه الأطروحة إلى دراسة تأثير انتخاب حزب العدالة والتنمية بجذوه الإسلامية على السياسة التركية. استندت هذه الدراسة على تحليل رد فعل حكومة رجب طيب اردوغان تجاه القضايا الإقليمية والدولية. وفقاً لنتائج الدراسة ، أدت قرارات السياسة الخارجية لحكومة حزب العدالة والتنمية إلى تضارب في المصالح بين تركيا والولايات المتحدة الأمريكية. تباين المواقف بين الولايات المتحدة وتركيا وصل إلى المواجهة التي تهدد شراكتها الإستراتيجية.

الكلمات المفتاحية: الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية ، تركيا ، حزب العدالة والتنمية ، رجب طيب أردوغان ، تضارب المصالح

List of Abbreviations

AKP	Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development party)
ANAP	Anavatan Partisi (Motherland Party)
CAATSA	Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act
CHP	Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican Peoples Party)
CUP	Committee (Society) of Union and Progress organization
DP	Democratic Party
DYP	Doğru Yol Partisi,(True Path Party(
FP	Fazilet Partisi (Virtue Party)
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GNA	Grand National Assembly
IMF	International Monetary Funds
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
ISIS	Islamic State of Syria and Iraq
KDPI	Kurdistan Democratic Party
KRG	Kurdistan Regional Government
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NOP	National Order Party
NSP	National Salvation Party
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PKK	Kurdistan Workers party
PYD	Partiya Yekitiya Demokrat (Democratic Union Party)

RP	Refah Partisi (Welfare Party)
RPP	Republic Peoples Party
SDF	Syrian Democratic Forces
SP	Saadet Partisi (Felicity party)
SU	Soviet Union
USA	United State of America
USSR	Union of Soviet of Socialist Republican
WWI	First World War
WWII	Second World War
YPG	People Protection Unites

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General Introduction

The Turkish-American political relationship begins with the end of the Second World War. United States (U.S.) alliance with Turkey is a product of their mutual interest in defeating the Soviet Union (SU) expansion. The U.S. used Turkey's geopolitical importance as a barrier against the communism spread to the Middle East. As a result of the US containment policy during the Cold War, Turkey benefited from economic help and military support throughout the Truman doctrine in 1947 and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization membership in 1952. The Turkish new nation westernization principles in addition to the American stress to end the Eastern Bloc preserve the strong bilateral ties between both countries.

Washington and Ankara's mutual fears finished with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989. U.S. established the new international order in 1991 as the unipolar power of the world. Turkey's officials were concerned about the idea of the American partnership end. Thus, Turkey took advantage of the First Gulf War against Saddam Hussein, to refresh its relation with America through their mutual military cooperation in the war. As a result, Washington and Ankara's relationship innovated to adjust the U.S. new role in protecting world security and safety, especially after the 9/11 terrorist attacks.

Despite the historical agreements, the early elections of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in 2003 turned the Turkish-American relationship upside down. The AKP leader Recep Tayyip Erdogan was affiliated to the 1970 Erbakan's Islamic movement in Turkey. Erdogan's success was based on his conservative democratic ideology, which adopted to fit the party Islamic roots and westernization process of Turkey. The elections of the AKP government considered a notable domestic change in Turkish political history. Erdogan plans to create a new Turkey throughout number of transformations with a concentration on Foreign policy. For the new Turkey Erdogan established Zero problems with neighbor's policy. The new administration shows a remarkable shift of interest in international affairs and mainly in

the Middle East region. For decades Turkey was a stable partnership for the US in the region, however; Erdogan's administration un-pretended standpoints and reactions towards recent circumstances in the area led to contradictions between Turkey and U.S. interests. Thus, the present research investigates the following questions:

- To what extent do the elections of Recep Tayyip Erdogan Justice and Development party reflect the Turkish –American partnership?

The present research aims also to investigate the following sub-questions:

- What are the historical developments constructed the alliance between Turkey and United States during the period (1945-2002)?
- What are Recep Erdogan's underlying tenets in the establishment of the AK Party?
- What are the reasons of Erdogan's Government disagreement with the United States administration?

Since the tensions between Turkey and U.S. is the result of Erdogan Justice and Development party government reaction to the latest international and regional developments, The present research aims to highlight the main divergent issues and crisis that sourced the tensions between Turkey and United State in addition to the limits of their unique old strategic partnership.

Regarding the methodology, the present research relies on a variety of primary and secondary sources. The primary sources are in the shape of American and Turkish officials statement mainly the Turkish Prime Minister and then-president Recep Tayyip Erdogan and the American President Donald J. Trump. On the other hand, secondary sources are in the shape of books and articles written by different scholars on the research subject. In addition to the combination of sources, the present research based on the historical approach to describe, analyze, and criticize the developments of Turkish-American bilateral ties throughout history. The present research follows the eight edition of the MLA manual of style.

The current research paper is divided into three chapters. The two first chapters constitute a historical and theoretical framework that tackles important events and agreements between Turkey and U.S. before 2002. The third chapter is devoted to the analysis of Erdogan's ruling role impacts on the Ankara-Washington partnership.

The first chapter is entitled **The Turkish-American Relationship from 1945 to 2002**. This chapter provides an overview of the development of the relationship between Turkey and United States. Also, this chapter presents the impact of US containment policy during the Cold War in building up the Turkish-American alliance.

The second chapter is entitled **The Foundation of the Justice and Development Party under Recep Tayyip Erdogan's leadership**. This chapter concerned with Mr. Erdogan's political carrier under the Islamic parties in the face of the Kemalist military-base political system. Also, it provides Erdogan's primary principles in establishing the AKP and the party main foreign policy guides.

The third chapter is about **The Turkish- American Political Relationship during Erdogan Tenure**. This chapter aims at analyzing the Turkish – American new relation path under the role of Erdogan AK Party in reference to number of incidents. Ankara and Washington's partnership is highly influenced by the later Middle East region crisis which clashed the interest of both countries in the region. This chapter study how the Turkish internal politics of the electing an Islamic rooted party (AKP) reactions to the international and regional alterations affected what considered a strategic partnership between Turkey and United States.

Chapter One

Turkish-American Relationship: 1945-2002

1.1 Introduction

The American-Turkish relationship could be traced back to the end of the Second World War. The territorial independence threats by the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), pushed Turkey to seek the Western alliance mainly with the United States of America. The geopolitical importance of Turkey in the Middle East region attracted U.S. interest; As a result, the U.S. government took its historical decision to support Turkey and built up a diplomatic relationship with it. Therefore, Turkey became the U.S. natural barrier against the Soviet Union and the spread of communism during the Cold War period. This chapter studies, on the one hand, the rise and consolidation of the American-Turkish relations during the Cold War (1945- 1989). The Turkish-American agreements were demonstrated economically in Truman Doctrine 1947 and militarily by the acceptance of Turkey's membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (1952). On the other hand, we will investigate the continuity of the U.S.-Turkish relationship even after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the establishment of the New International World Order. In fact, the U.S. considers Turkey a strategic partnership in the region. U.S. ties with Turkey secure the American interests in the vital region. Washington's main concerns in Turkey partnership are supporting Israel, maintaining military bases, facilitating the flow of oil and protecting its corridors, and fighting the source of terrorism in the region

1.2 The Beginning of the American-Turkish Relations

The United State interest in the Middle East including Turkey was limited to commercial, religious, and educational matters before the Second World War. The U.S.

and Turkey were similar in their position of neutrality towards the W.W.II. However, after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 the U.S. abandoned the isolationism and entered the war. Also, it started to understand the strategic importance of the Middle East and the Mediterranean area. Until the end of W.W.II, the U.S. viewed the Middle East as a British sphere of influence (Toprak 74).

The international system alterations after W.W.II helped in building up the American-Turkish relations. The Soviet-Turkish tension over the straits considers one of the main issues that led to the conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States (Atmaca 20). In another word, Turkey's disagreement with SU about the straits pushed Turkey to seek American help against Soviet oppression.

The Turkish military control over the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles straits was established throughout the Montreux Convention in 1936 (Howard 143). Nevertheless, in September 1939, the Soviets asked the Turkish Foreign Minister Şükrü Saraçoğlu during his visit to Moscow to revise the Montreux Convention. The Soviets proposal was a mutual control of the straits which would forbid the external powers from having access to the Black Sea. It also forbade warships from using the straits in peace and war times. The Soviet perceived insecurity from the western bloc was the main reason behind the question of the straits, especially after the triple alliance of Turkey, Britain, and France. The Turkish government refused Soviets demand under the justification of threatening Turkey's territorial independence and integrity (Idlir 7-9).

In 1945 at Yalta conference, the Soviet Union leader, Joseph Stalin, took the opportunity of U.S. and Britain presidents meeting and claimed for the revision of the Montreux Convention again. In that time Britain and the United States agreed with Soviet request (Piçak 178). The U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt stated that the limitations between Turkey and USSR were not good for both countries. And he added that the Soviets should

receive their share of the black sea without any difficulties with Turkey. Additionally, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill agreed on changing the Montreux Convention. Churchill suggested the Soviet Union guaranteed of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Turkey (Knight 451).

In March 1945, the Soviets notified Turkey that Neutrality and Non-Aggression treaty was abrogated. Moreover, In July 1945 at Potsdam Conference Stalin raised the question of Soviet-Turkish mutual control over the straits; According to Stalin, Turkey was not strong enough to secure these straits alone (Piçak 178). As a result of the Conference, President Harry Truman described the Turkish refusal of the Soviet collaboration as “selfish control of the waterways of Europe” (Howard 143). Harry Truman and Winston Churchill argued that the straits problem was both U.S. and world concern (Piçak 178).

After the Potsdam Conference, Turkey administration asserted that:

“The Turkish government appreciates the value and importance of the participation of the American guarantee to the freedom of passage and the preservation of peace in the Straits. The Turkish government decided to participate in the suggested Truman Formula as long as it will not hinder Turkey’s sovereignty and security, and exactly to end the disturbance posed by the Russian demands.” (Piçak 178).

In another word, Turkey tried to gain American support and highlighted the importance of its territories which is threatened by SU. Also, Turkey wanted to burden the US the responsibility to protect it and to find out a solution to SU pressure.

At that time the American Ambassador in Ankara, Edwin Wilson, realized the main purpose of the Soviets insistence on controlling the Turkish straits. According to Wilson, the Soviet aim behind the territorial request was dominating Turkey and the Middle East countries throughout what was called the domino effect policy (Atmaca 21). Domino effect is a political concept used to describe the USSR policy during the early Cold War. According to Leeson and Dean in their article “the Democratic Domino Theory”, if one

country in the region came under the influence of communism, then the surrounding countries would follow like a domino effect (533-551).

The Soviet proposal of military bases in the Turkish straits and the exclusion of non-Black Sea powers from using them, was seen as a threat against the British economy in the Middle East. In December 1945 at Moscow Conference, the British Foreign Secretary Bevin declared that Britain would not permit the Soviets control of those straits claiming that it would threaten the independence of Turkey. The British economic devastation after the end of W.W.II forced Britain to desert its help to Turkey (Atmaca 21).

