

MINISTRY OF HIGHER EDUCATION AND SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH

MOHAMED KHIDER UNIVERSITY OF BISKRA

FACULTY OF ARTS AND LANGUAGES

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN LANGUAGES

THE ENGLISH BRANCH



***Friends or Allies in Hard Challenges?
Investigation into the U.S.- Israeli
Special Relationship***

Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Master Degree in English
Option: Literature and Civilization

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Dedication

Without my Loving parents I wouldn't Succeed in life

Without my Dear brothers and sister I wouldn't be Brave

Without my Loyal friend Moussa I wouldn't be Strong

Without my Beautiful baby girl I wouldn't have Hope

Without my Supporting wife this work wouldn't be Written

To My Wonderful Family

I Dedicate this Work

Acknowledgments

I am most delighted to express my gratitude to my respectful supervisor

Mr. Ahmed BACHAR

who was patient during the long way of preparing

this work and from whom I received all the needed advice and the possible help

I owe many thanks to all my hard work teachers since I first stepped

in Mohamed Khider University

whom educated and supported me as well as all my classmates

along five years of study

A great deal of recognition is due to the members of the jury who are about to

honor me by going through my humble work

and will offer their fair chair of well-deserved critics, advice, and

priceless directions

I give my great thanks to my Classmate, advisor, and role model

Dr. Ahmed Khalfoun

who I most proud and honored to call him my Dear Best Friend for his

availability, kindness, and help

To All Them

Thank You Very Much

ABSTRACT

The United States of America has been a great ally to Israel since its birth in 1948. Each and every President from Truman to Obama has seen this relation as one of great importance. Israel and U.S.A have maintained close ties that can be termed as special relationship for more than half century. During this period the “special relationship” has been growing politically, financially, militarily, and diplomatically, Israel clearly benefits from America. But the dilemma lies in the fact that the U.S. loses in this relationship more than it gains and the U.S. does not need Israel as much as this last needs it. As the structure of the international system evolves into multi polarity, there have been problems surrounding what it appears to be the perfect alliance. There are several hardships that challenge the strength of the U.S.-Israel close relationship and may threaten its perfection.

المُلخَص

لطالما كانت الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية أكبر الحلفاء لإسرائيل منذ نشأتها سنة 1948 وهذا ما أظهره كل الرؤساء الأمريكيين من ترومان إلى أوباما حيث اعتبروا العلاقة مع إسرائيل ذات أهمية كبرى، لمدة فاقت نصف قرن حافظت كل من إسرائيل والولايات المتحدة على روابط قوية اصطلح على وصفها بـ"العلاقة الخاصة". خلال هذه الفترة بقيت العلاقة الخاصة بين الدولتين في تطور مستمر سياسياً، اقتصادياً، عسكرياً ودبلوماسياً، على أنه يبدو بكل وضوح إسرائيل استفادت وانتفعت كثيراً من أمريكا، لكن الإشكالية تقع في واقع أن أمريكا تخسر أكثر مما تستفيد من هذه العلاقة وأنها ليست بحاجة لإسرائيل بنفس قدر حاجة إسرائيل لها. ومع تطور النظام العالمي وتحوله إلى التعددية القطبية ظهرت بعض المشاكل التي أحاطت بهذا التحالف القوي، هي جملة صعوبات اعترضت وأضعفت قوة العلاقة بين إسرائيل وأمريكا بل وقد تهدد استمراريتها.

ACRONYMS

AIPAC: The American Israel Public Affairs Committee

EU : The European Union

FTA: Free Trade Agreement

FY : The Fiscal Year

IAEA: The International Atomic Energy Agency

NATO : The North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NPT: The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

PLO : Palestine Liberation Organization

QME: Qualitative Military Edge

R&D: Research & Development

U.S. : The United States of America

UN : The United Nation

USSR : Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

WWI : World War One

WWII : World War Two

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General Introduction

For its first 150 years, the U.S. avoided all and any kind of international entanglements. In her pursuit to increase competition for resources, defend democracies, and promote freedom abroad ended America's isolationist predispositions. But in a range of one hundred years that followed WWI, The U.S. was involved in almost every region in the world. So it was lured, as consequence, into Europe, Africa, South America, Asia and most important to the Middle East.

This perspective is applied perfectly in all of its positive and negative dimensions on the relations that the U.S. has with Israel; which is undoubtedly the most extraordinary one ever. Israel and the U.S. have enjoyed, over the past sixty-five years, a special kind of relationship based on a long history of cooperation to the degree of mutual dependence that include a political and economic support system that underpin their alliance, and threaten perceptions point towards continued strategic matters.

Although the U.S. and Israel claim that their relationship is based on fairness treatment to each other, it is needed to reexamine roughly the levels of specialty that Israel enjoys towards America when we read - with a surprise - what the former Israeli Secretary of Defense Moshe Dayan said: "Our American Friends offer us money, weapons, and advice. We take the money, we take the weapons, and we decline the advice." Which upgrade ultimately the old understanding to this relationship to a whole new level.

In fact, while both countries continue to share a deep friendship and see eye-to-eye on almost all important international subjects, they have different opinions about some of the crucial strategic issues, such as: The Israeli and espionage issue, the nuclear ambitions of Iran, and the need to end The Arab Israeli conflict. These matters in a way or another might jeopardize the continuity and the depth of their ties.

This approach put a critical question under a deep analysis: Can the U.S.-Israeli special relationship long stand in the light of the impact of different international challenges that may face them in nowadays world?

In light of that, this study aims first of all to emphasize on the gradual evolution of the U.S.-Israel relations through history, after Israel was the closest ally to Great Britain. Second to analyze the different bases of the U.S.-Israel relationship and to focus on the enormous benefits that Israel derives from its close alliance with the U.S. Finally to examine carefully the main issues those have brought and urged the close relationship of the U.S. and Israel under scrutiny and have contributed to some tension between them.

Since we are aiming to assess the hypothesis that there will be always a future for the American Israeli special relationship against any kind of hard challenges may both face along the way, we have to do this assessment according to an established methodological norms. The nature of this study can be classified into the Qualitative Research that depends on the procedures of the Descriptive Research Method. It is proved to be the suitable method to be applied in such research topic because it enables us to focus and direct all the search efforts to the most important and specific points in the subject.

By keeping a close eye on every single event happening around us; it is not an exaggeration at all if we think that the world is controlled by Israel that uses its ultimate powerful tool ever, the very reliable relationship with the U.S. And by understanding the truth about what Israel and America mean to each other. It will be rational to interpret correctly the U.S. supporting attitudes to every issue Israel is a part of it even on the expense of itself.

Because of the ongoing enmity between us as ultimate supporters of the Palestinian case and as a long term anti-U.S. favoritism to Israel; there is a fear of being with prejudiced against both countries. Besides, it is very hard to be absolutely accurate in determining the true depth of U.S.-Israel "Special Relationship" in the light of the lack of neutral documentations that examine this relationship far of all pre-judgments.

To succeeded in addressing all the needed angles of the subject, the research outline is drafted as following:

The first chapter deals with the essential component of the research title, the term "U.S.-Israel Special Relationship" by examining its epistemological roots, then tracking back through American presidential history the progress phases of supporting Israel.

Next, the second chapter focuses on measuring the depth and the strength of the U.S.-Israeli special relationship; it examines in details the mutual bases that gather tightly between the U.S. and Israel. It differs according to the standards into three pillars of politics, economics, and intellectual.

Then, the third chapter is devoted entirely to stress on the differences about the multiple hardships that put a great challenge in the way of a complete U.S.-Israel understanding over the main bilateral and international issues.

Finally, a general conclusion is drawn according to what each chapter has been concluded with. Which ultimately cite the most important results and reconditions that are drawn out along the research.

Chapter One

The Evolution of the U.S.-Israel Special Relationship

Introduction

The uniqueness of America's relationship with Israel has drawn much attention. Even though their relationship evolved slowly, the two countries are bound together by bonds that in practice acquire more strength than any other written or unwritten alliance. Fascinated by the ties between Israel and the U.S., especially in view of the immense disparity in size, power, and international role between two countries (Zucker 567).

That is why America and Israel pride themselves as special countries. By perceiving the fact that they were founded on the basis of an escape from European decadence, and both believe foreign policy should reflect moral choices - what is right, not just what is expedient and self-serving.

Yet, their relationship is not based solely or primarily on lofty values. Various scholars who have studied U.S.-Israel ties said that the special alliance emerged out of a realization that Israel was like a Rock of Gibraltar, a strategic asset in a sea of unstable regimes. Robert J. Lieber, writing in the scholarly journal MERIA Said: *"Israel's claim to a shared religious legacy had not been sufficient by itself to stimulate a more favorable American policy...Instead it was only after the administration began to recognize the strategic dimension and to appreciate how shaky other pro-Western governments in the region actually were, that it started to adopt a more explicitly cooperative policy towards Israel"* (Hertz para 23).

Over the pages of this chapter, we will prove beyond the doubt that U.S. - Israeli relations have developed throughout several phases started with an initial American policy of pure sympathy and support for the creation of a Jewish Homeland, and ended with an unusual but naturally expected multi-levels partnership that links a small yet military powerful Israel with what is considered -by nowadays criteria - to be The Absolute Mighty USA. Before that it is academically needed to explore first the Key Concept *"U.S.-Israel Special Relationship"*.

1-1. The Definition of the Concept "*U.S.-Israel Special Relationship*"

Winston Churchill was the first to popularize the term "Special Relationship" in his famous speech "Iron Curtain" delivered in March 1946 at Fulton Missouri; where he described the intimate American-British political, diplomatic, cultural, economic, military and historical ties between the United Kingdom and the U.S. that they had developed during the years of the WWII and after it.

The same term is to be well applied later to describe U.S.'s connections with other foreign states as it is defined in the international relation theory: "The Special Relationship is a set of relations between two countries have over the last half century blossomed not just into a thick forest of diplomatic and military links, but also into a unique range of economic, academic, religious and personal bonds" (Brad and Pipes para 01, 02).

In the American-Israeli relationship context, this term was first used by the President J.F. Kennedy in 1962 when he assured Israeli Foreign Minister Golda Meir that "The U.S. has a special relationship with Israel in the Middle East; really comparable only to that which it has with Britain over a wide range of world affairs". Both Jimmy Carter and Bill Clinton have reiterated the "Special Relation" terminology. Ronald Reagan spoke of an "Ironclad Bond" that, according to George H.W. Bush, is "transcends politics". And what George W. Bush explained it as "The deep and abiding ties between Israel and the United States" (Bailyn 11, 12).

The British comparison had a powerful and favorable resonance with Americans. Britain was the closest ally in America's last war. Former Israeli ambassador Dore Gold would establish the implication of the similarity on the fact that the U.S. - Israeli relationship is intimate, based on powerful bonds of shared values and interests. But if one delves deeper into the special relationship, a more complex portrait will emerge. The Anglo-American ties were based on the readiness of much of America's ruling establishment reflexively to take Britain's side, and more: to see the world through Britain's eyes.

If this sensibility was laudable in a world with an aggressive Nazi Germany, it had been seeded by Britain long before in the decades preceding WWI. Americans were the audience for Kipling's call to "take up the white man's burden." Rhodes Scholarships prepared Americans for leadership. Before America was Britain's ally, it was Britain's pupil. Or, as Christopher Hitchens would describe it in *Blood, Class and Empire*: "[T]his relationship is really at bottom a transmission belt by which British conservative ideas have infected America."

Two generations later, the special relationship with Israel has almost completely supplanted the British tie. But like the earlier special relationship, the new one is at bottom a transmission belt, conveying Israeli ideas on how the U.S. should conduct itself in a contested and volatile part of the world. To a great extent, a receptive American political class now views the Middle East and their country's role in it through Israel's eyes (McConnell para 02-04).

Numerous scholars defined the U.S.-Israeli Special Relationship differently, and subsequently find its genesis at different points in history. There is who argues, like Abraham Ben-Zvi, that the points of conception for the special relationship is as inscrutable as it is irrelevant, and that its existence should be conceptualized as one of many potential relational paradigms or school of thoughts.

"The Special Relationship Paradigm" is one of them, which operates as a "Symbolic construct that constitutes an integral part of a psychological rather than an operational environment." The special relationship paradigm goals reflect a general goodwill towards Israel that exists both in and out of the Jewish community and is characterized by a persistent commitment to Israel's existence, national security, and territorial integrity (Bailyn 13, 14).

The details of the Special Relationship Paradigm is well explained through scholars writings like William B. Quandt who thought *"Americans can identify with Israel's national style – the pioneering spirit, the commitment to Western-style democracy, the ideals of*

individualism and freedom – in a way that has no parallel on the Arab side." And like Bernard Reich who wrote:

There is an underlying perception of Israel as the type of state, with a similarity of outlook and generally progressive in nature, which the United States would like to see exist worldwide. There is an element of cultural identity that views Israel as "Western" state in a sea of feudal, oriental states and as a perpetuator of Judeo-Christian heritage (Bailyn 16).

As well as Nadav Safran who wrote *"Americans have also felt a strong sympathy for Israel as a democratic nation and a society imbued with the liberation values and humanistic culture of the west"*. (Bailyn 14-16).

The initial appearances of the reality and effectively of this paradigm started after WWII, where the U.S. support for a Jewish state grew with the desire to help settling the large numbers of Jewish refugees, displaced persons, and survivors of "the Nazi Holocaust". Popular support for Israel among U.S. Jews and significant segments of the Christian community has been supplemented by a general identification with Israel as "an Advanced Democratic Society with Strong Liberal and Humanitarian Values", as a "Pioneering" and "Innovative Nation"(Mark 01).

This previous school of thought stood in the opposite with what is called *The National Interest Paradigm*, which is predicated upon purely geo-strategic perceptions of American interests in the Middle East. The need to the national interest paradigm includes political and economic access to Arab oil, and historically, the need to increase American influence in the region at the expense of the Soviet expansion (Bailyn Footnote 23.14).

Indeed, there is no other Middle East country like Israel whose definition of national interests is so closely aligned with that of the U.S. As a global power, it has national interests that range over the Middle East region which is among the most critical for Israel. The U.S. interests that especially involve this vast area include: preventing the proliferation of the nuclear weapons; promoting an orderly process of democratic change and economic

development in the region; ensuring the free flow of oil and gas at reasonable prices; resolving the Arab-Israeli dispute through a process of negotiations; and protecting Israel security (Blackwill and Slocumb 04, 05).

1-2. The Historical Phases of the U.S. - Israel Special Relationship

Waxman confirmed that in all the foreign relationships that the U.S. has had after WWI, none of them is closely watched or incessantly scrutinized as its relationship with Israel (71). This “Complex Relationship” is described roughly as “Special” gathered since a long time between Washington and Jerusalem (Steinberg 61).

The U.S.-Israel bilateral relations have graduated from an initial U.S. policy of sympathy and support for the creation of Jewish homeland in 1948, to unusual partnership that hint what appears to be small but powerful Israel dependent on the U.S. for its economic and military strength, especially with the American arising superpower trying to balance other competing interests in the region (Israel-United States Relations para 02).

A study of American policy toward Israel shows in general that their special relationship has been developed gradually, from ‘a moral stance’ (1948-1951) to a ‘strategic asset’ (in the 1970s) to ‘strategic cooperation’ (in 1981 and on). With that America has come to the conclusion that when Israel is strong, not only does Israel benefit, but the U.S. does too (Hertz para 20).

As a result, all the multiple stages that the U.S.-Israeli relationships have progressed through time can be classified into Four (04) distinguished phases that are determined by a start and an ending year. Based on the American Presidential history in parallel with Israeli history, the U.S.’ attitude toward the whole movement of Zionism in general and Israel specifically has being changed dramatically with each American president, which is to be detailed as following:

1-2-1. Israel as a Burden on the U.S.' shoulders (1948-1969)

To reach the point where America did recognize the establishment of Israel as a state in the eyes of the members of the International community, Zionism had been encouraged gradually by active supports from members of the American and world Jewish communities, as well as domestic civic groups, labor unions, political parties that encouraged the Jewish Homeland Concept. It led at the end to an official American welcome for Israel as a proud member of the United Nation (Israel-United States Relations para 07).

The first period of the U.S.-Israeli relationship progress is determined from the emergence of the State of Israel to The Six Days War. This window of time was characterized by the facts that:

- American Leaders generally saw the fledgling Jewish State as a burden cast upon the U.S. Israel is an irritating responsibility in a period of confrontation with USSR.

- Israel's Democracy and Judeo-Christian attachment to the idea of "The Holy Land" solidified a popular belief that led to make Americans the major supporters of Israel (Spiegel 16).

According to the merits of this phase, every United States' president in it and in the following phases helped in a way or in another creating and building The State of Israel, as it is known today, and had founded a solid ground to a future Special Relationship between America and Israel.

1-2-1-A. President Harry S. Truman Administration (1948-1953)

On 15th of May 1948, the President H. Truman recognized the State of Israel within just 11 minutes after of the declaration of its existence. This immediate recognition of the Jewish State was justified by two main reasons: The great sympathy that the Jewish Cause acquired among the Americans in support for the concept, articulated in Britain's 1917 Balfour Declaration, of "The Promise Land" a definite homeland for the Jewish people. And the American desire to not to let Soviet Union become the first country to do so (Spiegel 16; Mark 01).

There was nothing strategic about President Truman's recognition of Israel. Israel was a fledgling state and had little to offer the world's most powerful state. Truman's advisers made compelling arguments both for and against the recognition. Secretary of State George C. Marshall in particular vehemently opposed recognizing Israel, arguing that it was a purely political calculation that could become a liability for the U.S.

Over and above political considerations, Truman made his own decision, largely based on religious conviction and his sense of moral obligation toward a persecuted minority. Although it took years to bear fruit, Truman's decision helped set the stage for what would become one of the most special and complicated U.S. partnerships of the modern era (Malka 03).

In the matter of the later, the Soviet Union posed a real threat to the U.S. during Cold War time, especially in the Middle East. The Soviet Union eagerly armed revisionary Arab states and the PLO, helping to fuel instability that would hurt American interests. Observers believed that Israel played a key factor in eroding the stature of the USSR and the Arab states decision to turn to the West for the sake of defensive needs. One way Israel aided the U.S. was to allow Americans to scrutinize state-of-the-art Soviet technology, whose value to American security in the Cold War was priceless.

Among those weapons were an Iraqi MiG-21 (whose pilot defected to Israel in a complicated undercover operation in 1966), a fully operational Russian-made ground-to-air missile system captured in the 1967 Six-Day War (that contributed greatly to protecting American pilots during the Vietnam War), and a Soviet Radar System capable of detecting low-flying aircraft (literally lifted intact by two Israeli CH-53 helicopters from Egypt in 1969 during the War of Attrition) (Hertz para 13).

By 1949, the U.S. was the central force behind the Tripartite Agreement that formally placed an embargo on weapons delivered to the countries involved in Arab-Israeli conflict. Even when the range of this embargo excluded - amazingly- Israel (Steinberg 61).

In 1950s, some argued that it was the start of the policy of Israel's containment, adopted shortly before the establishment of Israel. It led to America's friendly and supportive attitude, stressing that Israel, as a stable democracy, fit into the American plan to prevent Soviet expansion in the Middle East.

In this period, when courting the Arab countries was deemed necessary to bring them into the Western defense system, and when Europe was still almost dependent on those countries for its oil, it would seemingly have made more strategic sense to let Israel stand on its own.

Ultimately, this is precisely why State Department specialist in Truman's administration recommended considering Israel as a burden on the U.S. and an obstacle to any friendly relations with Arab countries (Zucker 567).

1-2-1-B. President Dwight D. Eisenhower Administration (1953-1961)

During this period, the U.S. initiated a foreign aid policy to serve specific purposes and grant Israel mainly economic aids such as food stuffs and financial loans (Israel-United States Relations para16). Eisenhower, in time, came to regard the Israelis as potential allies in his struggle to contain Soviet-backed revolutionary Arab nationalism (Little 563).

Because of particular international circumstances, the U.S. officially showed that it stands neutrally in all matters of the Middle East. At the beginning of the 1960s U.S started to provide military assistance to Israel such as defensive arms (Israel-United States Relations para17).

1-2-1-C. Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson Administrations (1961-1969)

In December 1962, *President J. F. Kennedy* hosted Israeli Foreign Minister Golda Meir at his family home in Palm Beach. Mrs. Meir opened their conversation by speaking of Jewish history and the threat of another Holocaust. The president responded with an effort at reassurance. "*The United States,*" he said, "*has a special relationship with Israel really comparable to what it has with Britain over a wide range of issues.*" Perhaps Kennedy was engaging in diplomatic flattery; he would go on to stress that America's ties to the Arab world

were of critical importance as well. Still, his words marked a landmark of sorts (McConnell para 01).

At the same time, under the international circumstances, Kennedy tried to show the fairness and impartiality of America toward Israel (Israel-United States Relations para18). Although he had won the hearts and votes of many American Jews in 1960 with his staunch support for Israeli security, he told Eisenhower during a transition brief on December the 06th that "*an atomic development in Israel is highly distressing*" (Little 567).

Even so, Kennedy moved to strengthen Israel's conventional deterrent -since he saw the signs during the early 1960s that Israel was on the verge of adding nuclear weapons to its arsenal- by providing sophisticated military hardware and pledging American Assistance in the event of Arab aggression (Little 563).

When the *President L. Johnson* took office in November 1963, the hope that a strong Israel might serve as a pro-Western bulwark against future Soviet gains in the Middle East and the fear that weak Israel might go nuclear had combined to lay the groundwork for special relationship that was cemented by the Six- Days War in 1967 (Little 563, 564).

Under his rule, America's policy took a definite turn toward the pro-Israeli direction. The U.S. worked on two levels: Firstly, trying to have deeper relations with Israel to the point of accepting the friendly fire in the incident of attacking the USS Liberty. Secondly, working on having stronger alliance with Gulf states and some non-socialist Arab countries to band any Soviet interests in the area (Israel-United States Relations para 18; Spiegel 16).

During the years of this administration, U.S. policy shifted to a whole-hearted support via Israel. Prior to the Six-Day War of 1967, Johnson had taken considerable care to avoid giving the appearance of Israel favoritism (Israel-United States Relations para 18,19).

The real sea change came after the Six-Day War "*when U.S. officials and analysts began to view the Jewish state as a major regional power, with assets and capabilities that could advance U.S. interests in the Mediterranean and the Middle East.*" That position was first

expressed in 1968 when Congress declared that it was committed to maintaining Israel's "qualitative military edge" in the face of Soviet rearmament of the Arabs (Hertz para 25).

But leading up to the war, while the Johnson administration was sympathetic toward Israel's need to defend itself against foreign attacks, the U.S. was worried that Israel's response would be disproportionate and potentially destabilizing. Israel's raid on Jordan after Samu Incident was very troubling to the U.S.; because Jordan was as well a valuable ally to her and had received aids to finish the construction of the east Ghor Main Canal, which was virtually destroyed in subsequent Israeli raids (Israel-United States Relations para 19).

Recent declassified documents, however, confirmed that Eisenhower and Kennedy were the two presidents who laid the groundwork for closer relations with the Jewish State and that were far concerned about long-term stability in the Middle East than about short-run domestic considerations (Little 563).

In the late 1950s under Eisenhower ruling and in the early 1960s under Kennedy's administration, America began to view Israel as an asset, rather than a liability or a burden. Israel received an American support in the first years of statehood as a part of the 'moral dimension' to politics which sets America apart from the cynical brand of *realpolitik* practiced by Europe (Hertz para 24).

This phase had witnessed the first official signs of the special relationship, which was the recognition of Israel that is considered as the most important event in the modern history of the Jewish people. Beside of that, the U.S. foreign aids provided a hope of continuity for the young state by being the major recipient of American aids and loans in the world as well as the U.S. foreign policy guarantees Israel security (Spiegel 16, 17).

1-2-2. American Duality of Attitudes toward Israel (1969-1993)

The Six-Day War had a profound impact on American-Israeli relations and would transform them. On one side, for American leaders this war had demonstrated that Israel was indeed the prime military power in the territory, providing a new dimension to the perspective of Israel as a potential benefiter to American interests. On the Other side, Israel

provided U.S. through The War of Attrition in years 1969-1970, with captured Soviet equipment (Spiegel 17).

By the late 1970s, Israel's status was elevated to that of a 'strategic asset' particularly after the Shah of Iran's collapse left America without reliable, stable regional allies. Then in the early 1980s came a watershed:

- The November 1981 Memorandum of Understanding on 'strategic cooperation' formally recognized Israel as a strategic ally of the U.S.

- Other memoranda followed that institutionalized the relationship in a series of working frameworks: to counter the Soviet threat, oversee security assistance, pre-position military equipment in Israel, conduct joint training exercises, and jointly develop weapon systems.

- The most recent cooperative framework was established in 1996: a Joint-Anti-Terrorism Working Group, whose importance and scope have only grown since September 11th (Hertz para 26, 27).

The ambivalence merit toward Israel in this phase appeared and continued to be throughout each presidential figure in the American history, as it is explained:

1-2-2-A. Presidents Richard M. Nixon and Gerald R. Ford Administrations (1969-1977)

This period of time was characterized by the following:

- *Nixon's* presidential term witnessed a controversial debate between two differing perspectives:

- The National Security Advisor H. Kissinger who thought that there would be no movement on the Arab-Israeli conflict until the Arabs recognize that only U.S. had leverage on both of them.

- While the older State Department approach by secretary of State W. Roger who preferred The Traditional Method of pressuring Israel to make concessions in order to facilitate diplomatic movements (Spiegel 17; Israel-United States Relations para 24-26).

The combination of a certain factors: The aftermath of the six days war; the Arab oil embargo from 1973 to March 1974; and the Soviet-American nuclear confrontation, led eventually to the collapse of the American - Israeli relations (Spiegel 17).

- Whereas *Ford's* presidential term in the other hand, witnessed a major agreement between Israel and Egypt through Kissinger's famous "Shuttle Diplomacy". Ford himself demonstrated a frustration with Israel by conducting what can be described as a controversial but inconclusive reassessment of U.S.-Israeli relations in 1975 (Spiegel 17, 18; Israel-United States Relations para 27-29), especially after the Israeli government refused the U.S. initiative for further redeployment in Sinai. This reassessment came to an end with the Israeli-Egyptian disengagement of forces agreement dated September the 04th, 1975 (Israel-United States Relations para 30).

1-2-2-B. President J. Carter Administration (1977-1981)

The Jimmy Carter's years were characterized by a very active U.S.'s involvement in the Middle East peace process, which appeared in the President ultimate support for a Palestinian homeland and Palestinian political rights. This American attitude created a tension with the rigid and inflexible Likud government under the rule of Menachem Begin, especially since Israel viewed the Carter-initiated Camp David as creating a U.S. pressure on it to withdraw from the captured Palestinian territories; as well as forcing it to take risks for the sake of peace with Egypt (Spiegel 18; Mark. 02; Israel-United States Relations para 31).

President Carter's support for a Palestinian "homeland" and for Palestinian political rights created more tensions with Israel. Some argue that the final draft text of the Camp David accords represented Begin' success in limiting Israeli requirements to deal with the Palestinians (Mark 02).

1-2-2-C. President R. Reagan Administration (1981-1989)

Although Israeli supporters expressed a deep concern in the early first R. Reagan presidential term about the potential difficulties Israel may face in her relationship with U.S., basically because of the fact that several presidential appointees had ties or business

associations with some Key Arab countries such as Secretaries Weinberger and Shultz who were officers in the Bechtel Corporation which had a strong links with Arab oil countries, but president Reagan's personal support for Israel led to a considerable strengthening in their bilateral relations based on the idea that *Israel is an American Strategic Asset* (Spiegel 18; Mark 02; Israel-United States Relations para 32).