The fears of losing the geopolitical importance of Turkey led the U.S. to accept Britain's idea of supporting Turkey. Support the British position aimed at preventing the Soviet territorial and ideological expansion in the region (Atmaca 21). As a result, the Undersecretary of States, Dean Acheson ensured the American support of Turkey against Soviets demands (Melvyn 177). In 1955, the Soviet Union leader Khrushchev admitted that the Soviet territorial demands from Turkey were the main reason behind breaking up the Soviet-Turkish relations (Ulunian 35-52). For Khrushchev, these demands are Soviets historical mistake that led to the loss of a strong ally in the Middle East region.

1.3. The Turkish-American Alliance during the Cold War (1945-1989).

The Turkish alliance was the U.S. significant strategy to prevent the spread of communism in the Middle East during the Cold War period. In that time, the U.S.-Turkish alliance was characterized by political, economic, and military plans such as the Truman Doctrine and Turkey's membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

1.3.1 The Truman Doctrine.

On 21 February 1947, the British ambassador, Lord Inverchapel, informed the U.S. State Department, that Britain will give up the economic and military burden for Turkey and

Greece. The British administration suggested a U.S. replacement for the sake of safeguarding both countries geopolitical interests (Satterthwaite 75).

Then, in 1946, diplomat George F. Kennan sent a message to the State Department, which later became known as the Long Telegram. Kennan warned the U.S. administration from the Soviets hidden desire to dominate Turkey and Greece after the British withdrawal. Kennan' Long Telegram provides an analysis of the Soviet Union and his personal views about the US required reactions (Nash 1). Kennan stated that “The main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies.”(Kennan para 9). Kennan was the first one who introduced the notion of containment policy. He argued that Soviet ambitious expansionism was a serious threat to Turkey, Greece, the U.S., and the entire world (Bouaziz 1).

As a result of these serious circumstances, the White House conducted many meetings involving worthy administration characters. On 28 February 1947, Acheson convened a group of state department officials to draft President Truman's message to Congress and that outlined the “Truman Doctrine.” The policy was presented as an American affirmative to Turkey’s request, not as an aid to Britain or responsibility replacement. Also, there was no direct mention of the Soviet Union in the doctrine (Evered 56-57).

On 12 March 1947, President Harry Truman delivered a speech to the Congress personally and it broadcast in radio to all the American citizens and the free world. Truman's speech became one of the most significant events in American history. President Truman “... [request] the congress to provide authority for assistance Greece and Turkey in the amount of \$400,000,000 for the period ending with June 30, 1948 ...”. Hence, Truman believed that supporting the free peoples from repression or pressure of the armed minorities must be the United States' new policy (Truman 4).

When Acheson took the speech draft to the President it involved supporting the Middle East region free people, exactly Turkey and Greece. However, Truman reviewed the message and made a basic alteration in the draft. He expanded the doctrine to the entire World (Henderson 86). Truman declared that” ...the free peoples of the world look to us for support in maintaining their freedoms. If we falter in our leadership, we may endanger the peace of the world and we shall surely endanger the welfare of our own nation” (Truman 5). Throughout the quote, one can understand that the free people of the world bear the U.S. their protection responsibility from the external dangers. Yet, U.S. endeavored to protect peoples from the Communist spread was a U.S. strategy to preserve its interests and security.

Consequently, Congress discussed the current question and agreed with Truman’s suggested solution. On 22 May, President Truman signed the bill or the public law 75 which authorized the economic and military aids to Turkey and Greece (Evered 59). Truman in his speech promised Turkey and Greece with subvention until 30 June 1948. According to McGhee George, the administrator of the aid package and the programs in Turkey and Greece, the U.S. distributed “\$750 million worth of military and economic assistance to Greece and Turkey over the following two years” (McGhee 19). The United States' economic and military aid to Turkey was an important step during the Cold War to prevent Soviet expansionism in that region. Moreover, U.S. assistants worked in Turkey to develop its political and security cooperation with the western bloc. In addition, many scholars believe that it was the basis for the Turkish westernization and modernization process (Ulgul 52-56).

1.3.2 Turkey Membership in North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization was signed on 4 April 1949 by United States, France, Britain, Holland, Luxembourg, and Belgium. Accordingly, NATO was established

as a political and military alliance between those countries. NATO's main goals were defeating the expansion of the USSR, seeking out the political integration of Europe, and forbidding nationalist militarism revival there (NATO Public Diplomacy Division 1).

Turkey's desire of joining NATO was a strategic choice during the Cold War. Turkey's objectives were derived from its serious needs. First of all, the Soviet Union territorial aspirations threatened Turkey's independence. For Turkey, joining a collective defense organization such as NATO would secure the western political and military reinforcement (Oguzlu 2). Especially with what Ankara viewed as equality in power between the West and the Soviet Union (Onder 91). Turkey was convinced that North Atlantic Pact would defend its sovereignty and integrity (Karaosmanoglu 297).

Secondly, the values of the Turkish new republic pushed to join NATO to carry out what it viewed as a necessary westernization and Modernization process. This reason was the government justification given to the Turkish people about Turkey's membership in NATO (Oguzlu 3). North Atlantic Pact membership was some kind passport for Turkey to the Western world. Westernization ideology was then for Turkey a new foreign policy of cooperation with the Western community (Karaosmanoglu 297).

In May 1950, the U.S. and Britain refused Turkey's proposal of admission to the new security arrangement (NATO). According to them, NATO's region is restricted in a specific era which involves Western Europe and North Atlantic countries. Inasmuch, Turkey's geographical location is neither Western Europe nor North Atlantic so Turkey could not be involved in the pact. The disapproval of Ankara's government question was not expected and led to Turkish disappointment. That response made high tension and fears within the Turkish government of the U.S. protection giving up (Baharcicek 60).

After the new circumstances and the rise of American-Western European relations, Turkey decided to restore its geopolitical importance for the United States. Thus, Turkey's

main goal was to attract the U.S. and Britain's attention in order to obtain their support (Atmaca 24). On 14 May 1950, Turkey political environment changed with the election of Democrat Party. The party main agenda was not domestic changes. However; they sought to gain Western assistance and NATO membership (Dagci and Diyarbakirlioglu 19). Fuat Koprulu, the Foreign Minister of the new government asserts that Turkish foreign policy "which has been oriented towards the west since the Second World War, will take a more energetic and active form in this direction." (Ahmed 390). According to the Foreign Minister, Turkey's non-changeable aim was the development of a strong relationship with the West, which then required North Atlantic Pact involvement. That pact would protect the boundaries of Turkey from any external dangers and especially what was viewed as Soviet expansion.

The outbreak of the Korean War on 25 June 1950 was an opportunity for Turkey to prove its important and active role in the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean region. Immediately, Ankara responded to the United Nation's resolution. The Turkish government sent 4,500 troops to the battlefield in Korea on 18 October 1950 (Onder 93). That action was the end of Turkish neutrality from the Second World War (95). The active participation in the Korean War and its commitment to the UN international system helped Turkey to affirm its main role in international security. The United States viewed that the rejection of Turkey's membership in NATO would lead to a Turkish-Soviet rapprochement. Thus, in the 1949 report, the State Department asserted that "[t]he loss of Turkey would critically affect US security interests in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East." Indeed, Turkey's geopolitical importance and military capabilities were a key role in the security dynamics of the Cold War for the United States, especially in the Middle East region (Oguzlu 2).

Britain suggested a new pact that involved Turkey and the Middle East countries to keep them under its sphere of influence and to avoid problems with the US. Nevertheless, U.S. viewed that the membership of Turkey in NATO was easier than creating a new pact (Baharcicek 62). Furthermore, Turkey refused any bilateral security agreement with the U.S. outside the North Atlantic Pact framework (Oguzlu 3). Hence, Acheson proposed to Turkey as well as Greece to be associate members and participators in the defense plan of the Mediterranean region which was accepted by Turkey and Greece (Baharcicek 63).

Thereafter, on 18 February 1952, Turkey became a full NATO member. Acheson informed NATO members that Turkey and Greece membership is an important step to strengthen the alliance. U.S. and NATO allies used the geopolitical benefits of Turkey as southern flank to hinder Soviet expansionism during the Cold War. In addition, the western bloc won a strategic ally that would serve its objectives in the region (Atmaca 24).

1.4. The End of the Cold War and the Beginning of the U.S.-Turkish Partnership (1991-2001)

In November 1989, the world environment witnessed fundamental alterations in the international political system. Those changes were referring to the end of the Cold War with its characteristic of the world division (Eastern and Western bloc). The removal of the Iron Curtain in December 1991 was the confirmation of the collapse of communist regimes (Cengiz 461). The Turkish-American relations were based on the existence of the Soviet threat during the Cold War period. Thus; the breakdown of the USSR raised Turkish fears regarding an eventual American abandonment of its security and the continuity of their relations (Larrabee 1). The collapse of the Eastern Bloc brought up Western power under U.S. leadership. Hence, the United States was the new hegemonic of the political, economic, and military international systems.

In 1991, U.S. President George H. Bush defined a new international system under the name of “New World Order.” This recent system thought to be characterized by the spread of international freedom and democracy around the world. The pervaded scenario of the U.S.-Turkish relations breaking down led Turkey to redefine its international geopolitical influence and strategic role in the world’s affairs. It had to do so to preserve its alliance with the United States and the West. As a result, Turkey had a plan to introduce a new role and a new identity in the international arena (Onis 48-68).

The end of the Cold War drew Turkey's attention to the problems of its neighboring countries and the regional instability because of the vacuum left by the demise of the Soviet Union (Muftuler-bac 257). As a result, insuring regional stability was Turkey's new active role (Cengiz 461-462). Ankara’s perception was that it is the only country that could defend western interests in the Middle East. Turgut Ozal, the Turkish Prime Minister from 1983 and 1989 and then the president until he died in 1993, declared many times that "the 21st century will be the century of the Turks.” Also, Tansu Ciller the Prime Minister in 1993 claimed that “if Turkey fails, peace will fail in Europe” (Muftuler-bac 256). According to Ciller, Europe and the US support of Turkey’s economic and political development would help Turkey to maintain regional stability that would lead to European and American stability. Since the rule of Kemal Ataturk in 1923, Turkey changed its Caliphate regime to a secular political system to be accepted within the Western states. Hence, Turkey was a U.S. and European supporter opposed to the Arabic and Islamic nations.

The turning point in the Turkish international position was the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990. Turkey participated in the Gulf War (1990-1991) in favor of the allied coalition. Besides, President Ozal allowed the United States and Britain to use the Turkish airbases to impose a no-fly zone over northern Iraq and launch airstrikes (Athanasopoulou

144-145). The Gulf Crisis shifted NATO to a collective security organization and transformed Turkey into a frontline country (Aybet 2). Moreover, it consolidated the western alliance with Turkey (Muftuler-bac 260). Consequently, the United States recognized Turkey's new role in the region. In a congressional representation of foreign operation, the State Department declared that:

“Turkey is vitally important to U.S. interests. Its position athwart the Bosphorus at the strategic nexus of Europe, the Middle East, the Caucasus and the Caspian makes it an essential player a wide range of issues vital to U.S. security, political and economic interests. In a region of generally weak economies and shaky democratic traditions political instability, terrorism and ethnic strife, Turkey is a democratic secular nation that draws its political models from Western Europe and the United States. Turkey has co-operated intensively with the U.S.as NATO ally and is also vigorously seeking to deepen its political and economic ties with Europe.” (Athanasopoulou 146).

Furthermore, the former U.S. Secretary of State James Baker proclaimed that Turkey's geostrategic position was extraordinarily meaningful for the entire free world (Athanasopoulou 146). The United States' needs to protect its objectives in the Middle East region and Turkey's desire to cooperate were the main reasons behind the Washington-Ankara partnership. Along with the military collaboration with Turkey, the United States raised the question of modernizing Turkey's military especially the air force. In fact, the American interest in the Turkish military started with their Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement (DECA) in 1980 which was renewed every year. Additionally, the Bush administration, together with Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates, created a fund for the defense of Turkey. It was some kind of reward for its contribution in the Gulf crisis (147). On 15 November 1991, before the Turkish Grand National Assembly, Clinton announced Turkey as the strategic partnership of America (Serdar 2).

The United States strengthened its relation with Turkey by providing political support to Turkey when the latter submitted its candidacy for membership in the European Union. The Clinton administration viewed Turkey as a key element in Europe's security (Cakar 2). According to Ian Lesser, Washington's insistence on Turkey's integration in the EU should not be based on geographical considerations. However, it was about "regional security and the development in the European periphery — and beyond" (Cengiz 472). Despite that Turkey is still facing many obstacles concerning its integration in the European community (Lesser 8).

1.5. United States Interest in Turkey Geopolitical Importance.

The changes in the international environment after WWII were the reason behind the US interest in Turkey's geopolitical importance. Turkey improved its strategic significance by preventing the Soviet Union expansion in the Middle East region throughout American reinforcement. Despite the end of the Cold War, the United States concern in Turkey did not disappear but it grew up. The United States Post-Cold war interest in the Middle East was served by Turkey's existence in the region. Turkey played a key role in the Middle East region to save the American interest which includes: protecting Israel's sovereignty, maintaining the United States' military bases, securing the strategic oil corridors, resisting terrorist groups, and defending client-states, and Supporting and Protecting Israel Sovereignty.

1.5.1 Supporting and protecting Israel Sovereignty

The Turkish-Israeli relation goes back to the creation of Israel in 1948. The regional isolation of Israel encouraged it to establish diplomatic relations with Turkey (Abadi 1). The Turkey covered its relation with Israeli in afraid of the Arabic countries reaction. Turkey-Israel relations put the Turkish-Arabic political and economic cooperation in danger. However, the motives for continuing this relation were stronger. Turkey built its

relationship with Israel to prevent what was viewed as Soviet expansionism in the Middle East (Arbell 4).

In addition, the cultural transformations during the era of Kemal Ataturk kept Turkey away from the Arab countries and pushed it to the western alignment. The cooperation between the two countries was based on commercial interchange and military collaboration. Furthermore, Turkey-Israel relations expanded to non-security matters. According to Moshe Dayan, the then Minister of Agriculture, Turkey benefited from Israel experience in agriculture (Abadi 2-8).

Yelmaz argues that Turkey was subject to manipulation of US foreign policy by the Jewish lobby. Hence it chose to improve the relation with Israel in order to gain the American support (162-163). As a result of the two countries cooperation, Turkey emerged as significant contributor of Israel in the region which accordingly increased Washington focus on Turkey western orientation (Athanasopoulou 145).

1.5.2 Maintaining the United States Military Bases

United States and Turkey relationship started with the beginning of the Cold War. The American fears of Soviet Union-Turkey rapprochement obliged U.S. to involve Turkey in North Atlantic Pact. Turkey entered the NATO in 1952 to become the only Middle East member (Wallin 9). As response to Washington help in deterring the Soviet threat, Turkey provided U.S. with strategic military bases in the region in order to facilitate the American military transition (Kinacioglu and Gurzel 593). U.S. military bases in Turkey were strategic and significant bases in protecting the Middle East region during the Cold War. United States bases and facilities were established in Turkey as a result of The Military Facilities Agreement in 1954 under NATO's third article. The Turkish-American Logistic Organization in relation to the pentagon is the responsible of controlling these bases (Acikel 25).

Turkey has strategic military installations; there are approximately 15 military bases in 10 different Turkish cities (Istanbul, Izmir, Ankara, Malatya, Diyarbakir, Batman, Kahramanmaras, Konya, Mersin, Ceyhan, and Adana. The military bases in Turkey are control even by NATO or directly by the United States (Acikel 25). The Incirlik Air Base is U.S./NATO facility located in the southern locality of Turkey overlooking the Black sea. Furthermore, the Incirlik Air Base located in Adana city with two runways, 2,500 U.S. military personnel, in addition to 50 B-61 nuclear gravity bombs (Wallin 9).

According to Washington government, Turkey geographical location reinforced it on one hand to gather the military information and on the other hand to perform the military operations. U.S. established Incirlik to be a transit base for heavy and middle bomber aircrafts of American Strategic Air Command (Cassaboom and Leiser 73). Turkey role of preserving peace and stability in the Middle East region was cooperated with The American military forces since the cold war and until the New International Order. The two countries were depended on Incirlik air base which increases its importance in the world affairs (Acikel 22). Washington was the responsible of Incirlik contribution. Therefore, U.S. put approximately 50 nuclear weapons in Incirlik for the American or Turkish use. The air base used in the Middle East crisis such as the Gulf war against Iraq and Afghanistan (Stefanovic 3). Moreover, the American interest in Incirlik grows up after 9/11 attack whereas it used to fight and stop terrorism in the region and the entire free world (Acikel 22).

1.5.1. Resisting Terrorism Groups and Defending Client States.

Turkey and U.S. as NATO members are committed to it principles including encounter Terrorist groups. The cooperation between the two countries are existed from the Cold War mainly in 1970s and 1980s where they were fighting the secular and nationalist terrorist groups around the world. The terrorist groups were supported by same active states

sponsors. However, the counterterrorism organizations efforts of political and economic constrictions led same sponsorship to decrease or stop supporting terrorist. Soviet Union was one of the terrorist sponsors for that reason its collapse led to destruct or neutralize same terrorist groups (national strategy for combating terrorism 7). Turkey geostrategic role of maintaining peace and stability reinforced its intervention in the international peacekeeping operations mainly in the Middle East region. Turkey participated in the Gulf War to protect the Kuwaiti peoples from Iraq military forces in 1991. Also, it contributes in Kosovo crisis in 1999 where the Turkish-American forces cooperated together under NATO command opposite to Serbia (Begum 50).

Turkey was strong condemned of the terrorist attack on United State of America on 9 September, 2001 which it allegedly done by Al-Qaida in Afghanistan. As reaction to this assault, the U.S. president George W. Bush declared a “War on Terror” that it involves the American partners and friends. Accordingly, Ankara commanded the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan (Serdar 2).

1.5.2. Securing Strategic Access to Oil flow and corridors

Oil/gas production consider as one of the main sources of power for same countries in the world. However, Turkey is not one of them since it is not an important oil/gas-producing country (Saltvedt 1). United States interest in Turkey derives from its central location between producers and consumers of both energy resource (oil and gas), which gives it a central geopolitical role in world affairs (Ruchir Shah 1). Turkey is highly important transit country and transport corridor between supply sources such as Russia, the Caspian region, and the Middle East states to Europe and other Atlantic markets (U.S. Energy Information Administration 1). Turkey controls the two important transport routes in the world Bosphorus and Dardanelles straits, which connects the black sea with the Sea of Marmara and Marmara’s sea with the Mediterranean Sea and the Aegean Sea respectively.

Furthermore, the Growing oil exports from Russia and the Caspian region, mainly Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan increases the importance of Turkey's Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline. In addition to, the black sea export routes to Western and Southern Europe (Saltvedt 1). As result, the significant of Turkey's energy supply routes to the world requires Turkey security importance, for the U.S. and European countries. Turkey's key location is reason behind establishing the southern corridor for natural gas passage from multiple sources in order to reduce the dependency on Russian Gas (Zanotti 24). Therefore, the energy sources consumers concentrate on turkey stability due to the fact that Turkey political unrest will jeopardize the oil supplying process throughout the transport corridor (Saltvedt 1). United States interest in Turkey increases because of Turkey's controls of same significant oil/gas transit corridors which consequently increased the Turkish status in the world affairs.

1.6. Conclusion

To conclude, the United States-Turkey relationship was limited due to the geographical location of Turkey in the British sphere of influence area. However, the Soviet Union determination on controlling Turkey's water ways (Bosphorus and Dardanelles) after W.W.II, draws the American attention to the geopolitical importance of Turkey and the Region. Turkey considered the S.U. request of defending and establishing military bases in the Black sea straits as threat to its territorial independence. The inability to defeat the S.U. power disturbed Turkey and forced it to seek the U.S. and the western support. As result, United States of America hold the responsibility of protecting Turkey and the free World from the Soviet Union expansion. Therefore, The American-Turkish bilateral ties developed coincident with the U.S.-S.U. Cold War breaking out. Accordingly, Turkey became a significant recipient of the American aid in order to defeat the communism spread in the Middle East and Mediterranean region. Washington government help

programs to Ankara started with the economic aid from the president Harry. S. Truman on 12 March 1947. Then the acceptance of Turkey's membership in NATO to be the southern flank of the pact. With the end of the Cold War in 1990 and the establishment of the unipolar international system, United States increased its relations with Turkey opposite to what was expected at that time. Turkey became a strategic partnership of America in the Middle East and the whole world. Washington increased Ankara's support to save its interest in the region which includes encouraging the Turkish-Israel cooperation, maintaining the strategic military bases which highly used in encounter terrorism particularly after 9/11 terrorist attack, protecting the clients states, and facilitating the oil flow and securing its corridors to the west. United States and Turkey strategic cooperation strengthened by the secularists regime. Nevertheless, in 2003 Turkey witnessed a domestic change marked with the election of the Justice and development party.

Chapter Two

The Justice and Development Party (AKP) and Erdogan's Leadership

2.1. Introduction

The political system in Turkey has changed over time throughout obtaining the Modernization concept. The Ottoman Empire relied on the modernization in military affairs. Turkish elites adapted the modernization in the political and social scene in connection to westernization. As a result, Turkish elites lead “the Young Turks movement” and declare the war of independence in 1919-1923 against Sultan Abdulhamid. The movement was under several Turkish elites and military staff mainly Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. After the end of the war, Ataturk appointed the first Turkish president of the newly born Republic of Turkey in 1923. Ataturk established the Republican People's Party (RPP) in depend on secularism ideology. The Party Secularists made radical political and social changes based on Anti-Islamism rules. Despite Ataturk's death in 1938 and the political transformation to a multi-party government, secularism was the dominant ideology in Turkey. As a result, secularists made a number of Military coups to bring down the government and banned many parties of the Islamist movement. The new Islamist backgrounds party, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) of Recep Tayyip Erdogan succeed in passing the secularist hatred to the Islamists by his “Conservative Democratic” ideology. The party won the parliamentary election in 2003 immediately after its establishment in 2002. Erdogan implemented a series of political, economic, and mainly social transformation under the excuse of fulfilling the EU accession program. The popularity of the AKP leader Erdogan agenda contributes to the two parliamentary elections of AKP. Moreover, the AKP wins the general election which leads to Erdogan appointment Republican of Turkey President.