The pro-Israeli organizations in the U.S. characterized the Regan administration as "The most pro-Israel ever" and praised the positive overall tone of bilateral relations. This new perspective toward Israel was manifested in both of the 01st and the 02nd Reagan Presidential terms throughout establishing several frameworks to enhance continued bilateral consultation and cooperation between the two of them on strategic and defense subjects (Mark 02; Israel-United States Relations para 33).

The two countries reached a number of precedent - setting agreements that included: the American- Israeli Strategic Cooperation Agreement signed in 1981, the Joint Political Military Group in November 1983, maintaining an American grant aid to Israel at \$03 billion annually beside the implementation of a free trade agreement in 1985, the U.S. supports to Israel's economic stabilization by a two years loan of \$01.5 billion, the creation of the U.S.- Israeli Joint Economic Development Group in 1985, and granting Israel a "major non-NATO ally" status in 1989 that gave it access to expanded weapons systems and opportunities to bid on U.S. defense contracts (Mark 02; Israel-United States Relations para 34, 35).

Nevertheless, this ultimate Reagan support to Israel was soured by Israeli misconducts which exposed some serious differences between Israeli and U.S. policies, especially when she carried out Operation Opera; an airstrike on Osirak nuclear reactor in Baghdad, or when Israel launched the siege of Beirut during the Lebanon War in 1982 where she used U,S, provided military equipment in the attacks. As a result of it; the American president was forced to suspend shipments of military aircraft and cluster munitions to Israel as a reminder to her that the weaponry provided by the U.S. was to be used for defensive purposes only (Mark 02; Israel-United States Relations para 34).

1-2-2-E. President George H.W. Bush Administration (1989-1993)

A certain fragility of a new approach to Israel was dramatically demonstrated by President George H.W. Bush and his Secretary of States James Baker, which was a clear signal that the pro-Israel Reagan years were over. As Bush Administration's was dominated by a notion heavily felt in the Ford and Carter Administrations that Israeli policy was a net detriment to American interests in the area. This attitude appeared in the comment Baker gave to the AIPAC audience on May 1989 that Israel should abandon its "*expansionists policies*"; or when Bush raised the ire of the Likud government by saying in a press conference on March 1991 that East Jerusalem was occupied territory and not sovereign part of Israel (Mark 02, 03; Spiegel 18; Israel-United States Relations para 37).

the U.S. and Israel disagreed over the Israeli interpretation of Israeli plan to hold elections for a Palestinian peace delegation in the summer of 1989 as well as the need for an investigation of the Jerusalem incident of October 08, 1990, in which the Israeli police killed over 17 Palestinians (Mark 02, 03).

Bush and Baker's diplomatic capability was epitomized by the efforts they demonstrated in the run-up to the Persian Gulf War in forming a large regional alliance against Iraq especially after Bush repeated the U.S.'s commitment to Israel security. These efforts were reinforced afterwards in setting up the Madrid Conference in 1991 and the bilateral and multilateral talks that followed by persuading all the parties to engage in the subsequent peace negotiations (Spiegel 18, 19; Mark 03; For further explanations see: Israel-United States Relations para 38-41).

1-2-3. The American Embrace of Israel (1993-2008)

The storied American-Israeli relationship only began in 1993 with the accession of Bill Clinton to the presidency and his consistently strong support for Israel, a pattern which has continued through the two terms of Bush's presidency. Whatever their differences in diplomatic skills, method, and fundamental premises of their foreign policies, both presidents approached Israel as a genuine partner, even an ally of the U.S. (Spiegel 19).

1-2-3-A. President B. Clinton Administration (1993-2001)

After electing Clinton; the U.S. witnessed and, in most cases, supervised the signature of several Arab-Israeli official understandings, such as: The Israel- PLO Declaration of Principles on 13/09/1993, the Jordan-Israeli Peace Treaty on 26/10/1994, and the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on 28/09/1995 (Mark 03; Israel-United States Relations para 42).

Even though President Clinton granted Israel many financial offers when he visited it on March 1996 that included \$100 million in aid for Israel's anti-terror activities, another \$200 million for Arrow anti-missile deployment, and about \$50 million for anti-missile laser weapon, he disagreed with Netanyahu's policy of expanding Jewish settlements in the occupied territories (Mark 03; Israel-United States Relations para 43).

But this disagreement didn't change anything, when Clinton hosted the Wye River Conference Center in Maryland; that ended with the signature of an agreement on 23/10/1998 which Israel suspended its implementation in December 1998 after the Palestinians allegedly violated it by threatening to declare a state; and later was delayed until Israeli elections in May 1999. Or even when he and the Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak appeared to establish close personal relations during July 1999 where Clinton mediated meetings in search for peace between Israeli and Palestinian parties in the White House, Oslo, Shepherdstown, Camp David, and Sharm al-Shaykh (Mark 03; Israel-United States Relations para 43-45).

1-2-3-B. President George W. Bush Administration (2001-2009)

Israel established a good relations with U.S. during Bush's presidency (Mark 04; Israel-United States Relations para 46). And when the attacks of 09/11 happened; it created a genuine basis for a US-Israeli alliance in the global war against terrorism that had not previously existed (Spiegel 20; Mark 04).

Israel has always been a stable American ally, but since September 11th, American-Israeli collaboration to combat mutual threats has taken a quantum leap forward. A T-shirt sold in Israel sports a fighter plane and the slogan - “Don’t Worry America, Israel is Behind You.” Although designed as humorous pop-art for the tourist trade, September 11th has transformed its underlying message into a serious reality (Hertz para 27).

The 09/11 events raised the U.S.- Israeli special relationship to a whole new level, especially when the American congress invited former Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to speak. He presented proudly the guidelines for what should be America’s strategy in the “war on terror.” No statesman from any other country was similarly honored, and it is unimaginable that another could have been. In terms of political symbolism, the Netanyahu address signaled that the special relationship had reached a plateau that John F. Kennedy (and Golda Meir) could not have imagined (McConnell para 07).

As preparations for a showdown on Iraq materialized in the early months of 2003, the community of nations at the UN sought to contain and restrict American power. Charter members of the NATO such as France and Germany failed to come to the defense of the U.S., and countries in the Middle East that the U.S. had courted for decades and considered key geopolitical allies - specifically, Turkey and Saudi Arabia- bailed out at the last moment. Only Israel remained one of America’s most trustworthy, consistent and important ally, even though many of its contributions to the war on terrorism and the war in Iraq remain undisclosed. Against the backdrop of “The emptiness of old alliances,” Israel’s record – at the UN and in other domains – has demonstrated its bond with the U.S. (Hertz para 28, 29).

Even so, on October 2001 the Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon accused Bush's administration of appeasing the Palestinians at Israel's expense in bid for Arab support for the US anti-terror campaign. The White House didn’t appreciate the remark, and Israel didn’t apologize for it.

Later, U.S. criticized Israeli practices of assassinating Palestinians believed to be engaged in terrorism, which appeared to Israelis as an act of inconsistent with the U.S. policy against terrorism (Mark 04; Israel-United States Relations para 46). This misunderstanding between the two countries didn't last. By 2003, the U.S. provided Israel with \$9 billion as a conditional loan guarantees made available through 2011 (Israel-United States Relations para 47).

1-2-4. The U.S.-Israel Partnership (2008-present)

American policy has come full circle from the 1950s; when the kind of identification and partnership with Israel that is seen today, was viewed as an anathema to American interest. The manifestation of this approach can be perceived starting by the 2008 presidential campaign.

By that time, no statement of support for Israel from both final candidates was too strong, and no commitment was too deep. As an example, when John McCain and Barack Obama spoke in the AIPAC convention in June 2008, their speeches in support for Israel seem -by the first look- to be mostly identical (Spiegel 21, 22).

After Obama won the elections and took office, Israeli-U.S. relations came under increase strain (Israel-United States Relations para 55). And even when Obama promised that he "*Will bring to the White House an unshakeable commitment to Israel's security ...*" (Spiegel 22), he did make a major goal of his presidency to achieve an Israeli - Palestinians peace deal, including putting some kind of pressure on Israel to accept the foundation of a Palestinian state (Israel-United States Relations para 55).

Even when Obama may say that the U.S. supports Israel and will not countenance a "nuclear Iran", the most Israelis saw him as lacking in that basic commitment to and sympathy for Israel that characterized American presidents from Truman through Kennedy to Clinton and George W. Bush (Morris para 08).

In this context, Waxman state that to many Israelis, and Israeli supporters in the U.S. the reason for the tensions between the two in recent years is simple: President Obama is not really pro-Israel or at least not in the way that right-wing, hawkish Israeli and American Jews, and most Republicans, understand the term. For them, being pro-Israel means providing uncritical support for Israeli governments. It certainly doesn't mean lecturing Israel on what's best for it, or applying any kind of pressure on it both of which President Obama has done. By this narrow definition, Obama is certainly not pro-Israel, but then neither are many American Jews, nor even Israelis for that matter, who also don't blindly support the Netanyahu government (71, 72).

On March 2010, Israel announced it would continue to build 1,600 new homes in the Eastern Jerusalem neighborhood of Ramat Shlomo; a move that was descried by Secretary of State Hilary Clinton as "*deeply negative*" for US-Israeli relation, and later she gave Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu an Ultimatum to cancel the approval of the housing units as well as freezing all Jewish construction in East Jerusalem (Israel-United States Relations para 57, 58).

As Bullimore tried to explain, Clinton candidly stated that the reason the Obama administration was displeased with Israel's continued settlement construction in occupied Jerusalem, was not because it wanted to stop Israel's settlement expansion or the stealing of Palestinian land or to ensure a just peace agreement and resolution. She frankly pointed out that settlement construction exposed a tactical difference in the U.S.-Israel imperialist alliance (para 13).

Obama's deliberate coldness toward America's traditional ally has not been lost on the Israeli public. He spoke in Cairo to the Muslim world, while avoiding a "balancing" visit to Jerusalem. Nor will Washington's overbearing tone be quickly forgotten. And while, without doubt, Obama's health care bill victory has bolstered his stature in American public opinion and enabled him to face off with Netanyahu, his Democratic Party yet paid the price in the congressional elections later in November 2010.

The pro-Israel lobby in Washington remains powerful, despite recent knocks and the emergence of a small, Obama-supporting dissident Jewish lobby called J-Street. While American Jews traditionally vote Democrat, Obama's trouncing of Israel may well affect campaign contributions and votes (American Jews, who number more than 05 million, tend to contribute and vote disproportionately) (Morris para 10 - 13).

Nevertheless, In her March 22, 2010 speech to AIPAC convention; Hillary Clinton clearly revealed that the supposed imminent collapse of US-Israeli relations was just wild speculation. Clinton spent much of her speech reiterating that the Obama administration was committed to continuing the US-Israel "special relationship", saying that Obama "has supported Israel in word and in deed". She also pointed out that: "*Under President Obama's leadership, we have reinvigorated defense consultations, redoubled our efforts to ensure Israel's qualitative military edge and provided nearly \$03 billion in annual military assistance*" (Bullimore para 10, 11).

Overall, Obama was the first U.S. President to authorize the sale of bunker buster bombs to Israel, a deal was kept a secret to avoid any impression that the U.S. was arming Israel preparing for attacks on Iran. As well as the U.S. did not stop her financial aids to Israel. In 2012, Obama signed into law a bill that would extend to another three years U.S. program guarantees for Israeli government debt. In addition to the fact that between 2010 and 2012 Israeli exports to the U.S. exceeds those to EU (Israel-United States Relations para 56 , 61, 63).

Conclusion:

During more than six decades of state-building, Israelis have looked to the U.S. for political inspiration, financial and military assistance, and diplomatic support. Americans, in turn, have viewed Israel with a special appreciation for its successful effort to follow the Western democratic tradition, its remarkable economic development, and its determined struggle against its uncompromising enemies.

But to reach this point, America's tie with Israel has grown - as it was established previously- through Four relatively distinct stages:

During The First, roughly from Israel's founding to 1967, many Americans were fond of Israel, admired its achievements, wished it well. But Israel wasn't really considered an ally, and whatever strategic ties existed were of little consequence.

The Second stage ran between the Six-Day War in 1967 and the end of the Cold War, when American military and financial aid to Israel accelerated sharply, and the country came to be considered by Washington, in the context of a battle for regional influence with the Soviet Union, as a valuable regional ally.

The Third stage began to germinate in the years following the collapse of the Soviet Union and came into full bloom after 09/11. Built upon the foundation of the relatively beneficial strategic relationship of the second stage, it was often justified by similar rhetoric. But it is actually a more profound and consequential relationship than existed between 1967 and 1990.

The Fourth started with beginning of Obama's precedential terms. It was clear that Israel still is U.S.'s chief ally in the region, playing a strategic role in helping the insurance U.S. dominance. The alliance is based on shared political interests - opposition to any form of Arab radicalism that would threaten Western economic domination.

Chapter Two

The Mutual Bases of the U.S.-Israel Special Relationship

Introduction:

Since Israel's founding in 1948, successive U.S. Presidents and many Members of the Congress have demonstrated a long term commitment to Israel's security and to maintain close U.S.-Israel cooperation.

Bilateral closeness has been based on number of factors, including robust domestic U.S. support for Israel and its security, shared strategic goals in the Middle East, a mutual commitment to democratic values and religious affinities besides the historical ties dating back to the creation year of Israel. All of that come along despite the warning of many researchers whom indicated repeatedly that the U.S.-Israel "Special Relationship" is a major factor in foreign hostility towards Americans (Zanotti 02; Sharp 01; National Summit to Reassess the U.S.-Israel para 01).

The U.S.-Israeli alliance now contributes more than ever to American security, as bilateral cooperation to deal with both military and nonmilitary challenges that has grown in recent years. The relationship mightn't be symmetrical; the U.S. has provided Israel with indispensable diplomatic, economic, and military support totaling more than \$115 billion since 1949.

But it is a two-way partnership whose benefits to the U.S. have been substantial. The other, less tangible costs of the U.S.-Israeli alliance - mainly, damage to Washington's reputation in Arab and Muslim countries, a problem also caused by American interventions and decades of U.S. support for autocratic leaders in the Middle East - pale in comparison with the economic, military, and political gains it affords Washington (Eisenstadt and Pollock, Friends with Benefits para 02).

The levels of cooperation that gather between the U.S. and Israel are multiple and complicated at the same time because they consist the mutual bases of the special relationship which they enjoy its benefits over the years.

2-1. The U.S.-Israeli Strategic Alliance

Based on the fundamental pillars of the American-Israeli strategic alliance, the prospects for continuation of this alliance in the next decade would appear to be relatively positive. The long history of cooperation, the political support system that underpins the alliance, and the shared threat perceptions point towards continued and in some ways, perhaps strengthened strategic cooperation. Although there are always differences and ups and down in the relationship between Washington and Jerusalem, these are largely tactical, and did not reflect fundamental differences in objectives (Steinberg 79).

To empower the U.S.-Israeli special relationship the White House passed, on March 05, 2014, " the U.S.-Israel Strategic Partnership Act of 2014" classified (H.R. 938). The 03rd section of the bill declares that Israel is a "*major strategic partner of the United States.*" In addition, the bill, among other things, would:

- Extend the authorization for the War Reserves Stock Allies-Israel (WRS-A-I) program;
- Authorize annual funding for a U.S.-based Joint Energy Research Center;
- Authorize \$03 million to be spent on research pilot programs between Israel and the Department of Homeland Security;
- Require the Secretary of State to report to Congress on "the range of cyber and asymmetric threats posed to Israel by state and non-state actors; and the joint efforts of the U.S. and Israel to address the threats";
- Require that the Administration undertake discussions with Israel to identify the steps required to be taken to give Israel the same Strategic Trade Authorization (STA) licensing exception for certain munitions and dual-use items that 36 other countries currently have. (Sharp 01, 02).

According to that, Israel continues to help the U.S. deal with traditional security threats. The two countries share intelligence on terrorism, nuclear proliferation, and Middle Eastern politics. Israel's military experiences have shaped the U.S.' approach to counterterrorism and homeland security.

The U.S.-Israeli alliance has paved the way for the two countries to cooperate on far more than just traditional security issues. In part because of the long-standing political and security relationship between the U.S. and Israel, most Israelis know the U.S. and harbor positive feelings toward it (Eisenstadt and Pollock, Friends with Benefits para 04, 05). By the year 1993, following the Oslo agreement, the U.S.-Israel strategic alliance was more strengthened at numerous complicated levels (Steinberg 69).

2-1-1. The U.S.-Israel Foreign Policy

American policymakers have seen U.S. support for Israel as a way of showing Israel that the U.S. is still taking its interests into account during negotiations, and thus convincing Israel that they can safely engage in peace talks. It's meant to draw the Israelis to the negotiating table, and keep them there.

Together, these strategic factors explain why America's approach to Israel has been broadly consistent for at least the past three last administrations. Despite the vast disagreements between the George W. Bush administration versus the Clinton and Obama administrations on foreign policy, they've both provided military and political aid to Israel. And they've both crossed Israel when it wasn't in the U.S.' strategic interests: Bush refused to support an Israeli strike on Iran, and Obama repeatedly clashed with Israeli leaders on West Bank settlements (Beauchamp para 11,12).

Depending on that, the U.S. and Israel cooperate on a broad range of international issues. The U.S. serves as Israel's great power patron, paying many billions to generally promoting Israel's acceptance worldwide. There happens to be a convenient quantitative index of the way Israel stands out as an American ally: voting records at the United Nations General Assembly.

Israel has for many years been far ahead of all other states in terms of voting most often with the U.S.. According to figures compiled by the U.S. government, Israel in 1996 agreed with Washington on 95 % of all significant votes, far beyond the number-two state and such close American allies as the United Kingdom (79 %), France (78 %), Canada (73 %) and Japan (72 %).

Typically, when only one or two states stand with Washington, Israel is always one of them. For example, in November 1992, when the United Nations condemned the Torricelli Bill - which bans foreign subsidiaries of American companies trading with Cuba- by a vote of 59 to 03 with 79 abstentions, only Israel and Romania joined the U.S. (Brad and Pies para 04, 05).

There are several examples of the strategic alliance between the two countries on the foreign policy level that include the special role U.S. has taken in facilitating peace negotiation between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. The U.S. has been criticized as acting as the attorney of Israel government at the expense of advancing the peace talks. Another example, under the U.S.- Israeli "no surprises" policy, the U.S. government must first check with the Israeli government any ideas for advancing the negotiations before publicly proposing them, which allegedly may have stripped the US of "the independence and flexibility required for serious peace-making" (EIPA para 09-11).

On a number of occasions over the past decades, Israel and the U.S. have disagreed on issues related to potential agreements between Israel and the Arab states which in a way or another might jeopardize their strategic alliance on the foreign policy level. For example, such differences characterized the period of the Rogers Plan (1969-1972), during Kissinger's efforts to negotiated a second round of interim separation agreements in 1975, and in 1990/01, when Bush and Baker sought to gain the agreement of the Shamir government to participate in an international peace conference.

In most cases, these differences had a limited impact on the strategic relationship, and the separation of these two key aspects of the Israeli-American relationship has grown stronger over the past decade. In 1975, Kissinger's frustration with the Rabin government's rejection of additional withdrawal proposals led to an American "re-assessment" of the strategic relationship. The strategic alliance continued to increase, and the level of U.S. assistance and the degree of interaction intensified (Steinberg 69).

2-1-2. The U.S.-Israel Military Cooperation

For many years, U.S.-Israel military ties were non-existent. From Israel's creation year in 1948 until the mid-1960s, State Department and Pentagon officials argued against even providing American arms to Israel out of concern that it would provoke the Arabs to ask the Soviets and the Chinese for more weapons, which in turn would stimulate a Middle East arms race. But the U.S. policy fundamentally changed after the 1967 war: now it was to give Israel a qualitative military edge over its neighbors (Brad and Pies para 06; Ruebner 06).

As Steinberg confirm, the U.S. has provided Israel with compensation and insurance, in the form of enhanced their military aid. In 1979 in connection with the negotiations of Camp David and the Peace Treaty with Egypt and the Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai, the U.S. increased the extent of military aid and paid the cost of relocating the air force bases.

From the mid-1960s through the early 1990s, the military alliance relationship between Washington and Jerusalem evolved significantly. At the end of this period, the alliance was characterized by three dimensions: Shared threat perceptions and common security interests. Institutionalization in the relationship, and the resulting ability to ride out short term policy disagreements in some areas; Symmetry and burden sharing: Israeli reciprocity and support for American objectives in the region (63, 69).

As a fact, almost all current U.S. aid to Israel is in the form of military assistance. U.S. military aid has helped transform Israel's armed forces into one of the most technologically sophisticated militaries in the world. U.S. military aid for Israel has been designed to maintain Israel's "Qualitative Military Edge" (QME) over its neighboring militaries. The rationale for

QME is that Israel must rely on better equipment and training to compensate for being much smaller geographically and in terms of population than its potential adversaries (Sharp 07; Eisenstadt and Pollock, How the United States Benefits 13).

Historically, Lyndon Johnson was the first to sign the 1968 agreement to sell Phantom jets to Israel, and establish the U.S. as Israel's principal arms supplier. Still, these sales resulted from a consideration of Israel's domestic political needs, not from an assessment of U.S. security interests. American officials viewed Israel as lacking the military might to contribute to the NATO policy of containment, and so having no role in defending the West.

This perception began to change in 1970, when the Nixon administration called on Israel for help to bolster King Husain of Jordan. Soon thereafter, as it became clear that no Arab state would contribute to Western defense in the Middle East, the Carter administration began to implement an implicit form of strategic cooperation by letting Israel sell military equipment to the U.S. and engage in limited joint exercises. Later on, President Reagan brought new ground by seeing Israel as a potential contributor to the Cold War (Brad and Pies para 07, 08; Ruebner 08-10).

These strategic ties on the military level have further grown. A Joint Anti-Terrorism Working Group came into existence in 1996, as did a hotline between the Pentagon and the Israeli defense ministry. In early 1997, Israel linked up to the U.S. missile-warning satellite system, which provides it with real-time warnings of hostile missiles. The U.S. government continues to fund the research and development of Israeli weapons systems and military equipment (Brad and Pies para11).


Nevertheless, Israeli officials have periodically expressed concern about U.S. sales of weaponry to Arab countries as was the case in Lebanon in 1958, the Kuwait tanker reflagging in 1987, or the war against Iraq in 1991. Arab critics of U.S. military aid to Israel routinely charge that Israeli officials exaggerate the threat posed by Israel's neighbors in order to justify calls for increased levels of U.S. assistance to Israel. As the U.S. is one of the principal suppliers of defense equipment and training to both Israel and Saudi Arabia, U.S.

policymakers and defense officials seek to carefully navigate commitments to the two countries, while following the legal requirement to maintain Israel's qualitative military edge (Sharp 07; Mark 01).

The level of military cooperation is extraordinarily deep. The U.S. now provides Israel with \$03 billion a year through the Foreign Military Financing program. In addition to direct military aid, it provides funds for the joint development of antiballistic missile systems and has pre-positioned nearly \$01 billion worth of military equipment and ammunition in Israel for use by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) in emergency contingencies. U.S. military aid represents roughly 01.5% of Israel's gross domestic product and approximately 21% of its defense budget. Nearly three-quarters of that money is used to purchase U.S. military equipment, providing an indirect subsidy to the U.S. defense industry and ensuring that Israel has access to the best U.S.-made military equipment available for foreign sales (Malka 01, 02).

The "increasingly unconditional nature" of U.S. military aid despite the fact that Israel has often taken actions the U.S. government opposes as refusing to sign the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, annexing conquered land, building settlements in conquered territories, selling U.S. technology to China, spying on the U.S., and using U.S. weapons like cluster bombs in ways that violate U.S. law. Since Eisenhower, the U.S. has used only larger carrots, not sticks, to try to influence Israeli behavior, often with little or nothing to show for it. Even when Israeli actions contravene explicit American policies, there is at best a temporary interruption of U.S. aid (MacDonald 34, 35; Ruebner 11-14).

Chart 01: The U.S. Military Aid to Israel (2009-2018)



Source: Ruebner. U.S. Military Aid to Israel. p 09

2-2 The U.S.-Israeli Economic Partnership

Israel has an advanced industrial, market economy in which the government plays a substantial role. Despite its limited natural resources, the agricultural and industrial sectors are well developed. The engine of the economy is an advanced high-tech sector, including aviation, communications, computer-aided design and manufactures, medical electronics, and fiber optics. Israel still benefits from foreign loans, contributions, and capital investments, but its economic strength has lessened its dependence on external financing (Zanotti 14; Eisenstadt and Pollock, How the United States Benefits 32)

Nevertheless, The growth of aids programs, trade, joint efforts, and American intervention in the Israeli economic system have made the U.S. and Israel remarkably interdependent. The U.S. Israel economic relationship - that was upgraded later into unusual partnership - started slowly but steadily.

In the light of this fact, Myron Brilliant-executive vice president and head of International Affairs for the U.S. Chamber of Commerce - makes three observations about the U.S.-Israel economic relationship to prove that the public support for Israel remains strong, and much will be gained for both countries as commercial ties deepen. These observations are:

1- Israel is the partner to the oldest U.S. free trade agreement: Since the signing of the U.S.-Israel Free Trade Agreement 30 years ago, two-ways trade has multiplied tenfold to over \$40 billion per year with shared economic benefits for both countries.

2- Israel is a major U.S. economic partner in the Middle East: Israel is the top importer of U.S. goods in its region, despite representing a mere 02% of the population. There are more companies listed on the NASDAQ exchange from Israel than from any country besides the U.S. and China. And nearly half of all investment into the U.S. from the Middle East comes from Israeli companies. The commercial relationship, while often glossed over given the focus on security matters, is not only sparking new technologies but supports thousands of good jobs in both countries.

3- Israel is an innovation hub: In a country as small as Israel, it is amazing that over 250 multinational companies have R&D centers there. And underscoring the importance of their relationship, two-thirds of them are U.S. companies. Intel, Microsoft, IBM, and Cisco have been in Israel for decades. Because of trade and innovation, future economic prospects between the U.S. and Israel are bright. In 2014, in a piece on the maturing economic relationship between the two countries, the U.S. Chamber's Josh Kram wrote, "Much of what will define the relationship in the coming five years was unthinkable a decade ago, let alone three decades ago when the FTA was signed" (Hackbarth para 02-08).

2-2-1. The U.S.-Israel Foreign Financial Aid

U.S. foreign aid to Israel has been a major component in cementing and reinforcing these ties. Although successive Administrations have disapproved of some Israeli policies, including settlement construction in the West Bank and prior to Israel's 2005 disengagement-the Gaza Strip, U.S. officials and many lawmakers have long considered Israel to be a vital partner in the region, and U.S. aid packages for Israel have reflected this calculation.

Some observers, including opponents of U.S. aid to Israel, argue that U.S. assistance to Israel supports Israeli arms purchases without providing sufficient scrutiny of controversial Israeli military actions that contravene various laws and international norms, particularly regarding treatment of Palestinians (Sharp 01).

In the 25 years between 1949 and 1973, the U.S. government provided Israel with a total of \$03.2 billion in aid during. And in the 23 years later since 1974, Israel has received nearly \$75 billion, making it far and away the largest per-capita recipient ever. Israel has become an affluent country with a personal income rivaling Great Britain's, so the American willingness to provide aid to Israel is no longer based purely on need.

Rather, the aid today is closely tied to the peace process; any hint of a reduction is resisted on the grounds that it endangers Israel's confidence and so its willingness to take risks for peace. This makes U.S. aid to Israel unlike any other. Although an increasing number of voices, especially among conservatives in both countries, express skepticism about the continuation of aid, it remains a mainstay of the two countries' relations (Brad and Pies para 12).