2.2. Historical Background of Turkey Political System

Turkey is the successor country of the Ottoman Empire which rose from 1288 to 1923. The Ottoman Empire was based on the caliphate ruling system. However, Turkish people sought out a Modern Nation State of Turkey (Fanani 95). The Modernization process of Turkey started with Salim III (1761-1808) who focus on modernizing the Ottoman's military Forces. Sultan Salim established new troops based on The European training style. Furthermore, Sultan Mahmud II (1808-1839) changed the old Janissaries with an organized and modernized force under the name of the victorious Mohammedan Soldiers (Arslan 132). According to Onulduran (30), the political system modernization was a result of military modernization. As for, Rustow the military reforms led to the cultural transformation (Karpas 313).

In 1808, Sultan Mahmud signed "the Deed of Agreement" with the Council of Notables which reduced Sultan authority (Masters and Gabor 144). Moreover, Sultan Mahmud engaged the European minded Turks elites in the ruling process to create bureaucracy government within the empire. Turkish elite's reorganized the imperial decree under the name of "Tanzimat Rescript" during the Sultan Abdulmejid period (Arslan 132). In 1856 Turkish elites named the young Turks announced Reforms (Islahat) in the Imperial Edict. The young Turks decrees aimed to modernize the Ottoman Empire political and social system even at the expense of the Islamic rules (Kunnath 133).

The Tanzimat period (1839-1876) was the Ottoman Empire preface to a constitutional monarchy transformation. The newly established reforms contributed in the re-structuring process of ruling system. As a result, The Young Turks decided to prepare a constitution includes the main principles of the European political framework. Accordingly, the first constitutional monarchy declared and the first constitution established on 23 December 1876. The constitution written mainly by Medhat Pasha based on 1831 Belgian and 1850 Prussian

constitutions, hereby Turkey entered officially the constitutional political system (Kydyralieva 241).

After establishing the parliament, the Young Turks sought to involve the Turkish citizens in the decision-making process to get their rights through discussing the suggested laws to the Sultan. However, Sultan kept the main governor of the empire and has the power even to dissolve the parliament. In 13 February 1908, Sultan Abdulhamid II in spite of his agreement on establishment of the constitution and Young Ottomans support, he dissolved the parliament and suspends the constitution. According to Abdulhamid, the Young Turks were the European powers hand especially after the territorial losses and military defeats (Masters and Gabor 144).

Abdulhamid II repression following the dissolution of the parliament pushed the Young Turks to burden the responsibility of freeing Turks people from the injustice government. The Young Turk's solution was the system modernization according to their European ideology in depends on patriotism, nationalism, liberalism, and secularism (chapter 5,111). As a result, in 1908 the Young Ottomans revolted against the Sultanate government throughout founding the Committee (Society) of Union and Progress organization) CUP(. Due to his failure in controlling the uprising, Sultan Abdulhamid II declared the beginning of the second constitution period on 23 July 1908 and reopened the parliament. In April 1909 Abdulhamid II deposed and replaced by his brother Mehmed V (Masters and Gabor 144 and Arslan 132-133).

After 1909, the CUP power increased and became the controller of the regime even with the existence of the parliament and the constitution. CUP guided the empire during World War I in favor of the central powers but it capitulated on 13 October 1918 (Masters and Gabor 145). As a member of the CUP, General Mustafa Kemal organized a nationalist army to defeat

Western Anatolia from the Greek power then the whole territory from the great power occupation (Feroz 2).

With the end of W.W.II, the Young Turks complete their resistance movement against the Ottoman dynasty. In 1920 the Ottoman Empire collapsed and proclaimed the birth of the Nation-State of Turkey under Mustafa Kemal leadership (Fanani 107). On 24 July 1923, the Lausanne Treaty or the Peace Conference signed in Switzerland between representatives of New Turkey and the Allied Forces (Encyclopedia Britannica). Kamal Ataturk succeeded in obtaining the international power recognition of the Republican of Turkey territorial independence and peoples sovereignty (Feroz 3).

On 29 October 1923, the parliament announced Turkey's birth under Mustafa kamal Ataturk presidency and Ismet pasha prime minister. Ataturk declares that " [the] Turkish nation is a Republic" in reference to the end of the Ottoman Monarchy system (Arslan 133). On 9 September 1923, Ataturk established the single-party government by forming the Republican Peoples Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi-CHP). The party obtained all the Grand National Assembly (GNA) or parliamentary power that given by the constitution until Ataturk death in 1946 (Ozcan 1).

Kemal Ataturk or "Turks Father" is the founder of the new modern nation-state of Turkey. Ataturk relied on secularization and westernization in his modernization process of the New Republic of Turkey (Sevinc, Hood, and Coleman III 3-4). According to Ataturk, absorbing the "European cultural values and political institutions" is the source of Turkey's development. As a result, Ataturk adopted and forced the European lifestyle and civilian laws. Besides, he kept the strong centralization and bureaucratic elements of the Ottoman Empire with neglecting of Islamic rules. The Republic of Turkey based on the military power domination over the political power (Haynes 5). In response to CHP program implementation, Ataturk declared certain principles well-known as Kemalism or the Six Arrows principles. The

Kemalism principles are Republicanism, Nationalism, Nation, Etatism, Revolutionism, and Secularism (Izmaylov, Fakhrutdinov, and Galimzyanova 1254)

According to Zürcher, republicanism considers as the abandonment tool of the monarchy system. While secularism means the removal of religious rules and principle from the public life and impose the government control over the rested religious institutions, nation or populism means deleting the self (classical) interest in front of the group (whole) interest, Etatism is new concept means the government sovereignty over the economy, revolutionism is the loyalty and the commitment to the Independence revolution basics, and nationalism considered as the religion substitute to build the national identity (182). As a result of Kemal Ataturk's commitment to his ideology principles, he incorporated them within the constitution of 1937 and includes them in all Turkish live aspects. Ataturk implemented many social, political, and economic changes in an attempt to civilize the Turkish community according to western civilization standers. He changed the Arabic alphabet to Latin, banned the traditional and religious customs in public and office places, forbidden the use of Islamic text in the legal issues, caused enclosure of the new political parties anti-secularism in his time (Seker 49-56).

After Ataturk's death on 10 November 1938, the GNA appointed the Prime Minister Ismet Inonu, the Republic of Turkey President (Zurcher 185). The WWII aftermath international changes prompted Turkey-Western bloc consolidation which summoned Turkey democratic transformation. The bureaucratic CH party refused the idea of a free election. Thus, the party prepared an early election in order to make the newly established Democratic Party (DP) of Adnan Menderes lose the election. (Bulut and Yildirim 15). Despite the Republican People's Party will, The Democratic Party won the election of 1950 under the slogan of "Enough: The nation has the word!". Mender's party was more respect to religion and minorities. Besides, Mender's succeed in many foreign policy affairs, whereas, he involved Turkey in the NAT

Organization and received Truman doctrine help from the US. The DP was the Turks hope to restore democracy and Islamism freedom (Akyol 73).

Since the election of the Democratic Party Turkey's political system shift to the multi-party system and the Republic of People's Party authority challenged (Arslan 140). The DP attracted the RPP's attention to the Secularism survival in Turkey due to the party Islamic ideology and anti-secularism tends appearance (Eryilmaz 12-13). On 27 May 1960 under the Republican People's Party guide the Turkish Armed Forces made a military coup against the DP government. The military coup aimed to save Ataturk's Secularist Regime from the DP Islamist and undemocratic affairs. The coup resulted in imprison most of the DP government officers including Menders. The General Cemal Gursel became the head of state and the Prime Minister (Yesilbursa 124).

The military coup constitution of 1961 emphasized more on civilian freedoms and rights which led to Modern Democratic Turkey. The multi-party political system resulted in the foundation of many different ideological parties (Feroz 136). The new parties' deferent ideologies raised the tension about the secularism persistence in Turkey mainly the National Order Party, who guides the Islamists movement (Arslan 136). Consequently, on 12 March 1971, the Senior Generals of Land, Air, Naval forces send a threatening memorandum to the president and the Justice Party government because of their Islamism. Accordingly, the Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel resigned and the new government established under the army auspice (Kucukozygggt 321). The military commanders used the protection of national unity, security, and the army independence as an excuse to stabilize the government under the secularism and the military control (Kutay 10-11).

According to Ahmed Feroz, Turkey was suffering from terrorist politics during 1971 and 1980 period (163). Whereas, the new Prime Minister Nihat Erim managed an arbitrary operation against the people's liberties and freedom and extended to include the state

institutions such as the constitutional court, the press, universities, and all the Turkish intellectual's meeting places to avoid the freedom of expression (Arslan 136). Turkey witnessed the third military coup on 12 September 1980 in response to the Government oppression. The military junta controlled the National Security Council and appointed Kenan Evren its leader (Feroz 214).

As a result, The Turkish military power became the political, economic, and defensive ruler in Turkey (Feroz 214). In that time the army forces suspend the constitution, and dissolve the parliament. They saved the economic and foreign policy program but changed Turk's social environment. The military Junta banned all the political parties and jailed their leaders (Arslan 136). In November 1983, the Junta decided to prepare for general election. The Mother Land Party who mixed the democratic, Islamists, Conservative ideologies under Turgut Ozal leadership won the parliamentary election in 1983 and the presidential election in 1989. Turgut Ozal played a main role in defeating the military engagement in the political affairs (137).

2.3. Recep Tayyip Erdogan Political Career and the Foundation of the Development and Justice Party.

2.3.1. Recep Tayyip Erdogan Earlier Political Career

Recep Tayyip Erdogan starts his political career in 1971 as a president of the Beyoğlu youth, Branch within the Islamist National Salvation Party (NSP) that was formed by Necmettin Erbakan (Baykal 4). Erbakan was one of the Islamist Movement leaders in Turkey during the 1970s and the first who established an official organization represented in the National Order Party (NOP) (Nilufer 38). However, the party desecration of the secularism of Turkey and its replacement with Islamic principles led to the military coup in 1980 which dissolved the party (Demy and Shaw 719).

On July 19, 1983, the Welfare Party (RP-Refah Partisi) formed by Ali Turkmen in the replacement of (NSP) in the political arena. On the contrast, in 1987 the party participates in the general election under Erbakan's leadership (Nilufer 39). On March 27, 1994, the RP won Istanbul and Ankara cities popular voters, as one of the RP members Erdogan's won the local election of 27 March 1994 and appointed the Mayor Istanbul district (Yilmaz And Bashirov 1815).

After all, on 24 December 1995, The RP won the general election and gained the opportunity to form the new government in coalition with the True Path Party (Doğru Yol Partisi, DYP) (Gürel, Küçük and Taş 3). The welfare party became the first Islamic party elected to roll from the establishment of the Turkish Republic (Demy and Shaw 719). Erbakan's Prime Minister activities provoked the Turkish military, especially that is related to the abolishment of the western ideology and the secularism from Turkey. As a result, the military forces agreed in the National Security Council on 28 February 1997 on the necessity of solving RP. Hence, Prime Minister Erbakan was obliged to abdicate and he was abandoned from politics by the constitutional court for the second time (Karataşlı 409).

Accordingly, On December 12, 1997, after dissolving the RP Erdogan read a famous Islamic poem in party demonstration, the poem stated that "the mosques are our barracks, the domes are our helmets, towers are our bayonets, and the believers are our soldiers." Erdogan words considered as an incitement to a religious fragmentation and an attack on the secular system of the Republic of Turkey. Therefore, Erdogan imprisoned for four months from December 1999 to March 2001 and prohibit from entering any political institute (Baykal 4-5).