Since 1970s, Israel has been one of the top recipients of U.S. foreign aid, in the past, a portion was dedicated to economic assistance, but all economic aid to Israel ended in 2007 due to the Israel's growing economy. Currently, Israel receives \$03 billion in US assistance through U.S. Foreign Military Financing (FMF). 74% of these funds must be spent on the acquisition of U.S. defense equipment, services, and training. Thus, United States military aid to Israel is seen as a subsidy for U.S. industries (EIPA para 07, 08).

In 1984, at a time of economic distress in Israel Secretary of State George Shultz suggested the creation of an American-Israeli Joint Economic Development Group (JEDG) to work on Israel's economic challenges. The JEDG played a pivotal role in the formulation of Israel's ambitious and successful economic stabilization plan that included budget cuts, tighter control of the money supply, and devaluation of the shekel. When Israel took these and other steps, Reagan approved a \$01.5 billion emergency aid program, which helped save the Israeli economy from collapse and stimulate a recovery that reduced inflation from triple digits to the low double digits (Brad and Pies para 15).

MacDonald discusses the fact that Israel is in a class by itself in terms of receiving aid, not only in how much it receives but in how it receives it and in the lack of accountability for how it is spent. Israel is the only country to receive all of its aid at the beginning of the fiscal year, so that it is able to earn extra interest (\$660 million as of 2004) even as the U.S. government must pay interest on the money it provides Israel (\$50 million - \$60 million per year). Lax enforcement of U.S. tax law results in Jewish donations to the settler movement being tax deductible, and since there is no accountability for how U.S. aid is spent, it can be used to support policies like the settler movement that the government officially opposes (34, 35).

Which proves what Chomsky noticed. In theory the U.S. placed several restrictions on the Israeli use of American aids, but care has been taken to ensure that these restriction cannot be invoked. As an example of these restriction there is the ban on use of the U.S. funds for the settlement and development programs that the U.S. has officially regarded as illegal and as a barrier to peace, this had never been enforced, and the aids programs are designed so that cannot be enforced. As a fact, no official of the U.S. department or the aid program has ever been assigned to supervise the use of American funds by the Israeli government (50).

Table 01: Recent U.S. Bilateral Aid to Israel (1949-2016)

Year	Total	Military Grant	Economic Grant	ASHA	All other
1949-1996	68,030.9	29,014.9	23,122.4	121.4	14,903.3
1997	3,132.1	1,800.0	1,200.0	2.1	50.0
1998	3,080.0	1,800.0	1,200.0	—	—
1999	3,010.0	1,860.0	1,080.0	—	—
2000	4,131.85	3,120.0	949.1	2.75	—
2001	2,876.05	1,975.6	838.2	2.25	—
2002	2,850.65	2,040.0	720.0	2.65	28.0
2003	3,745.15	3,086.4	596.1	3.05	—
2004	2,687.25	2,147.3	477.2	3.15	9.9
2005	2,612.15	2,202.2	357.0	2.95	—
2006	2,534.5	2,257.0	237.0	—	0.5
2007	2,503.15	2,340.0	120.0	2.95	0.2
2008	2,423.9	2,380.0	—	3.90	—
2009	2,583.9	2,550.0	—	3.90	—
2010	2,803.8	2,775.0	—	3.80	—
2011	3,029.22	3,000.0	—	4.225	—
2012	3,098.0	3,075.0	—	3.00	—
2013	2,943.2	3,100.0	—	—	—
2014	3,115.0	3,100.0	—	—	—
2015	3,110.0	3,100.0	—	—	—
2016 Request	3,110.0	3,110.0	—	—	—
Total	124,467.57	76,723.4	30,897.0	162.075	14,991.9

Source: CRS Report for Congress. February 27, 2015. p 35.

2-2-2. The U.S. Loan Guarantees to Israel

Loan guarantees are a form of indirect U.S. assistance to Israel, since they enable Israel to borrow from commercial sources at lower rates. Congress directs that subsidies be set aside in a U.S. Treasury account for possible default. These subsidies have come from the U.S. or the Israel government. Israel has never defaulted on a U.S.-backed loan guarantee (Sharp 17).

Loan guarantees to Israel are just another way that the U.S. financially helps the Jewish state, but this is done without even spending one dollar. In 1992, Congress and President Bush authorized \$10 billion in guarantees to Israel and, in 2003, a new set of loan guarantees - for \$9 billion - were put in place to serve until 2012. In January 2012, this guarantee was extended a further three years to last until 2015.

Guarantees are not grants - not one penny of U.S. government funds are transferred to Israel. The U.S. simply cosigns loans for Israel that give bankers confidence to lend Israel money at more favorable terms: lower interest rates and longer repayment periods - as much as 30 years instead of only five to seven. These loan guarantees have no effect on domestic programs or guarantees. Moreover, they have no impact on U.S. taxpayers unless Israel were to default on its loans, something that has never done. In addition, much of the money Israel borrows is spent in the U.S. to purchase American goods (U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel para 01, 02).

Since 1972, the U.S. has extended loan guarantees to Israel to assist with housing shortages, Israel's absorption of new immigrants from the former Soviet Union and Ethiopia, and its economic recovery following the 2000-2003 recessions, which was partly caused by Israeli-Palestinian conflict due to a Palestinian second intifada (Sharp 17).

In 2003, the Prime Minister Ariel Sharon requested an additional \$8 billion in loan guarantees to help Israel's ailing economy. The loan guarantee request accompanied a request for an additional \$4 billion in military grants to help Israel prepare for possible attacks during an anticipated U.S. War with Iraq.

"The FY2003 Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act" classified (P.L. 108-11), authorized \$09 billion in loan guarantees over three years for Israel's economic recovery and \$01 billion in military grants. The P.L. 108-11 stated that the proceeds from the loan guarantees could be used only within Israel's pre-June 05, 1967, borders; that the annual loan guarantees could be reduced by an amount equal to the amount Israel spends on settlements in the occupied territories; that Israel would pay all fees and subsidies; and that the President would consider Israel's economic reforms when determining terms and conditions for the loan guarantees. In FY2005, the U.S. government reduced the amount available for Israel to borrow by \$795.8 million. Since then, no other deductions have been made.

According to the U.S. Treasury Department, Israel is legally obligated to use the proceeds of guaranteed loans for refinancing its government debt and also has agreed that proceeds shall not be used for military purposes or to support activities in areas outside its pre-June 05, 1967 borders (the West Bank -including East Jerusalem- and Gaza). However, U.S. officials note that since Israel's national budget is fungible, proceeds from the issuance of U.S.-guaranteed debt that are used to refinance Israeli government debt free up domestic Israeli funds for other uses (Sharp 17, 18).

According to the P.L. 108-447, the FY2005 Consolidated Appropriations Act, first extended the authority of the loan guarantees from FY2005 to FY2007. In the aftermath of the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah conflict, President Bush stated that he would ask Congress to extend again the authorization of loan guarantees to Israel. In the P.L. 109-472, the 2006 Department of State Authorities Act, extended the authority to provide loan guarantees through FY2011. Under that legislation, the loan guarantee program had a stated end of September 30, 2011; however, there was also a "carryover" provision in the statute under which Israel could draw on unused U.S. guarantees until September 30, 2012.

In the summer of 2012, Congress passed and the President signed into law P.L. 112-150, the U.S.-Israel Enhanced Security Cooperation Act of 2012. Section 5(b) of the law extends the loan guarantee authority until September 30, 2015. As of 2014, Israel is still authorized to issue up to \$03.8 billion in U.S.-backed bonds.

In general, Israel may view U.S. loan guarantees as a “last resort” option, which its treasury could use if unguaranteed local and international bond issuances become too expensive. According to one Israeli official, *“We consider the loan guarantees as preparation for a rainy day.... This is a safety net for war, natural disaster and economic crisis, which allows Israel to maintain economic stability in unstable surroundings.”* Israeli officials may believe that although they have not needed to use the loan guarantees in the last nine years, maintaining the program boosts the country’s fiscal standing among international creditors in capital markets (Sharp 18).

2-2-3. The U.S.-Israel Commercial Relationship

There is no question that the U.S. and Israel enjoy a strong commercial relationship that may exceed to the degree of full partnership, which has grown dramatically since the U.S.-FTA nearly thirty years ago (U.S. Chamber of Commerce 01). The U.S.-Israel FTA was one of the first modern day agreements signed in 1985. This unprecedented treaty opened up the entire U.S. market to Israel by gradually eliminating tariffs (Brad and Pies para 13).

The Agreement entered into force in September 1985 after it was approved by the U.S. House of Representatives by a 422-0 vote and by a voice vote in the U.S. Senate. In his remarks after the FTA was signed, President Ronald Reagan said that *“the Free Trade Area Agreement symbolizes once again our two countries’ deep community of interest and our shared values and aspirations for a better future. It underscores the importance of Israel to the United States as an ally, as a trading partner, and as a friend”* (U.S.-Israel Trade Relations para 02).

Like most trade agreements, the FTA with Israel has generated its share of trade disputes, but it has also achieved the intended purpose of increasing the volume of trade: The total two-way trade came to about \$04.7 billion in 1985 and reached over \$11 billion in 1995, with U.S. exports to Israel doubling in the last decade (Brad and Pies para 13).

Prior to it, Israel benefitted from the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), which is a unilateral trade preference program that allows goods from developing countries to enter the U.S. duty free. In addition, beginning in the early 1970's, Israel was a recipient of U.S. economic aid. The FTA resulted in the mutual liberalization of bilateral trade and the eventual elimination of U.S. economic aid to Israel.

Despite that the FTA is being over twenty-five years old and only twenty pages long, provides a stable business environment and a flexible platform to further enhance the commercial relationship. It established a bilateral Joint Committee (JC) in order to provide a structure for discussing the enhancement of trade and issues of mutual concern. The JC meets annually and is headed by USTR and the Foreign Trade Administration of Israel's Ministry of Industry, Trade, and Labor. The JC's broad mandate has provided the forum to further liberalize trade in agricultural products and establish cooperation on standardization.

Both countries benefitted, and continue to benefit, from the FTA, as evidenced by the exponential growth of the U.S.-Israel economic relationship since its signing in 1985. Between 1984 and 1996, one year after the FTA was fully implemented and ten years after it was signed, bilateral trade in goods more than tripled from \$03.9 billion to \$12.4 billion, with U.S. exports to Israel totaling \$06 billion and Israeli exports to the U.S. totaling \$06.4 billion. Between 1996 and 2010, bilateral trade in goods nearly tripled reaching \$32.3billion. In general, about 50% of bilateral economic exchanges are concentrated in trade in goods; 30% are in investment; and 20% in trade in services (U.S.-Israel Trade Relations para 03, 06, 08).

Current negotiations between the U.S. and the EU on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) agreement may impact countries that have free trade agreements with the U.S., like Israel. Given that the EU and the U.S. are Israel's two largest trading partners. It is believed that now is an important time to revisit discussions to update the U.S-Israel FTA to expand the opportunities for the two countries to deepen commercial ties and benefit from the latest innovations and patterns in global trade (U.S. Chamber of Commerce 07).

Table 02: U.S.-Israel Bilateral Trade Statistics (1948-2013)

Year	U.S. Imports from Israel	U.S. Exports to Israel	Total Trade	Annual Change
1948	\$5,000,000	\$29,000,000	\$34,000,000	
1949	\$6,000,000	\$79,000,000	\$85,000,000	148%
1950	\$8,000,000	\$92,000,000	\$100,000,000	17%
1951	\$12,000,000	\$107,000,000	\$119,000,000	20%
1952	\$12,000,000	\$90,000,000	\$102,000,000	-15%
1953	\$12,000,000	\$78,000,000	\$90,000,000	-12%
1954	\$14,000,000	\$74,000,000	\$88,000,000	-2%
1955	\$17,000,000	\$90,000,000	\$107,000,000	22%
1956	\$19,000,000	\$98,000,000	\$117,000,000	9%
1957	\$20,000,000	\$97,000,000	\$117,000,000	0%
1958	\$18,000,000	\$106,000,000	\$124,000,000	6%
1959	\$28,000,000	\$117,000,000	\$144,000,000	17%
1960	\$27,000,000	\$126,000,000	\$153,000,000	6%
1961	\$33,000,000	\$147,000,000	\$180,000,000	18%
1962	\$41,000,000	\$175,000,000	\$216,000,000	20%
1963	\$47,000,000	\$167,000,000	\$214,000,000	-1%
1964	\$56,000,000	\$181,000,000	\$238,000,000	11%
1965	\$62,000,000	\$224,000,000	\$286,000,000	20%
1966	\$77,000,000	\$210,000,000	\$287,000,000	0%
1967	\$87,000,000	\$196,000,000	\$283,000,000	-1%
1968	\$117,000,000	\$279,000,000	\$396,000,000	40%
1969	\$129,000,000	\$457,000,000	\$586,000,000	48%
1970	\$150,000,000	\$592,000,000	\$742,000,000	27%
1971	\$173,000,000	\$707,000,000	\$880,000,000	19%
1972	\$222,000,000	\$558,000,000	\$780,000,000	-11%
1973	\$269,000,000	\$962,000,000	\$1,231,000,000	58%
1974	\$280,000,000	\$01,206,000,000	\$1,486,000,000	21%
1975	\$314,000,000	\$01,551,000,000	\$1,865,000,000	26%
1976	\$423,000,000	\$01,409,000,000	\$1,832,000,000	-2%
1977	\$572,000,000	\$01,447,000,000	\$2,019,000,000	10%
1978	\$720,000,000	\$01,925,000,000	\$2,645,000,000	31%
1979	\$750,000,000	\$01,855,000,000	\$2,605,000,000	-2%
1980	\$950,000,000	\$02,045,000,000	\$2,995,000,000	15%
1981	\$1,243,000,000	\$02,521,000,000	\$3,764,000,000	26%
1982	\$1,164,000,000	\$02,271,000,000	\$3,435,000,000	-9%
1983	\$2,017,000,000	\$01,255,000,000	\$3,272,000,000	-5%
1984	\$2,194,000,000	\$01,750,000,000	\$3,944,000,000	21%
1985	\$2,123,000,000	\$02,580,000,000	\$4,703,000,000	19%
1986	\$2,418,000,000	\$02,239,000,000	\$4,657,000,000	-1%
1987	\$2,700,000,000	\$03,100,000,000	\$5,800,000,000	25%
1988	\$3,000,000,000	\$03,200,000,000	\$6,200,000,000	7%
1989	\$2,800,000,000	\$03,300,000,000	\$6,100,000,000	-2%
1990	\$3,312,000,000	\$03,200,000,000	\$6,512,000,000	7%
1991	\$3,484,000,000	\$03,911,000,000	\$7,395,000,000	14%
1992	\$3,815,000,000	\$04,074,000,000	\$7,889,000,000	7%
1993	\$4,420,000,000	\$04,429,000,000	\$8,849,000,000	12%
1994	\$5,229,000,000	\$04,994,000,000	\$10,223,000,000	16%

1995	\$5,709,000,000	\$05,621,000,000	\$11,330,000,000	11%
1996	\$6,434,000,000	\$06,012,000,000	\$12,446,000,000	10%
1997	\$7,326,000,000	\$05,995,000,000	\$13,321,000,000	7%
1998	\$8,640,000,000	\$06,983,000,000	\$15,623,000,000	17%
1999	\$9,870,000,000	\$07,695,000,000	\$17,565,000,000	12%
2000	\$12,964,000,000	\$07,746,000,000	\$20,710,000,000	18%
2001	\$11,959,000,000	\$07,475,000,000	\$19,434,000,000	-6%
2002	\$12,416,000,000	\$07,027,000,000	\$19,443,000,000	0%
2003	\$12,769,000,000	\$06,892,000,000	\$19,661,000,000	1%
2004	\$14,527,000,000	\$09,198,000,000	\$23,725,000,000	21%
2005	\$16,857,000,000	\$09,732,000,000	\$26,607,000,000	12%
2006	\$19,150,000,000	\$10,964,000,000	\$30,114,000,000	13%
2007	\$20,812,000,000	\$13,019,000,000	\$33,831,000,000	12%
2008	\$22,334,000,000	\$14,486,000,000	\$36,820,000,000	8%
2009	\$18,744,000,000	\$09,559,000,000	\$28,803,000,000	-23%
2010	\$20,975,000,000	\$11,272,000,000	\$32,247,000,000	14%
2011	\$23,000,000,000	\$14,000,000,000	\$37,000,000,000	14%
2012	\$22,129,000,000	\$14,268,000,000	\$36,397,000,000	-1.7%
2013	\$22,676,000,000	\$13,738,000,000	\$36,414,000,000	0%

Source: Office of the US Trade Representative / International Trade Administration

Recently, The U.S. Chamber of Commerce's U.S.-Israel Business Initiative and its partners in Israel submitted a Policy Discussion Paper (June 2014) where they both committed to supporting the U.S.-Israel bilateral commercial relationship. As well as continue to work collaboratively to pursue policy and organize activities that deepen this strategic alliance through greater trade and investment.

To fulfill this commitment, the Policy Discussion Paper included a series of recommendations that can help -for sure- in strengthening the U.S.-Israel commercial relationship. Among them there are: Establishing a U.S.-Israel Strategic Economic Dialogue, Updating the U.S.-Israel Free Trade Agreement, Promoting Support for Energy Development in Israel, Streamlining the Regulation of Hydrocarbons in Israel, Including Israel in the Visa Waiver Program, Developing an Effective Cyber Security Framework, Increasing U.S.-Israel Research & Development Collaboration, Continuing to Protect Intellectual Property, Making Infrastructure Procurement Processes More Competitive, and Promoting U.S.-Israel Third Party Cooperation (For complete details consult: The U.S. Chamber of Commerce para 01-07).

2-3. The U.S.-Israeli Religious and Intellectual Ties

Over the decades, American leaders have primarily explained the foundations of the U.S.-Israel relationship by properly citing “*shared values*”: the two countries’ common democracy, mutual experience in fighting for freedom, roots in Judeo-Christian culture and civilization, and commitment to the right of nations to live in security while manifesting the will of the people. As well as a strong ties with Israel based on the moral responsibility America bears to protect the small nation-state of the Jewish people.

the U.S. has built this unique bilateral relationship with Israel that enjoys the deep, long-standing support of the American people, bilateral ties commonly described by a broad, bipartisan consensus of U.S. political leaders as “unbreakable” (Blackwill and Slocomb 01).

Overall, as Eisenstadt and Pollock state, the U.S.-Israel special relationship has traditionally been defined in terms of a moral obligation, shared cultural and political values, and common interests (Eisenstadt and Pollock, *How the United States Benefits* 01).

2-3-1. The U.S.-Israeli Shared Religious Heritage

the U.S. has supported Israel as a part of a grand design for extending its influence into the Middle East; the U.S. support to Israel has many domestic political factors such as the Israeli lobby, Jewish vote, pro-Israeli PACS... among others. But by surveying the records of the past 45 years conclude that American support for Israel is more rooted in shared culture, ideology, and religious values than in anything else.

Zucker proofs beyond the doubt that reinforcing the effect of a common heritage and pioneering background were America's religious and historical ties to the Old Testament, which facilitated the development of natural kinship with the land of the Bible and people of the book. (570).

He explained that with the fact that the link between the ancient Hebrews and the modern Israelis was played up repeatedly; many Americans were reluctant to identify the cause of religion with that of state, and it has always been difficult to establish anything like a consensus concerning Israel among America's Christians. Besides, the Puritan heritage, which

identified the Old Testament with Supreme Good, can be said to have had an impact on American attitudes toward Israel (571).

It is a known fact that President Truman based his decision to recognize Israel on the abstract notion that Israelis and Americans shared basic beliefs rooted in Judeo-Christian values. His strong religious impulse resonated with many Christian Americans who saw Israel's rebirth as the fulfillment of biblical prophecy.

For many Christian Americans, supporting Israel has deepened their physical connection to the Holy Land. Early U.S. support for Israel was also built on the idea of a small democracy struggling for survival against the odds, all while trying to absorb hundreds of thousands of immigrants. Many Americans glimpsed themselves and the American pioneer spirit in Israel's struggle for independence and survival. (Malka 03; Eisenstadt and Pollock, *How the United States Benefits* 53, 54).

If believing American Christians were emotionally affected by the vision of Israel as the land where biblical promises were fulfilled, this vision promoted a much deeper bond between American Jews and the new Jewish state. The American Jewish attitudes toward Israel arose from the wellsprings of Jewish experience in America which reflect an attitude similar to that of Christian Americans. Even when most American Jews do not seek to disassociate themselves from their Jewish identity, they primarily visualize themselves as Americans and act accordingly. As a result, American Jewry's moral, political, and financial support for Israel reflects general American beliefs as well as identification with Judaism and multi-levels solidarity with the Jewish people (Zucker 571; Brad and Pies para 22).

The fundamental basis that can justify a bit the American Jewish attitude toward Israel lay in the fact that they have a sense of belonging to one family, of sharing heritage of faith, history, and fate. Although American Jewry is a highly complex community composed of diverse groups and viewpoints, and its members often in regard to Israel, the American Jewish community has nevertheless evinced attachment to the Jewish state and acknowledged its

sovereignty by helping to provide for Israel's financial as well as political needs (Zucker 571, 572; Brad and Pies para 23).

Nevertheless, given America's freedom and democratic political system, the Jewish community could openly express its loyalty to the State of Israel, "The National Home of the Entire Jewish People," whenever it deemed such expression necessary to Israel's security. It is the successful interrelation between Jewish and American believes those have allowed American Jews the unique position of being fully dedicated to and identified with America's domestic and foreign interests and acknowledge their Jewishness by supporting Israel (Zucker 573).

American Jews and evangelical Christians are two of the most politically engaged religious groups in the U.S. They're major constituencies, respectively, in the Democratic and Republican parties. And both are overwhelmingly pro-Israel. There are nuances here: evangelical support for Israel tends to be more uncritical than Jewish support.

For instance, a majority of reform and secular Jews - 65% of the American Jewish population- disapprove of Israel's expansion of West Bank settlements. And Jews under the age of 35 are the least likely to identify as Zionist. On the other hand, the older and more conservative Jews who aren't entirely representative of the more liberal body of Jewish-American public opinion toward Israel, have a lot of clout with national politicians. They express strong desire to vote based on the Israel issue and are clustered in large swing states in presidential elections (Beauchamp para 19, 20).

2-3-2. The U.S.-Israeli Intellectual Connections

Brad and Pies talk about an interesting fact that Israeli intellectuals are uniquely attuned to the life of the mind in the U.S.. Probably more Israelis show up as leading authors in the U.S. than do their counterparts from any non-English-language country and include such figures as Abba Eban, Amos Oz, and David Grossman. In certain fields such as Biblical studies and Middle East studies, Israel scholars not only enjoy a larger role than any other foreign nationality but drive the research agenda in the U.S. (para 17-19).

Opportunities for collaboration between the U.S. and Israel on science and technology are not abundant. Both countries are on the frontlines of developing new patents in the life sciences, nanotechnology, and a myriad of other fields. The U.S. ability to scale and help bring to market is unmatched globally (U.S. Chamber of Commerce 05). In the early 1970s, Israeli academics began looking for ways to expand investment in Israel's high technology sector. At the time, Israel's nascent technology sector, which would later become the driving force in the country's economy, was in need of private capital for research and development.

The U.S. and Israel launched several programs to stimulate Israeli industrial and scientific research; the Congress has on several occasions authorized and appropriated funds for the following organizations:

- **The BIRD Foundation** (Israel-U.S. Binational Research & Development Foundation). BIRD, which was established in 1977, provides matchmaking services between Israeli and American companies in research and development with the goal of expanding cooperation between U.S. and Israeli private high tech industries. The mission of the Foundation is “to stimulate, promote and support joint (non-defense) industrial R&D of mutual benefit to...” the two countries.

Since its creation, the BIRD Foundation has approved over 850 projects in several fields such as: homeland security, communications, electronics, electro-optics, software, life sciences, and renewable and alternative energies, among others. These projects were developed with leading American companies and cumulative sales of products developed under its auspices have sold over \$10 billion. The increased funding of the BIRD Foundation is a priority for the U.S. and Israeli private sectors.

- **The BSF Foundation** (U.S.-Israel Binational Science Foundation). BSF, which was started in 1972, promotes cooperation in scientific and technological research.

- **The BARD Foundation** (Binational Agriculture and Research and Development Fund). BARD was created in 1978 and supports U.S.-Israeli cooperation in agricultural research.

- **The (USISTF) Foundation** (The U.S.-Israel Science and Technology Foundation).

USISTF was established in 1995 to fund and administer projects mandated by the U.S.-Israel Science and Technology Commission (USISTC), a bilateral entity jointly established by the U.S. Department of Commerce and the Israel Ministry of Industry, Trade, and Labor in 1994 to foster scientific, technological, and economic cooperation between the two countries (Sharp 20, 21; Brad and Pies para 14; U.S. Chamber of Commerce 05, 06).

Conclusion:

The Special Relationship between the U.S. and Israel has been a curious one in the world affairs and American culture. It is well expressed in the levels of U.S.' strategic alliance, economic ties, as well as shared religious and intellectual values with Israel.

First of all, over the years, these two countries special relationships would continue to develop, mature, and to define much about U.S. policy in the region. Indeed, of the original reasons for America's involvement in the Middle East the oil and Israel, only these two really continue to shape U.S. policy. Regardless of political differences between the U.S. and Israel about the Middle East, what binds the bilateral ties has been stronger strategically on both of the foreign policy and military cooperation levels than what divides them.

Secondly, Israel is a leading recipient of U.S. foreign aid and a frequent purchaser of major U.S. weapons systems. By law, U.S. arms sales cannot adversely affect Israel's QME over other countries in its region. The two countries signed a free trade agreement in 1985, and the U.S. is Israel's largest trading partner.

Finally, Jews have a well-known special interests in Israel as well as Christians. A substantial majority of Christian Americans consistently sympathizes with Israel, which it does not see as just another country but as a key source of the shared Judeo-Christian heritage. The special feeling for Israel translates directly into policy. While the U.S public dislikes foreign aid in general, polls show that most Americans strongly support economic and military aid to Israel.

Chapter Three

The Multiple Challenges of U.S.-Israel Special Relationship

Introduction:

In the past, U.S. Middle East interests included containing Soviet expansion into the region, ensuring industrialized countries' access to Middle Eastern petroleum resources, fostering the growth of democracy and market economies, maintaining communication and trade with the region, and ensuring Israel's security (Mark 01).

Today, Things changed, Because over the 42 years since the last major Arab-Israeli war in 1973, Israel has relied on the three important advantages all either explicitly or implicitly backed by the U.S. to remove or minimize potential threats to its security and existence, especially: Overwhelming conventional military superiority; formally ambiguous but universally presumed regional nuclear weapons exclusivity; de facto arrangements or relations with the authoritarian leaders of its Arab state neighbors aimed at preventing interstate conflict (Zanotti 17).

The U.S. and Israel may ascribe different levels of challenges they face, accept varying degrees of risk in addressing them, and disagree on ways to advance their common national interests. Over the decades, the two sides have periodically had policy are-ups, some even bitter, on topics ranging from Israel's preemptive action against Iran's nuclear reactor to its ongoing conflicts with Arabs and Palestinians and the major intruding that Israeli lobbies do in the American decision making beside their role in spying on the U.S. (Blackwill and Slocomb 05, 06).

As the U.S. and Israel have a very different capabilities, one a superpower, the other a regional power, it should be expected that both of them will not agree on everything and will sometimes have different concerns. The following details are the best proof.