The abandonment of the RP from politics led its member to establish a new party, the Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi –FP) formed on 17 December 1997 under the leadership of Recai Kutan. The FP was divided into two parts conservative wing of the party under Erbakan's control and reformist wing under Erdogan's control (Nilufer 43). To avoid the opposition of military

secularists the reformist members suggested many reforms in the party agenda to escape the previous parties' fate (Yang and Guo 18). Kutan was highly influenced by Erbakan's ideas hence the traditionalist refuses to adopt the young reformist's thoughts.

The internal disagreement between the traditionalist and the reformists resulted in the resignation of some leading characters. Therefore, the party recruited new sophisticated members to replace them and to dispersal the secularist's view about the party (Yesilada 68). The reformists were predicting the abandonment of the FP because it was clinging to the anti-secular and anti-western principles, thus; on 22 June 2001. The party was barred from political activities (Yang and Guo 6). Accordingly, the reformists and traditionalists split and each group chooses his way to represent his ideology. On one hand, the traditionalist formed the felicity party (Saadet Partisi- SP) under Recai Kutan leadership and Erbakan's guides. On the other hand, the reformists founded the Development and Justice Party under Recep Tayyip Erdogan's leadership and Abdullah Gul (Grigoriadis 23).

2.3.2. The Foundation of the development and Justice party (AKP)

Recep Tayyip Erdogan formed the Development and Justice Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi-AKP) on 14 August 2001 (Gürel, Küçük, Taş 3), Erdogan's was supported in the establishment of the AK party by some of the resigned reformist's members of the Fazilet Party such as Abdullah Gul, Bulent Arinc and Camil Cacak (Yeşilada 69). Despite Erdogan abandonment from leading the party during the election because of his past condemned, On 3 November 2002, the AK party won the national election and obtained the absolute majority in the parliament with 34.5% and most of the seats in the Grand National Assembly (Heper and Toktal 184). Although, Since November 2002 Abdulah Gul served as the caretaker prime minister until the constitution was modified in order to enable Erdogan to lead his party. Thus, on 3 November 2003 Erdogan appointed the prime minister of Turkey after his victory in the by-election in Siirt constituency (Baykal 5). The AK party holds the position of Turkish

Parliament leader for two other consecutive elections 2007 and 2011 with a continuous increase in the percentage of polls 46.5% and 49.9% respectively (Gul 20).

The main reasons for AKP's success are Erdogan's and the party member's previous political experience within the Islamist Parties. Therefore, they firstly highlighted the necessity of the AKP isolation from the Islamic Identity and the Islamic outlook movement in order to avoid the Turkish Constitutional Court and secularist's supporter's opposition (Yang and Guo 19). In another word Erdogan renunciation of Islamism was an excuse to avoid the abandonment because of his Islamist background. As result, Erdogan represent the party as "Conservative Democratic" or "Muslim Democrat" in refers to the "Christian Democrat" in Europe (Dagi 7), Erdogan was aiming to save the Islamic roots in the same time include new modern principles to the party. As Mr. Dengir Mir Mehmet Fırat, one of the AKP spokesmen, in definition to the conservative democratic ideology of the party, stated that:

"[AKP] conservatism [...] does not carry the past into today, yet its roots are established in the past, its face is turned to the future, contemporaneous and novelty seeking in essence, so that it provides for the co-existence of the local and the universal, tradition and modernity, and produces change while preserving continuity and thus seek the objective of opening up to the contemporary world." (Kalaycioglu 8).

In addition to the conservative democratic ideology, Erdogan reached his electorate program with multiple agenda's which attracts various segments of Turkish society (traditionalist, Islamist, pro-European Union, and anti-military liberals) (Danforth 2).

Erdogan obtains the Turk's trust in the party's ability to rule the parliament by many steps. Erdogan's adaptation of the conservative democratic ideology was an assertion of the party .openness on secularism which attracted the secularist's supporters. Also, Erdogan invites many important political figures to the AKP from True Path Party and Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi-ANAP) this helped in attaining the other parties supporters (Bulut and

Yildirim 24). Moreover, the party leader and members gained the Islamists supporters bolster because of their previous political career within the RP where most of them were officials and mayors in Istanbul and Ankara states (Gürel et al 3).

According to Erdogan the first step to moderate Turkey was its involvement in the European Union (EU), thus the AKP promised Turkish people that the main party goal after its victory will be the EU accession demand (Dagi 5). Because of the economic crisis during 2001 the party members agreed on the adoption of the neo-liberal policy source. Furthermore, Erdogan and AKP members were highly supporters of women's and Turkish minorities' rights as part of their party democracy bases which raised the party supporters in the election. source

The AKP leader and member's commitment to their promises to moderate and progress Turkey contributed to their popularity among the Turkish peoples as faithful Politian. The economic, political, and social development changes played a key role in the party success in the 2014 and 2018 presidential election where Recep Tayyip Erdogan appointed Republic of Turkey president.

2.4. The Justice and Development Party Transformation of Turkey under Recep Tayyip Erdogan leadership.

In the aftermath of the AKP election in 2002, Turkey was facing one of its major economic crises from the W.W.II. because of the weak economic decisions of the previous coalition government (Öztürk 3). As Erdogan appointed a Prime Minister, he started his electorate program implementation in correspondence with Copenhagen Criteria (Eralp, Göksel, and Lindgaard 3). According to Paulina Rezler (390-411), the Copenhagen Criteria are a set of economic, political, and social conditions that countries should require to be included in the European Union (EU). Throughout this step Erdogan aims to gain two goals. On one hand, he solves Turkey's economic crises and its burdens on politics and society. On one hand, he facilitates and accelerates its European Union accession. AKP led Turkey's democratization

transformations process which some Turkish elites call it a westernization or Europeanization process since it based on the EU political, social and economic principles (Eralp 5-6). In this context, Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul declares that "...[the AKP]... fundamental objective is to transform Turkey into a fully functioning European democracy." (Cinar 481). The development and Justice party managed a historical achievement in Turkey politics by persuading the EU governors to start Truly Turkey-EU membership negotiations on October 3, 2005 (Yeşilada 3). AKP negotiation of Turkey-EU membership raised the government legitimacy and limited the military power and secularist's elite's doubts about the Islamic origin of the party (Grigoriadis 28).

Turkish economic crisis was AKP's opportunity to implement economic recovery reforms, firstly by creating a new economic institution, and passing new economic restrictive laws based on the EU characteristics (Özel 3). Secondly, AKP invited Kemal Derviş the previous coalition government economic minister and the World Bank professional economist to benefit from his experience (Onis 418). Dervis established a program for economy restoration named "Transition Program to a Strong Economy" which reforming the banking system, reducing inflation and keeping the budget stabilized during the huge exchange of economic repair process (Bredenkamp, Josefsson, and Lindgren 3). Whereas, Dervis relied on the International Monetary Funds (IMF) auspices in his reform plan (Onis 419). According to the EU and IMF instruction, the AKP committed to the neoliberal economic agendas in order to integrate Turkey into the global economic system (Patton 516). The neo-liberalism offered a free-market economic policy that involves free trade, privatization, price deregulation, reduced size of government, and flexible labors markets policies. Turkey adopted the Neo-liberalism policy to reduce budget deficits because of the economic crisis (Pettinger 1). The AKP rules led to reform in the Banking and finance sectors, social security, and tax systems in addition to the AKP launch of a new Lira in 2005 (A.A 249). Despite Turkey's western

orientation, the economic crisis pushes the AKP to developed economic relations with Middle East countries, hence their trade cooperation reached 65 billion dollars in 2012 (Karacasulu 34).

As a result of the AKP economic performance, Turkey Gross Domestic Product (GDP) raised from \$238 billion in 2002 to \$864 billion, whereas the per capita income increase from \$3,660 in 2002 to \$10,862 in 2016 (Yildirim 4). The economic crisis of 2001 affected Turkey's social environment and left approximately 44% of the Turkish people were poverty in 2002. Nevertheless, the AKP economic regulation and GDP growth contributes to Turk's financial condition improvement and decrease poverty percentage to 22% in 2011 (Genckya, Togan, Schulz, and Karadag 14). Also, the unemployment rate stood at 9.8% during 2014 (3). Moreover, the spending on the health care sector increased from 4.9% in 2000 to 5.4% in 2012 with an increasing number of doctors and nurses which led to raising the life expectancy in Turkey (16).

The AKP's desire for EU accession derives Erdogan to concentrate on the fulfillment of the EU membership conditions mainly democracy and human rights improvement (Dagi 13). The AKP and its leader Erdogan led the Demilitarization of Turkish politics in an attempt to reduce Kemalist military hegemony and replace it with more flexible democratic political system in order to satisfy EU members of Turkey-EU true integration willingness (Caman 6). In August 2004, Erdogan made a basic military change by transforming the National Security Council to an advisory institution. The Council was headed by civilians and the old general's power decreased to be political decision-makers (Yeşilada 23).

As most of the world countries, the Republic of Turkey society includes a number of Religious, Ethnic and Linguistic Minorities. Turkey's government made a huge effort to absorb the Turkish minorities' problem. Thus, it is participating in many Human Rights and Minorities Protection Organization such as Protection of National Minorities, Organization

for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. As a result, Turkey is committed to these organizations' frameworks and obliged to respect and protect minorities' rights (Karimova and Deverell 6). Turkish minority status was regulated by the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923 in the aftermath of Turkey's independence and under the League of Nation pledge. Lausanne Treaty ensures the Non-Muslim minorities' rights to use their native language, establishing religious, political, and educational institutions. However, it neglected the religious and ethnic Muslim minorities. (Toktas and Aras 699-700).

Kurds are the major ethnic Muslim minority in Turkey after the Turks with nearly 20% of the total population (Karimova and Deverell 13). Turkish Kurds were repressed by the Turkish Republic regime. Accordingly, as the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDPI) in Iran and Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) in Iraq, Turkish Kurds formed The Kurdistan Workers Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê- PKK) in 1978 to be their official representative under Abdullah Öcalan leadership (Jongerden and Akkaya 1-3)

However, the constitutional amendment and EU harmonization process of the AKP made Erdogan follow a conciliatory approach to face the Kurdish national movement in Turkey (Derisiotis 55). Whereas, Erdogan released a number of PKK imprison leaders such as Leyla Zana. In addition, he accepted the Kurdish broadcasting channels (Dagi 11). Erdogan said that “Bringing ... [minority] differences to a political level will be the biggest damage one can make to this country [Turkey].”(Cinar 483). Erdogan attempt to aware the Turkish people about the union community's importance and disadvantages of ethnic minorities racism. Furthermore, a response to the EU insistence on Turkish minorities' cultural rights improvement, Erdogan made reforms in the educational textbooks to fit the non-muslims minorities. Also, he allows learning the minority dialects in language private schools (Toktas and Aras 707)

From the first beginning of the Turkish Republic establishment by Kemal Ataturk, he uses to adopt Women's rights. Women were able to vote and to participate in the political scene by holding a position in the parliament (Arslan 133-134). Kemal's wife Latifa Hanem considered as a representation of headscarf legitimate in Turkey. However, the development of the secularist regime throughout the military coup led to more restrictive rules towards the headscarf issue mainly of 1997. Muslim women plundered completely their rights to wear a headscarf in universities and official places. As a result, many women chose to complete their education outside the country including Erdogan's daughters (Topark and Uslu 46-47). The headscarf problem arose with the election of the AK party knowing that most of the party member's wives wear the headscarf including Erdogan's wife (Saktanber and Corbacioglu 520). Erdogan and his AK party solve the headscarf problem throughout a by-election in 2013, the AKP members agreed on removing the ban on wearing the headscarf in a public institution unless in security corps (military, judiciary, and police force) (Akoglu 278). Erdogan said that " [the] dark time eventually comes to an end," and he adds that "Headscarf-wearing women are full members of the republic, as well as those who do not wear it." In another word, according to Erdogan non-veiled and veiled Turkish women are equal thus the government should provide the veiled women their religious rights to wear the scarf. Moreover, it is a step to accelerate Turkey-EU accession since they fulfill the religious women's minority rights (Roff 1).