3-1. The Palestinian-Israeli Conflict

Pressman track down the origin of the modern conflict between Jews and Arabs, the precursor to the Arab-Israeli conflict that began in 1881. At that time, about 565,000 Arabs and 24,000 Jews lived in Palestine; about 90% of the Arabs were Muslim while most of the rest were Christian. A few Zionist Jews from outside the Holy Land decided they wanted to immigrate to Palestine, then a part of the Ottoman Empire.

Pressman adds to that, Zionism, one form of Jewish nationalism, called for the return of Jews to the Holy Land and the re-establishment of a Jewish homeland; the last independent Jewish state had been destroyed in 63 BCE. The Zionists fled European anti-Semitism and rejected two other, more popular options for 19th century Jews: Assimilation in Western Europe based on the progressive values of the Enlightenment and immigration to the U.S.(01).

Though aid to Israel has detractors as well as supporters, overall U.S. public support for Israel remains strong. According to a March 2013 Gallup poll that measured Americans' sympathy toward the disputants in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, 64% said their sympathies lie with the Israelis and 12% said their sympathies lie with the Palestinians. According to Gallup, the 64% favorable response toward Israel "ties the highest Gallup has recorded in a quarter century, last seen in 1991 during the Gulf War" (Sharp 01).

3-1-1. The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict Timeline

The history of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict has a convenient elasticity; it changes dramatically depending on who is telling it and where they start the story. Therefore, it is important to note that a historic timeline of events concerning this conflict is always difficult to present in an objective manner.

Table 04: The Top Events in The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict History

<i>Date</i>	<i>Event</i>	<i>Description</i>
1917	Balfour Declaration	The British Balfour Declaration promised to create a Jewish homeland in the region comprising the ancient Land of Israel. "His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavors to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country."
1920-1947	British Mandate for Palestine	The League of Nations divided Ottoman lands between the British and the French after WWI. Britain was given the Palestine Mandate on land comprising modern-day Israel, the West Bank, Gaza Strip and Jordan. The Mandate incorporated the language of the Balfour Declaration. In 1921, Britain created Transjordan as a subdivision of the mandate in the area east of the Jordan River. During the same period, the Arab population nearly doubled from natural increase and immigration from neighboring Arab countries. The Jewish population formed community organizations. Arab resistance to Jewish immigration grew, causing the British to sharply limit Jewish immigration.
1947	UN Partition Plan	In 1947, amidst growing tensions between Arabs, Jews, and the British, Britain announced its plan to pull out of the region and turned the question of sovereignty over to the United Nations. On November 29, 1947 the UN General Assembly voted to partition the Palestine Mandate into an Arab state and a Jewish state and to internationalize the city of Jerusalem. Although it was less than they hoped for, the Jews accepted the partition. The Arabs in the Palestine Mandate and the Arab states rejected it and increased attacks on Jews.
1948-1949	1948 War	In accordance with the UN Partition Plan, David Ben-Gurion proclaimed the independence of the new State of Israel on May 14, 1948 and became Israel's first Prime Minister. The following day, Arab armies from Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and Iraq attacked the Jewish state. This was the first Arab-Israeli war. As a result, Israel obtained 20% more land than the UN partition allotted. Jordan captured the West Bank and East Jerusalem (the Old City), later annexing them. Egypt took control of the Gaza Strip. Arab countries would not enter into a peace agreement with Israel. Armistice boundaries were established and remained until 1967.

1964	Establishment of the PLO	The Palestine Liberation Organization was formed with the aim of fighting Israel and creating a Palestinian state in its place.
1967	Six-Day War	In the days before the war, Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Iraq moved their armies to Israel's borders. Egypt closed the international water way, the Straits of Tiran, to all Israeli shipping. These actions were accompanied by Arab leaders' statements about their intent to destroy Israel. After weeks of fruitless diplomacy, Israel launched a preemptive strike against the Arab armies mobilized on its borders, and a six-day war ensued between Israel and them. As a result of the war, Israel captured the West Bank and East Jerusalem from Jordan, the Golan Heights from Syria, and the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Peninsula from Egypt.
1973	October War	Egypt and Syria attacked Israel. After initial Arab military successes, the Israelis managed to push back the attack. Syrian troops were stopped ten miles from the Israeli town of Tiberias; after the war, Israel retained the territories captured in 1967.
1978	Camp David Accords	Menachem Begin and Anwar al-Sadat signed agreements in Camp David. The American-sponsored talks paved the way to the peace treaty signed in 1979.
1979	Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty	As a result of intense diplomatic efforts by the U.S., Egypt became the first Arab country to recognize and enter into a peace treaty with Israel. For its part, Israel returned to Egypt all of the Sinai that had been captured during the 1967 war. This agreement became a model for Israel's "land for peace" policy.
1987-1993	The First Intifada	Palestinians in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank engaged in intifada against Israeli control of these territories. Palestinians attacked Israelis with improvised weapons and firearms supplied by the PLO. This conflict continued until the Oslo Accords were signed in 1993.
1993	The Oslo Accords	The Oslo Accords were a set of agreements that began in 1993 when Israel and the PLO signed a Declaration of Principles. The Oslo Accords led to the creation of the Palestinian Authority, which had responsibility for administering the territory under its control. For the first time Israel formally recognized the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people. The Oslo Accords were intended to be an interim agreement that would lead to a permanent settlement with Israel giving up land in return for peace and security.
2000-2005	The Second Intifada	In September 2000, Israeli opposition leader Ariel Sharon visited the Jewish Temple Mount, Palestinians claimed that Sharon's visit was provocative and began to resist. There is no definitive event marking the end of the Second Intifada. Many people suggest late 2004 or early 2005. Others argue it never stopped.
		Between December 27, 2008 and January 18, 2009, Israel targeted Hamas strongholds in Gaza to stop ongoing rocket attacks on civilian towns in southern

2008-2009	The Gaza Conflict	Israel and. Hundreds of militants were killed, as were many civilians. Gaza's buildings and economy were heavily damaged.
2012	Prisoner Exchange for Gilad Shalit	In 2006 Hamas militants captured Israeli Army soldier Gilad Shalit in a cross-border raid into Israel from Gaza. Hamas held Shalit captive for five years. In 2011, Israel made a deal with Hamas to release 1,027 Palestinian prisoners held in Israel in exchange for him.
2013-2014	Kerry Israeli - Palestinian Authority Peace Talks	In 2013, a new round of direct peace talks between Israel and the Palestinian Authority took place, led by U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry. Hamas, did not participate in the talks. The negotiating teams for both sides met many times during the agreed upon nine-month negotiating period. Despite promising developments during negotiations, the peace talks collapsed after the announcement of the formation of a unity government by Palestinian factions, Hamas and Fatah on April 23, 2014.

Source: Timeline of the Arab-Israeli Conflict and Peace Process –
History of The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

3-1-2. The U.S. Point of View on the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

According to Waxman, while the U.S. and Israel agree on many things about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict: The desired outcome; the need for direct bilateral negotiations between the two parties in order to resolve the dispute; and the unacceptability of Hamas as a negotiating partner. There are still some major points of disagreement between them. The most obvious concern is Israeli settlement building in the West Bank and East Jerusalem a subject of longstanding disagreement between Israeli and U.S. governments (75).

The author noticed that every previous U.S. administration has opposed Israeli settlement construction, and every Israeli government has balked at stopping this construction, although some have slowed it down, while others have speeded it up. There is, therefore, nothing new about the Obama administration's repeated condemnations of settlement building by the Netanyahu government, except that it has been more vocal and unambiguous about it.

The Obama administration, along with many experts inside and outside the U.S. government, recognizes that settlement building is a critical issue and has a major impact on the Israeli-Palestinian peace process beside their importance to the Palestinians themselves. Instead of regarding the continued expansion of Israeli settlements as merely a nuisance (76).

Jones confirm along his Executive Summary the fact that the current situation of Israeli-Palestinian conflict poses many hurdles to the U.S. national security policy at home, abroad, and specifically, in the Middle East. Since the founding of Israel with the goal of a establishing a Jewish state, there has been constant tension and conflict between the Israelis and the Palestinian.

He carries on, the Palestinians apprehension towards Israel comes from the forced removal of local Palestinians that took place in 1948 in order to make room for the Jewish state, the Palestinian lands had been taken over by Israel in multiple military actions over the past 60 years that saw the taking of the predominantly Palestinian areas of Gaza and the West Bank, the division and inaccessibility of the holy city of Jerusalem, the Israeli security barrier which has walled off the Palestinian areas and effectively turned the cities into a prison, and the view that Israel has dealt with Palestine unjustly.

No doubt, as Jones proves, this conflict has special implications to the U.S. because it has maintained a staunch alliance with Israel since its founding. This relationship was seen by the U.S as a way to counter balance the threats that other state actors in the region play and also to be a “shining beacon” of democracy in the Middle East. Although it has ostracized the Palestinian people and has caused many consequences for the U.S. abroad and will dictate American national security policy for the region (09).

The immediate prospects of a negotiated settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict seems dim. The most recent U.S.-backed round of peace talks ended unsuccessfully in April 2014 after differences between the parties on long-standing core issues of Israeli-Palestinian dispute were exacerbated by the parties’ respective actions during the negotiating process. Neither Israeli leaders, nor Palestinian leaders of the Fatah and Hamas factions that are preoccupied with maintaining their domestic credibility and respective aspects of control in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, appear disposed to make substantive compromises (Zanotti 24).

Overall, the perception that Israel bears a measure of responsibility for the current impasse with the Palestinian Authority has gained traction in various circles in the United States, including parts of official Washington, and could someday endanger the U.S.-Israeli relationship. This is a largely self-inflicted wound; greater restraint with regard to land expropriations, the destruction of illegal Palestinian dwellings, and settlement construction would help avoid unnecessary tensions between Israel and the U.S. while keeping the focus on the many common interests these allies share (Eisenstadt and Pollock, How the United States Benefits xiv)

3-2. The Iranian Nuclear Threat

The major world powers followed a two-track policy toward Iran: encouraging it to engage in diplomatic negotiations, while imposing increasingly comprehensive sanctions against Iran's energy and financial sectors. Both the U.S. and Israel promoted the imposition of sanctions as well as the search for a diplomatic resolution, while warning that there will be a time limit for these policies, and that "all options" - including military action - remain on the table (The Iranian Nuclear Threat: Why it Matters 13).

Today, the international concerns about Iran's nuclear program have reached the fever pitch. At times it seems that the U.S. and Israel war with Iran is imminent. But what is the actual status of Iran's nuclear program? And what key concerns must both of the U.S. and Israel's policy makers weigh as they consider this issue? (The United States and the Iranian Nuclear Program para 01)

3-2-1. The Iranian Nuclear Program Background

The Nuclear Program of Iran was launched in the 1950s with the help of the U.S. as a part of the Atoms for Peace program. The participation of the U.S. and Western European governments in Iran's nuclear program continued until the 1979 Iranian Revolution that toppled the Shah of Iran. After it, a clandestine nuclear weapons research program was disbanded by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini (1902-1989), who considered such weapons as

sinful and forbidden as unethical and immoral in Muslim jurisprudence (Nuclear program of Iran para 01; Coats and Robb 38).

In 2002, undeclared nuclear research in Iran had been made public. When an opposition group revealed secret activity including construction of a uranium enrichment plant and a heavy-water reactor. Subsequently, Iran agreed to inspections by the global nuclear watch organization, the IAEA. But the IAEA was unable to confirm that Iran had not seen to develop nuclear weapons (Iran nuclear crisis para 11; Coats and Robb 39).

The IAEA inspections have cast doubt on the Iranian government's assertions that the Islamic Republic's program is for peaceful purposes only. A June 6, 2003 IAEA report found that the Iranian government could not explain the presence of uranium metal in its nuclear fuel cycle, since "neither its light water reactors nor its planned heavy water reactors require uranium metal for fuel." When the Iranian government explained that such metal was contamination on equipment purchased from Pakistan, it contradicted its earlier assertions that their enrichment program was entirely indigenous.

The inspections have also found traces of bomb-grade uranium at other sites, and revealed that Iranian scientists have experimented with Polonium-210, a substance used to initiate the chain reaction leading to the detonation of a nuclear bomb (Coats and Robb 36).

Despite the many negotiations engaged in by the international community with Iran through countries or organizations, the situation has gradually been worsened and the West became convinced that Iranian reluctance to cooperate and its obstinacy in enriching uranium on its own were hiding nuclear-armed projects. Although the program is conducted in shadow and there are no proofs of its military goals, Iran is expected to acquire the bomb within a few years (Long 01; Kahl et al. 20).

The Iranian officials justified their nuclear program in many different ways. Some argue that energy needs motivate the programs; others cite prestige or even security concerns. As the Islamic Republic develops a nuclear capacity, it become impossible for the international community members to determine Tehran's intent.

While the 2007 U.S. National Intelligence Estimate suggests Iran ended its nuclear weapons program in 2003, ambiguity surrounds Iranian goals. Indeed, it is quite likely that the Iranian government has yet to decide whether or not they will build a bomb and transform an ostensibly civilian program into a military program. In the short-term, Tehran may not exercise its capacity but, should Iran develop the know-how, in the long-term, it probably will (Coats and Robb 36; Kahl et al. 21, 22).

This situation led the U.S. and its allies to put more press on Iran to stop enriching uranium. Talks failed to make any progress and in 2005 the IAEA referred Iran to the UN Security Council for failing to comply with the NPT. Since then, the Security Council has adopted six resolutions requiring Iran to stop enriching uranium, some imposing sanctions (Iran nuclear crisis para 12).

By September 12, 2011, Iran's first nuclear power plant *Bushehr I* reactor was complete with major assistance of the Russian government agency and opened officially. Iran has announced that it is working on a new 360 MW nuclear power plant to be located in Darkhovin and has indicated that it will seek more medium-sized nuclear power plants and uranium mines in the future (Nuclear program of Iran para 01). In 2012, the US and EU began imposing an additional sanctions on Iranian oil exports and banks, putting pressure on Iran to negotiate (Iran nuclear crisis para 12).