2.5. Conclusion

To conclude, the Modernization and Westernization process transformed the hereditary Ottoman Empire into the nation-state of the Republican of Turkey. The Young Turks under Kemal Ataturk's leadership established the secularist regime based on Kemalism principles and strong military forces. The Secularist regime challenged all the Anti-secular and Islamist

parties by consecutive military coups in 1960-1970-1980. The constitutional court banned many Islamist parties of the National Islamist outlook under Erbakan's leadership.

However, the Justice and Development Party under Erdogan's leadership succeeds in holding power by defining his party as "Conservative Democratic". Erdogan leads political democratization, social improvement and economic stabilization transformation to establish a "New Turkey". The AKP programs are based on the Copenhagen Criteria to fulfill the Turkey-EU accession. According to Turkey's internal transformation programs, Turkey holds a new position and recognition in the World's Affairs. As a result, Erdogan's government reorganized the Turkish international political relationship with Western and Eastern countries in order to fit the New Turkey national, international, and the Justice and Development Party Ideology interest.

Chapter Three

American-Turkish Political Relationship during Erdogan Tenure

3.1. Introduction.

The election of Recep Tayyip Erdogan Justice and Development Party (AKP) in 2003 led to many internal as well as external changes. The Islamic roots of the AKP affected the new government's standpoint towards regional and international affairs. Therefore, Erdogan's party transforms Turkey's foreign policy to seek government new interests. As a result, Turkey-United State bilateral relations witnessed new alterations regarding world issues. The third chapter will study a number of conflicted cases with Turkey-U.S. interest from 2003 until 2019: firstly, the AKP parliament rejection of the American use of Turkish land to invade Iraq. Secondly, the impact of the rising tension between Ankara and Tel Aviv about Israel war against Gaza on Turkey-American bilateral relations, Thirdly, Washington disapproval of the Turkish purchase of the Russian S400 missile. Fourthly, the Turkish-Iranian development ties and the U.S. point of view. Fifthly, the Turkish government's arrestment of American citizens provoked the U.S. officials and Erdogan suggested swap between two clerics, Fethullah Gulen and Andrew Brunson. Sixthly, the open Syrian Crisis and the Kurdish threats of Turkey territory, the refugees problems and the disagreement on the establishment of the "Safe Zone" in northeast Syria.

3.2. The American invasion of Iraq in 2003

As a strategic partnership and neighbor country to Iraq, the United States sought to obtain Turkey's full cooperation in the war against President Saddam Hussein's regime. Turkish previous Prime Minister Bulent Evecit attempted to avoid the war by asking the U.S. for serious reasons to the war, at the same time he contacted Iraq's president to persuade him to change his policies (Altunişik 185). President George W. Bush administration justify the war

against Baghdad by Saddam's program of mass distraction weapons threats to world peace, especially after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. However, Washington's real purpose was destroying Iraq's rising power and re-contains the strategic importance of the Middle East region before Saddam (Hinnebusch 9-11).

Washington requested Ankara's permission for a list of requirements to invade Iraq including the use of airbases near to Istanbul and the Black Sea, 14 (military and civilian) airports, 5 seaports, in addition to the deployment of approximately 90,000 troops in the way to Iraq (Karen 70). Altunışik and Karen agreed that the American huge questions shocked the Turkish government, and increased Turkey's fears about the U.S. desire to invade another Middle East country such as Syria or Iran (187) (72). The expert in American-Turkish relations Soli Ozal, stated that U.S. promised Turkey to found 20 kilometers safe zone in northern Iraq to protect Turkey's Southern borders and prevent the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) forces from capturing Kirkuk. In addition to financial help worth \$6 billion from Ankara's economic crisis. Also, the U.S. permitted the entrance of 50,000 Turkish troops to Iraq northern front; however, 30,000 of them would be under the American rule (70).

The U.S. continued its effort to convince Turkey even after the election of a new government in November 2002 led by the Justice and Development party where Abdullah Gul served as its first Prime Minister, by sending Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Defense Secretary, to negotiate with Turkey's cooperation necessity in the war (Karen 73). Turkey was divided about Iraq war participation decision between stand beside their strong ally (U.S.A), or preserve the Arab countries relations. On the one hand, the Turkish President and parliament asked for UN resolution to participate in the war. On the other hand, Turkish officials in foreign and military affairs were seemingly with the U.S to minimize the negative effect of the war on southern borders as well as be present in the scene after the war ended (Altunışik 185). On 23 January 2003, The AKP government organized a diplomatic meeting called "the

meeting of Iraq's neighboring countries" in aim to prevent the war or secure the "red lines" of Turkey's territorial integrity (Sonmez and Kurban 18-19). Turkey separated U.S. demands in two motions, firstly the arrival of proposed military modernization groups and secondly the deployment of American troops in a way to Iraq, presented to the parliament for approval. The first motion approved by the parliament whereas the second kept on hold (Karen 73).

Migdalovitz clarify Turkey's position from the American invasion of Iraq by its fears of repeating the first Gulf War days experience, where Turkey witnessed a significant decline in the economic power reached \$100 billion because of the imposed sanction on Iraq trade (4). Moreover, the Turkish Tourism industry lost approximately \$1 billion and 10.5 million tourists because of Turkey's instability fears during the war (Yaya 22). Furthermore, The Turkish government declares that the first Gulf War power vacuum resulted in the foundation of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in northern Iraq (Karen 71). Sonmez and Kurban see that Turkey was worried about the American dependency on KRG in defeating Saddam's regime, which will encourage the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) terrorist group to claim for their independent Kurdish State in southern Turkey through receiving help from the Iraqi Kurds (19). At the same time participation in the Iraqi war considered a threat to the Turkish-EU membership plan (Altunisik 188).

As a result of the previously expected negative impact on Turkey. On 1 March 2003, the parliament refuses to authorize the U.S. forces to pass through Turkish soil into Iraq (Sonmez and Kurban 19). According to Larrabee, Washington was trusting on her NATO partner to accept her request. Thus, the unexpected vote result disappointed U.S. administration. The Iraq war demonstrated the limits of U.S.-Turkish relations from its first days especially when it comes to national sovereignty (12-13). The Turkish parliament's refusal of U.S. cooperation in the war against neighbor Muslim country (Iraq) raised the tension between Ankara and Washington, whereas it followed with Al-Suleymaniyah incident on 4 July 2003. The U.S.

forces arrested a group of Turkish Special Forces officers in Al-Suleymaniyah city in northern Iraq based on intelligence tips accusing them of Kirkuk mayor killing attempt. Turkey considered the incident as an insult to her military and international status. Despite the release of the Turkish officers but their humanitarian scene caused massive anger in the Turkish streets and muddied the American-Turkish relations (Larrabee 14). The Middle East Affairs Specialist Zanotti declares that Turkey's position towards the American invasion of Iraq denoted Washington that the historical political and military bilateral relation does not affect the newly elected government (5).

3.3. Palestine and Israel conflict

For decades Turkish-Israeli relationship was marked by its stability in contrast to the other Middle East countries. As their mutual partner, the U.S. tried to strengthen the Turkey-Israel relationship to promote its existence in the Middle East (Arbell, 4). However, Erdogan's Justice and Development Party's new policy of "Zero Problems with neighbors" caused Turkey–Middle East region countries relations enhancement. Otherwise, it led to deteriorations in the Ankara-Tel Aviv relation which has strained the Turkish-American concerning future security cooperation in the region (Zanotti 6).

Binyamin Netanyahu, Israeli Prime Minister, accused Erdogan of being the source of Ankara and Tel Aviv tension, because of his disagreement with Israel's policy towards Palestine. Erdogan's support of Palestine reached the extent of accusing Israel as "Terror State" after its war crimes against Gaza in December 2008 – January 2009 (Larrabee 43). Furthermore, Erdogan's withdrawal from the World Economic Forum in Davos on 29th January 2009 due to his prevention from replying to Israeli President Shimon Peres's statement about "Israel legitimacy of self-defense against Hamas terrorism" (Alsaftawi 191). Netanyahu replied on Erdogan's accusation with terrorism that his support of Hamas made him a terrorist also, and advice him to "not preach morality to us" (@netanyahu).

Furthermore, the AKP government canceled Israel's air forces participating in the international exercises "Anatolian Eagle" as a result of Israel refusing to allow Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu to travel through Jerusalem to meet Gaza's officials (Inbar 43-44). On the other hand, the broadcasting of the Anti-Israel drama during Erdogan's ruling period mainly "the Valley of the Wolves" in 2006 which shows the Israelis defense forces as un-humanitarian and child killers infuriated Israelis and raised the tension between Ankara and Tel Aviv (Smets, Mutlu, and Winkel 31). In reaction to Turkish drama, Israel Deputy Foreign Minister Daniel Ayalon summoned the Turkish ambassador in Tel Aviv Ahmet Oğuz Celikkol, where he referred to the press in Hebrew that "The main thing is that you see that he is seated low and that we are high . . . that there is one flag on the table (the Israeli flag) and that we are not smiling" (Efron 9). The low chairs incident was aiming to insult the Turkish ambassador, which led to a huge displeasing of the Turkish officials and people. Turkish administration threatened Israel to fix the matter or it will invite the ambassador, thus Ayalon gave his apology quickly and declare that "it was a personal mistake". In reality, Israel apology was AKP government political success (Alsaftawi 198)

In spite of the chair incident's negative effects, Israel put its relationship with Turkey in another crisis by attacking Mavi Marmara flotilla on 30 May 2010 which belongs to the Turkish humanitarian aid organization. The attacks resulted in the death of 9 Turks and one Turkish-American citizen (görgülü and gündoğar 2). United Nations prepared its investigation on the incident and submitted a report absolves Israel which led Erdogan to charge the UN of concealing Israel's faults and Israel of being "the spoilt boy of the UN" (Alsaftawi 200). Mavi Marmara incident led Ankara to end all the political relations with Tel Aviv (Olson 7).

Due to Turkey's strategic importance for the U.S, President Barak Obama pressured Israel's administration to apologize from Erdogan's to solve the misunderstanding. As a result in March 2013 Netanyahu officially apologies from Erdogan about the Mavi Marmara

incident. In fact, one of National Security Council officials declares that “Obama’s Administration strongly pressured us to apologize and for three years we did not know what to say because we didn’t want to apologize. It’s not smart to apologize to someone like Erdoğan” (Efron 11). To explain more, the Turkish-Israel harmony relationship does not concern Israel, however, the Turkish-Israel tension deteriorates the U.S. plans in the Region, thus Washington hastened the conciliation of Ankara-Tel Aviv bilateral ties and force Israel to apology.

In May 2018, Turkey expelled Israeli ambassador from Turkey after Israel defense forces killing dozens of Palestine’s and received her consul from Jerusalem. Trump administration replaced the U.S. embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem after admitting it as Israel’s capital in 2017 as he challenging Turkey or President Erdogan himself (Efron 1).

3.4. Turkey Iran relations and U.S. position

Imposing economic sanctions is U.S. main foreign policy towards her enemies including Iran (Tanter and O’Sullivan para1). The American- Iranian tension starts with Islamic revolution in 1979 where Washington accused Teheran by supporting the terrorist militants in the Middle East. Also, the progress of the Iranian’s nuclear program increases the U.S. imposed economic sanctions (Katzman, McInnis, and Thomas 1). In spite of the American-Iranian tensions, Turkish-Iranian relations marked noticeable improvement after the AK party come to power (Larrabee and Nader 2). In 2010, Turkey voted against the United Nations National Council suggested additional sanctions on Iran (Security Council para 2). Babali states that Turkey’s vote in favor of Iran and against its western allies has a negative effect on Turkey’s EU membership (9). Furthermore, Larrabee and Nader agree that Turkey’s bilateral ties with Iran base on Turkey’s need of Iranian gas, and especially Turkish fears of Iranian support for PKK. Thus Turkey is seeking to keep harmony relations with Iran even if it sometimes challenges the American wish (viii). Otherwise, Erdogan declares that Turkish-

Iranian relation is “necessity of bilateral relations” (Migdalovitz 18). For instance, Erdogan says to the British newspaper *the Guardian* that “There is no doubt... [that Ahmadinejad] is our friend..., so far we have good relations and have no difficulty at all.” (para 3). According to The professor in the international relation Sinkaya, Turkish-Iranian relation declined due to their disagreement on regional issues after the Arab Spring movement in 2011, however; the Iranian support for Erdogan after the failed military coup in 2016 contributes in restoring the Turkish-Iranian diplomatic, security, and economic relations (19). Moreover, Erdogan named Iran as “neighbor and strategic partner”, and during his meeting with Iranian President Rouhani in December 2018, Erdrogon adds that “Iran’s and Turkey’s security and stability are one” (28). As a result of the U.S. Withdrawal from the Iranian nuclear program in 2018, Trump imposed new sanctions on Iran which the Turkish administration declares that they refuse it (Trump’s sanctions on Iran para 2).

3.5. Ankara and Washington between Andrew Brunson and Fethulah Gulen

On 15 July 2016, Turkey witnessed a military coup attempt against the President-elected Recep Tayyip Erdogan the leader of the Justice and Development Party (Aslan 5). Erdogan publicly accused his friend-turned-enemy Fethullah Gulen of goading his Hizmet movement supporters officers to lead the failed military coup attempt (Tas 5). However, Gulen denied any personal relation with the failed coup but he added “could not rule out” his adherents participation (Zanotti 3). Furthermore, the recently American disagreement with Erdogan led to many suspensions of a U.S. involvement in the Coup plan which harshly rejected by the Secretary of State John Kerry (Zanotti 2). Erdogan said that” ... [the coup] is a gift from God ... to cleanse ... [the] army” (Schanser 3), whereat; the Turkish Government carried out purge operation conduce in arresting dozens of military officers, politicians, teachers, Businessmen, and all who are suspected to be related to the Gulenists Movement (Sullivan 24). In Fact, the coup resulted in the public and political mobilization for the AK Party to

protect the democracy. Also, it contributed to the internal and external policy alterations including the convergent of Turkey and Russia (Turkey since the failed July 2016 coup 1).

The Turkish government detentions raised the U.S. and some EU countries rage and considered it as “hostage diplomacy” because it includes a number of their employees and citizens there (Erdemir and Edelman 7). Among the U.S. citizens detained was Pastor Andrew Brunson, who resides in Turkey and working in Izmir Resurrection Church for more than 20 years (Americans Arrested in Turkey 4). Despite Brunson's refusal Izmir court convicted him with belonging to a terrorist group and “Christianization activities” (Turkey 2018 Human Rights Report 15). Due to the Turkish refusal of releasing Pastor Brunson, Trump administration imposed sanctions on Turkey which raised the disputes between both countries. Trump condemned the Turkish government by twitting that “United State will impose large sanctions in Turkey for their long time detainment of Pastor Andrew Brunson, a great Christian, family man and wonderful human being he is suffering greatly. This innocent man of faith should be released immediately”(@realDonaldTrump).

Brunson’s incident raised the disputes between Washington and Ankara, where Trump administration imposed sanctions on Turkey trade due to its refusal of releasing the Pastor Brunson (Goldman and Gradiner para1-4). Erdogan seized the opportunity of detaining Pastor Brunson in Turkey and Fethullah Gulen's residence in the U.S. and suggested swapping between them (Hoffman, Makovsky, and Werz 7). Turkey’s government was already requested the U.S. to arrest Fethullah Gulen or extradite him to the Turkish government, however; John Kerry State Secretary asked for legal evidence to the American judiciary (Saul para6-7). The congressional Senator Lankford stated that Erdogan deal is refused and “should not be taken seriously,” (Erdemir and Edelman 22). Erdogan’s attempts to capture Fethullah Gulen throughout Brunson failed and Andrew Brunson released on 12 October 2018. In reality, the court convicted Brunson with three years and 1 month and 15 days; however,

since Brunson served his sentence in detention he released directly and backed to United State (Andrew Brunson 5).

3.6. Turkey and Russian S400 military Weapon

Turkey is the second-largest military power after U.S. and strategic North Atlantic Treaty Organization southern flank member. As a member of NATO, Turkey is committed to the organization's foundation rules and mutual defensive systems (Department of Defense 1). However, on 25 July 2017, President Erdogan's signed an agreement with Russia to purchase its S-400 surface-to-air missile system (Keşvelioğlu, Oğuz, Akca, and Türkcan 7). According to the Turkish government, the acquisition of S-400 aircraft is an attempt to reduce the Russian threat after its involvement in the Syrian proxy war (Tol and Goren 1).

Nevertheless, the U.S. was worried about developing the Turkish-Russian relationship, especially after Putin supported Erdogan against the failed military coup in 2016 (Yegin 3). As a result, Washington has threatened to impose several sanctions on Turkey if it purchases the s-400 that could lead to its expulsion from NATO (Stefanovic 1). In response to Washington's threats, Turkey Foreign Minister, Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu declared that Turkey has the freedom to obtain any necessary defense system without any permission (Keşvelioğlu et. al 7). U.S. informed Turkey about its concerns about possible Russian radars spying on the American Joint Strike Fighter Program F-35 (Yegin 3). Moreover, Washington has tried to make an alternative deal by selling Ankara \$3.5-billion Raytheon Co Patriot missile instead of buying the Russian S-400 (US State Department para 3).

However, Erdogan neglected the Washington proposal and stated that the s-400 purchase is "done deal" (Sitki 81). Consequently, the congress increased his pressure on Turkey by introducing the CAATSA (Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act) Sanctions which aims to stop Ankara's government contribution in upgrading the F-35 program If it buys the S-400. The CAATSA Sanction Act would negatively influence Turkey

economy in addition to the region security (Yegin 4). According to Erdogan “Turkey has already invested \$1.25 billion in the F-35 program” therefore “if the US goes the other way, we will apply to international arbitration and request the refund for our payments” (Keşvelioğlu et. al 15).

On 12 July 2019, Turkey received the first batch S-400 missiles from Moscow’s (Keşvelioğlu et. al 6). Thus, Washington starts its threats implementation by pending the training of Turkish pilots as the first step to terminate Turkey's participation in the F-35 program (14). Defense Industries president, Ismail Demir reminded Washington’s government that the removal of Ankara from the F-35 program will add heavy financial burdens on the other participator in the program may be reached to \$7-8 million per jet (15).

The Russian S-400 missiles create a conflict of interest between Turkey and the United State, for Turkey obtaining the S-400 contributes to its regional stability protection and the enhancement of the Turkish-Russian relationship to reduce the Russian risks. Whereas, U.S. considers the purchase process a serious threat to NATO security and a Turkish betrayal to its western belonging.

3.7. Syrian Crisis

The Syrian crisis started in 2011 as a peaceful protest against President Bashar Al Assad’s regime. However, the conflict transformed to be a civil war between the government and different Syrian internal groups. The warring parties in Syria used external forces to obtain military support and political recognition. As a result, Syria turned to a battleground of global powers who seek to protect their interest in the region (Sajid and Nazmul 107).

According to Yeşiltaş, The mutual Turkish southern borders with northern Syria threatens Ankara’s stability, thus Erdogan’s government abandoned “the Zero problems with neighbors” foreign policy and entered the war to protect the integrity of the Turkish borders (9). Abramowitz and Edelman justify Ankara’s intervention in Syria mainly by her concerned

from the rising power of the Syrian Kurds, which are affiliated to the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) in Turkey (7). The PKK considers terrorist groups for Turkey and U.S.; also it threatens the Turkish territorial as well as national unity (Aytekin Introduction).

Erdogan's government started its policy towards the Syrian crisis by suggesting several political reforms for President Bashar Al Assad to allay the Syrians wrath. However, Assad refuses and due to his arbitrary treatment of the protesters' people, AKP forced to enter Syria and support the opposition, the Syrian National Council with the Free Syrian Army to end Assad's regime (Rahmouni 33). While Washington chose to support The Democratic Union Party (Partiya Yekitiya Demokrat; PYD) with its military section, the People's Defense Units (Yekineyen Parastina Gel; YPG), the PYD is dominated Kurdish party in Syria and affiliated with the PKK ideology (Clawson preface).

The contradiction standpoint of the U.S. and Turkey about the war in Syria led to serious conflicts between them (Aziz 6). D'Alema announced that U.S. concern in supporting the PYD and YPG is only to fight the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) (8). To put it in another way, U.S. participation in the war was defeating the ISIS and not helping the PYD in their war against the Baath's regime. Nevertheless, the Turkish administration and people considered the U.S.-PYD coalition as a betrayal to their old partnership (McCowan 12). Erdogan expressed his disappointment from the American administration and tweets that "we are waging a fight against the terrorist organizations, which the world cannot dare, [but] instead of supporting us, they [in reference to the U.S.] stand against us with the rhetoric and requests of terrorist organizations." (@RTErdogan). In other words, Erdogan was blaming the U.S. for supporting the PYD instead of Turkey which fight the PKK terrorist and the Syrian type PYD. According to Nikita Daniuk, Washington also disturbed from Erdogan because of his ignorance of Washington's point of view in Turkey's foreign affairs and Erdogan's desire to create Turkish hegemony in the region especially in Syria after the war (Szénási 2).

Since July 2012, the Democratic Union Party creates an autonomous government in northern Syria with three cantons Kobane, Afrin, and Amuda named “Rojava” (Moberg 21). Until 2016 and due to the American reinforcement, the YPD/YPG succeed in defeating the ISIS and freeing Raqqa (the ISIS capital) and a number of northern cities such as Tal Abyad, al-Shadadi, and Manbij near to the Turkish borders to come under their control (Pollock 3). As a result, Turkey's military forces passed the Syrian northern borders in August 2016 to push the Kurds back (6). The European countries criticize Turkey’s military operations in Syria and described it as an occupation. Thus, Erdogan declares that “[Ankara] will open gates for 3.6 million refugees” if the European countries kept criticizing Turkey (Kirişci 18). In fact, the refugees’ movement fatigues the political, social, and economic aspects of Turkey due to Erdogan’s “Open Door” policy towards Syrian refugees (Esen and Binatli 1).

Consequently, Recep Tayyip Erdogan suggested a “Safe Zone” in the northeast of Syria. According to Erdogan the “Safe Zone” will provide a shelter for the 2 million displaced Syrian people in Turkey, at the same time it will reduce the PYG forces' threat by pushing them back from the southern borders of Turkey (Zahir Al Jazeera). the “Safe Zone” of Erdogan located in the Turkish-Syrian tape with approximately 30-40 kilometers deep and 460 kilometers long (al Jazeera). On 9 October 2019, The AKP government declares the beginning “peace Spring Operation” to establish “the Safe Zone” which followed the American troops’ withdrawal from Syria leaving Kurds Facing Turkey (Szénási 2). Accordingly, Trump announced that ”After defeating 100% of the ISIS caliphate, I largely moved our Troops out of Syria, Let Syria and Assad protect Kurds and fight Turkey for their own land. I said to my Generals why should we be fighting for Syria...”(@realDonaldTrump) Then, Trump posted a number of threats on Twitter to Turkey government whereas he stated that “As I have stated strongly before. And just to reiterate, if Turkey does anything I, in my great thing unmatched wisdom, consider to be off-limits, I will totally destroy and obliterate

the economy of turkey (I've done before!). They must, with Europe and others, watch over..." (@realDonaldTrump).

Although, Turkey Vice President Fouad Oktay replies that "Our message to the international community is clear. Turkey is not a country moved by threats" in an expression of the process continuation. (De Young and Fahim 4). In reality, the Syrian proxy war caused several problems to Ankara-Washington which breaks down their partnership trust and it did not end yet thus we cannot expect what is coming on Turkish-American relations.

3.8. Conclusion.

As a conclusion, the Turkish domestic change marked with the election of the Justice and Development Party under Recep Tayyip Erdogan leadership in 2003. The AKP government relied on new Foreign policy towards the recent international developments. In fact, Erdogan's adopted new interests mainly in the Middle East region which challenged with its historical ally United State interest. Washington and Ankara conflict of interest resulted in the un-pretended tensions between both countries during the AKP ruling period (2003-2019). The Turkish-American disagreement started with the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, where for the first time U.S. shocked by its NATO partner refusal of cooperation. The AKP 1 March parliamentary vote resulted in disapproving Turkey's participation in invading Muslim neighbor country such Iraq. Secondly, the AKP Islamic roots increased Erdogan's empathy to Palestine issue. Erdogan directly condemned the Israel terrorism war against Gaza and named it "a Terror State". The tensions between Ankara and Tel Aviv reached the extent of cancelling the diplomatic relations and recalling both of their ambassadors, which passively affected U.S.-Turkey relationship especially with Washington support of Israel. Thirdly, the AKP government policy of "Zero Problems with neighbors" and Turkey economic crisis pushed Erdogan to develop friendly relations with Iran, whereat; Turkey defied U.S. by rejecting its sanction policy on Iran nuclear program. Fourthly, Turkey purchase of Russian S-

400 missiles led to high disputes within NATO members, mainly U.S. which imposed number of sanctions as well as expelled Turkey from F-35 aircrafts program. Fifthly, Erdogan “hostage diplomacy” in the aftermath of the failed military coup attempt in 2016, highly by U.S. especially after the government detention of the American Pastor Andrew Brunson. Sixthly, the ongoing Syrian Crisis which bear down the bilateral ties of Turkey and Washington with many problems. Turkey felt betrayal after U.S. support of the YPG and threatening Turkey southern territorial sovereignty. Also, President Trump and Erdogan disagreement on “the Safe Zone” Suggested plan in northeast Syria is still caring out.

General Conclusion

As conclusion, The United States relationship with the Ottoman Empire was limited because of its belonging to the British sphere of influence. In 1923, the young Turks under Mustafa Kemal Ataturk leadership declared the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the establishment of the Republican of Turkey. Ataturk made a fundamental change in the Turkish political system by cancelling the hereditary Islamists regime. The New Nation State leaders sought to modernize Turkey by adopting secularization and westernization ideology. The modernization process of Turkey touched the political, social, economic and constitution laws aspects. The Secularists leaders took a neutral position towards the Second World War against Germany, despite of their western belonging aim.

The Soviet Union expansion desire after WWII led to numerous alterations in the international relations. Soviets requested form Turkey a mutual control the Dardanelle and the Bosphorus straits. SU aimed to gain access to spread the communism to the Middle East region. The Turkish government considered the Soviets demand as menace to the Turkish territorial independence and integrity. The Soviet threats pushed Turkey to ask for the American support. According to the Turkish leaders point of view the U.S. is the only equal power to the SU. The Soviets requirement attracted the U.S. administration attention to the geopolitical importance of Turkey and the Middle East. Additionally, U.S. confirmed from the SU desire of controlling the World. Thus, The United State took the decision to help Turkey in defeating the Soviet Union which caused the Cold War.

The American-Turkish relationship developed as a result of the U.S. Cold War containment policy. The Cold War period (1945-1989) marked with strategic alliance between the American and the Turkish administrations. On the one hand, The President Turkey received a financial aid from the president Harry Truman in 1947. In addition, the Turkish military power strengthened by joining the NATO in 1952. On the other hand,

Turkey protected the American interest in the region including, the breaking down of Israel isolation, the maintenance of the mutual military bases, supporting the American client states, and facilitating the oil/gas flow to the west.

In order to preserve the westernization and the American strategic alliance of Turkey, The Turkish military secularists overthrow number of Islamic governments (1960, 1970, and 1980). The Turkish constitutional court banned many parties of Erbakan's Islamist movement. Despite of the suspicions of the American-Turkish relationship end after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989, Turkey restored the American interest by its participation with U.S. in the Gulf War against Iraq in 1991. Ankara's propping up of Washington role in the New International World Order, mainly after the 9/11 terrorist attack; maintained the American-Turkish strategic partnership. However Turkey political and economic internal problems in 2002, led to pre-governmental election which highly affected the American-Turkish partnership.

In August 2001, Recep Tayyip Erdogan established the Justice and Development Party (AKP). Erdogan was affiliated to Erbakan's Islamic movement parties. Nevertheless, Erdogan's party adopted the conservative democratic ideology. The AKP ideology was based on the respect of the party Islamic roots during the modernization of Turkey in depend on western principle. The Party main agenda was Turkey's-EU membership throughout the democratization of Turkey by the implementation of the Copenhagen Criteria. The AK Party fundamentals attracted the Turks interest which resulted in the party success in the pre-election of 2002. Erdogan banned from leading his party because of political condemnation in 1997, thus he was replaced by Abdullah Gul until the constitution modification. Therefore, in 3 November 2003 Erdogan hold the Turkish Prime Minister office.

The election of an Islamic roots party after approximately 80 years of the secularists rule was considerable prosperity of the AK Party. Erdogan's government conducted many changes

relying on the Copenhagen conditions to implement democracy, stabilize the economy, and improve the Turkish citizen live. The domestic alterations influenced Turkey foreign policy mainly towards the regional issues. The AK party developed a Zero problems with neighbors to avoid the regional instability negative effect on Turkey. Additionally, the party attempted to make Turkey the regional country of peace and solve neighbors countries matters. AKP government new interest conflicted with the American interest. As a result, the American-Turkish strategic partnership set under the pressure.

The first exam of Ankara and Washington relation was in the American-led invasion of Iraq. The U.S. administration required Turkey for reinforcement in the war against Saddam Hussein regime. The AKP parliament studied the American demands which included the open of northern front to Iraq through the Turkish territory. In 1 March parliamentary voted for non participation in the war against a neighbor Muslim country. The vote result was strong hit to the American confidence in the Turkish government. The AKP position confirmed to the American administration the extent of changes reached the Turkish political system. The U.S. makes sure that it cannot rely on the historical ties with the new government.

The second tension between Erdogan's government and the American administration was concerning the Israel war against Palestine. Erdogan's Islamic roots and commitment to the Human rights pushed him to support Palestinians independence fight. Erdogan publically in Davos panel condemned Israel war against Gaza in 2008-2009 and accused it of being a Terror State. Moreover, Anti-Israel sentiment rose up within the Turkish media and society. In response to the Turkish media indignity, Israel insulted the Turkish ambassador in Tel Aviv which led to huge outrage in Turkey. The disagreement between Ankara and Tel Aviv reached the cancellation of the diplomatic relation between both countries. as their mutual partner, U.S. tried many times to calm down their tension, however; the American recognition

of Jerusalem as the Israeli capital provoked Erdogan government as well as the Turkish society.

Thirdly, the convergent between Turkey and Iran highly stressed the Turkish-American relationship. Washington considered Iran as threat to the American national security because of its nuclear program. Nevertheless, Turkey developed the bilateral ties with Iran due to economic crisis and “the Zero Problems with neighbors”. Additionally, Erdogan described Iran as Turkey’s strategic friendship. Hence, Erdogan opposed Washington sanction on Iran many times. Additionally, Erdogan declared that America cannot intervene in Turkey’s economic partners choosing process.

Fourthly, in 2016 the president Erdogan encountered a failed military coup. Erdogan accused Fethulah Gulen by inciting his military supporters to lead the coup. Gulen is an apatrait in America, thus Erdogan requested the U.S. administration to arrest or extradite Gulen. Washington refused the Turkish demand and asked for evidence mainly after Gulen’s absolute denied. In fact, the failed military attempt followed with huge number of detentions included people from deferent sectors. Among the arrested people was the American Pastor Andrew Brunson. U.S. denounced Turkey arrestment of Brunson and promised to destroy the Turkish economy if Brunson do not release. Brunson incident increased the tension between Turkey and US. As a result of Washington pressure, Erdogan suggested an exchange between Brunson and Gulen. However, Erdogan failed in convincing the US administration and charged with pursuing a hostage diplomacy. In 2018, Turkey’s court declared the release of Brunson after his innocence confirmation and not because of the political pressure.

Fifthly, U.S. sought to integrate Turkey within the western bloc and depart it from the eastern bloc since the end of WWII. However, Erdogan’s decision of purchasing the Russian S-400 missiles led to the NATO members objection mainly America. According to the U.S., Turkey purchase of the S-400 missiles threatened the NATO F-35 aircraft security. The

American administration obliged Turkey to choose between the S-400 and F-35 because it could not get both of them. Erdogan replays that the S-400 purchase is done deal as refuse of the American order. As a result of Erdogan's choice, Washington imposed number of economic sanctions in addition to the Turkish expelled from the F-35 program. The Turkish officials declares that the negative impact of the Turkish expel will be much more on the other program members then on Turkey.

Sixthly, the Syrian Crisis regarded as source of many disagreements between Turkey and Washington interests. From the one hand, the U.S. depends on the YPG in defeating the ISIS existence in Syria led to the Turkish betrayal feeling. According to the Turkish administration, the reinforcement of a PKK affiliated group threatens the Turkish-Syrian borders sovereignty. On the other hand, Turkey's determination to establish a Save Zone in northern Syria with the Russian help enlarged the gap between Ankara and Washington.

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