3-2-2. Three parties views on the Iranian nuclear program

A nuclear-armed Iran would pose a significant challenge to U.S. and Israeli interests and would increase the prospects for regional conflicts. Nevertheless, a preventive military strike against Iran's nuclear program by either of them at this time is not the best option, and rushing to war would risk making the threat worse (Kahl et al. 05).

For several years, world leaders have described Iran and its reported pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability as an imminent threat, though there are a range of views among the officials and analysts regarding how to address the threat and the potential implications it has

for Israel's security and its international relationships (Zanotti 18). These points of view on the Iranian nuclear program vary greatly, as they are very contentious geopolitical issue.

3-2-2-A.The Iranian position

The Iranians believe that their concerns about the nuclear weapons proliferation are pre-textual, and any suspension of enrichment is simply intended to ultimately deprive Iran of their right to have an independent nuclear technology. Iran says that its inalienable right to peaceful nuclear technology has been the subject of *"the most extensive and intensive campaign of denial, obstruction, intervention and misinformation"* and that the international community has been subjected to *"bias, politicized and exaggerated information"* on the Iranian nuclear program and activities.

After the 1979 Iranian Revolution, Iran informed the IAEA of its plans to restart its nuclear program using indigenously made nuclear fuel, and in 1983 the IAEA planned to provide assistance in uranium conversion to Iran under its Technical Assistance Program, until the program was terminated under U.S. pressure. An IAEA report at the time stated clearly that its aim was to *"contribute to the formation of local expertise and manpower needed to sustain an ambitious program in the field of nuclear power reactor technology and fuel cycle technology"*.

Iran announced later plans in 1995 to build a uranium hexafluoride (UF₆) conversion plant at the Nuclear Technical Centre in Esfahan, with Chinese assistance. During November 1996, Iran informed the IAEA Department of Safeguards that it planned to build a (UF₆) that was scheduled to open after 2000, but the project was abandoned by China under pressure from the U.S. in October 1997. The Iranians informed the IAEA that they would complete the project nonetheless. In 2000, the Iranians completed it, using the blueprints provided to them by China, and declared the facility to the IAEA.

Iran argued that it disclosed information about its programs in which "in nearly all cases, it was not any way obliged to disclose it in accordance with its obligations under its safeguards agreement with the IAEA." Iran declares its voluntary confidence building

measures were only "reciprocated by broken promises and expanded requests" and that the EU3 "simply wanted prolonged and fruitless negotiations" to inhibit Iran from exercising its inalienable right to peaceful nuclear technology.

However, Iran kept insisting that it will not suspend its enrichment because "it would further be deprived from its inalienable right to work on nuclear fuel cycle, with the aim of producing required fuels for its research reactors and nuclear power plants."

Iran also believed it has a legal right to enrich uranium for peaceful purposes under the NPT, a right which in 2005 the U.S. and the EU-03 began to assert had been forfeited by a clandestine nuclear program that came to light in 2002. Iranian politicians compare its treatment as a signatory to the NPT with three nuclear-armed nations that have not signed the NPT: Israel, India, and Pakistan. India and Pakistan developed an indigenous nuclear weapons capability, and it is widely suspected that Israel has as well: Israel by 1966, India by 1974, and Pakistan by 1990 (Views on the nuclear para 02-14; Coats and Robb 46-48).

Nowadays, Iran is reportedly offering to freeze the current number of operating centrifuges for three to seven years. After that, it argues, there must be sufficient enrichment capacity to produce fuel for the Bushehr power plant when its fuel supply agreement with Russia expires in 2021. That would require Iran to expand its current capacity 10-fold or more. In return, Iran says it would ship almost all its stock of low-enriched uranium to Russia and accept more intrusive inspections by the IAEA. The P5+1 has noted that Russia, which recently agreed to build two new reactors in Iran, is prepared to supply fuel for Bushehr for its lifetime (Iran nuclear crisis para 17-18; Kahl et al. 25).

3-2-2-B. The Israeli viewpoint

Terrill alleged that Israel has a unique historical legacy making it especially sensitive to any military threats from hostile powers such as Iran. The Nazi Holocaust in particular has given many Israelis an enduring sense of vulnerability, while Israel's limited acceptance by other states within the Middle East has contributed to an ongoing sense of insecurity (82, 83).

These crucial situation, made it understandable to accept when Israeli leaders have asserted that even if Iran does not use, intends to use, or even manufactures a nuclear weapon, its mere capacity to do so will increase its deterrence by raising the potential costs Israel and others would incur by acting against it or its allies.

The resulting intimidation could lead Arab Gulf states in proximity to Iran to adopt more quiescent or pro-Iranian policies or to pursue nuclear capabilities of their own. In turn, this could open the way for increased Iranian influence and/or nuclear proliferation throughout the region that Prime Minister Netanyahu emphasizes would pose a “grave danger” to Israel (Zanotti 17; Terrill 83).

Petras argued that Israel's political and military leadership have repeatedly and openly declared their preparation to militarily attack Iran in the immediate future. Their influential supporters in the U.S. have made Israel's war policy the number one priority in their efforts to secure Presidential and Congressional backing. The arguments put forth by the Israeli government and echoed by their followers in the US regarding Iran's nuclear threat are without substance or fact and have aroused opposition and misgivings throughout the world, among European governments, international agencies, among most U.S. military leaders and the public, and the world oil industry (122).

Israelis believe they are faced with a new context where Iran has practically crossed the technological threshold. They believe that opacity has proved in the past vital in preventing Arabs from moving to a nuclear path. An Israeli low nuclear profile made life easier for Arab leaders not eager to engage in a costly nuclear competition with Israel. However, if Iran ends up becoming a full-fledged nuclear power, this would mark the collapse of the Non-Proliferation Treaty regime, and the decline of the region into nuclear proliferation as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Turkey move to counter the Shiite ‘nuclear empire.’

In this circumstance, Israel is skeptical of President Obama’s vision of a world without nuclear weapons, and concerned that his administration is moving away from previous understandings with Israel. Israel would fight the emerging American doctrine of equality

among states in the nuclear realm, which has been supported by America's Arab allies in the region. Israel's principled position would be that if the international community fails to stop Iran, then it will have no choice but to eliminate the threat and uphold its role as the refuge of the Jewish people. Which means the possibility of unilateral Israeli military action against Iranian nuclear program sites (Ben Ami 01, 02; Zanotti 19).

The U.S. policy of "dual-containment," beginning in 1993, and directed at isolating Iran drew much of approval from Israel, under the rule of both Rabin and Netanyahu governments. Especially when the Israeli intelligence analysts and high-level officials, including the Prime Minister began, in the early 1997, presenting their American counterparts with evidence of an accelerated Iranian missile program, based on extensive technical assistance from Russia (Steinberg 66; Terrill 84).

Overall, the official Israeli position on March 05, 2012, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu addressed the AIPAC annual policy conference in Washington and described the grave threat posed by Iran's nuclear ambitions. *"Iran calls for Israel's destruction, and they work for its destruction – each day, every day,"* Netanyahu said. *"This is how Iran behaves today, without nuclear weapons. Think of how they will behave tomorrow, with nuclear weapons. Iran will be even more reckless and a lot more dangerous."*

Arguing that a nuclear-armed Iran would be undesirable, Netanyahu stated that *"responsible leaders should not bet the security of their countries on the belief that the world's most dangerous regimes won't use the world's most dangerous weapons"*. Those weapons could be used directly or *"Iran could threaten all of us with nuclear terrorism"*. Netanyahu further predicted that Tehran would extend its nuclear umbrella over Hezbollah, Hamas and other Iranian-backed militants, emboldening them to increase their attacks against Israel and the U.S.. Finally, warning of the emergence of a Middle East with multiple nuclear-armed rivals, Netanyahu concluded that *"the world's most volatile region would become a nuclear tinderbox waiting to go off"* (Kahl et al. 07).

3-2-2-C. The U.S. viewpoint

Although the U.S.-Iranian relationship today is fraught with tension, for many years the two countries were close allies. In fact, it was with U.S. support that the Iranian government began its nuclear program in the 1960s to produce nuclear fuel. In 1968 Iran signed the NPT, the international treaty that regulates international nuclear activities and aims to prevent the proliferation, or spread, of nuclear weapons.

In 1979, a popular revolution overthrew Iran's U.S.-backed government and established an Islamic Republic. Under this political system, Iranians elect their president and legislators, but Islamic clerics have final say over all government decisions. U.S.-Iranian relations quickly deteriorated after Iranians took American diplomats hostage at the end of 1979. The relationship has never recovered. To this day, Iran and the U.S. do not have a formal diplomatic relations.

For many years after the Popular Revolution, Iran continued to allow regular inspections to its nuclear program by monitors from the IAEA. Then, in 2003, Iran admitted it had been secretly enriching uranium. In the face of international condemnation, Iran voluntarily suspended but the suspension was short lived. In 2006, when a deal with the international community wasn't achieved, Iran began enriching uranium again.

Yet, the IAEA has expressed concerns about Iran's nuclear program, it has stated that there is no definitive proof that Iran is developing nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, the U.S. and other governments around the world worry that Iran intends to build nuclear weapons. Iran's President Ahmadinejad has defended Iran's right to a nuclear program on the basis that it is only developing nuclear materials for peaceful purposes, a right protected under the NPT.

The U.S. response to Iran's nuclear program is tied to a number of important issues. The U.S. has labeled the Iranian government "A State Sponsor of Terrorism" for its support of the so called radical Islamic groups like Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in the Palestinian Territories. In addition, the U.S. accuses the Iranian government of human rights abuses against the Iranian people.

Israel security is a concern for U.S. policy makers. Iranian leaders have taken a hostile stance towards Israel, and Israeli leaders consider Iran to be one of the greatest threats to their country's security. Some observers fear that the Israelis will launch their own attack on Iran's nuclear facilities if the U.S. government does not take a strong enough stance against Iran's nuclear aspirations. This could force the U.S. into a military conflict that could potentially spark a bigger, regional war.

At the same time, the economies of the U.S. and its allies are closely tied to the oil that flows from the Persian Gulf. The continued flow of oil at steady prices is a critical part of the U.S. economic recovery from the financial crisis. Some observers warn that any increase in oil prices could plunge the global economy back into recession. U.S. policy makers must consider the effect that any policy toward Iran will have on the flow of oil (Steinberg 66, 67 ; Terrill 81, 82; See also: the U.S. and the Iranian Nuclear Program para 01; The Iranian Nuclear Threat: Why it Matters para 01-06).

Overall, Petras stated that as Israel and the Jewish lobbies intensified their efforts to provoke a U.S. economic and military confrontation with Iran, disputes within the Washington establishment surfaced. The conflicts and mutual attacks extended throughout the state institutions, and into the public discourse. Supporters and opponents of Israel's war policy represent powerful segments of state institutions and civil society.

On the side of the Israeli war policy are practically all the major and most influential Jewish organizations, the pro- Israeli lobbies, their political action committees, a sector of the White House, a majority of subsidized Congressional representatives and state, and local and party leaders.

The other side are sectors of the Pentagon, State Department, a minority of Congressional members, a majority of public opinion, a minority of American Jews and the majority of active and retired military commanders who have served or are serving in Iraq (Petras 124, 125).

3-3. The Israeli Lobbies and its impact on the U.S.

The term "Israeli lobby" is used as a convenient short-hand term for a loose coalition of individuals and organizations that consists of Jews, Neoconservatives, and Christian evangelicals that actively work to shape the U.S. foreign policy in a pro-Israel direction. The lobby's activities are essentially consistent with the interest-group tradition that has long governed American political life (Mearsheimer and Walt 40; Jones et al. 04).

The Israel lobby is one of the most powerful and pervasive special interest groups in the U.S. that work to influence Congress, the president, academia, the media, religious institutions, and American public opinion on behalf of Israel (Weir Introduction to para 01)

3-3-1. A Partial List of the Most Powerful Israeli Lobbies in the U.S.

Both of Mearsheimer and Walt believe that Jewish-Americans differ on specific Israeli policies. Many of the key organizations in the lobby are run by hardliners who generally supported the expansionist policies of Israel's Likud party, including its hostility to the Oslo peace process. The bulk of U.S. Jewry, on the other hand, is more favorably disposed to making concessions to the Palestinians, and a few groups strongly advocate such steps. Despite these differences, the majority of organized groups in the American Jewish community favor steadfast U.S. support for Israel (40).

Table 03: The Top Influential Israeli Lobbies in the U.S.

The Israeli Lobby Name	Its Description
<p><i>The American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC)</i></p>	<p>The most prominent governmental lobbying organization on behalf of Israel. Fortune Magazine typically rates it as the 02nd most powerful lobby in the U.S. AIPAC frequently writes legislation for members of Congress, which extraordinarily large majorities of both parties typically endorse.</p> <p>It has a \$100 million endowment and annual revenue of about \$60 million and spends about \$02-03 million each year in lobbying Congress. AIPAC's annual conventions are typically a who's who of high government office from both parties pledging their loyalty to Israel.</p>
<p><i>Pro-Israel Political Action</i></p>	<p>AIPAC does not give campaign contributions itself but instead uses a campaign finance network consisting of around thirty Pro-Israel Political Action Committees (PACs), which AIPAC is constantly signaling.</p> <p>Only four of these PACs have names that indicate their true agenda, such as</p>

<p><i>Committees (PACs)</i></p>	<p>‘Allies for Israel’ or ‘World Alliance for Israel.’ The rest have innocuous names like ‘National Action Committee’ or ‘Heartland PAC.’ Constituents usually don’t realize their candidates are receiving money from PACs that advance the interests of a foreign government.</p>
<p><i>Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations (CoP)</i></p>	<p>This group of 51 Zionist organizations advocate on behalf of Israel, including a focus on Iran. It had revenues of over \$02.2 million in 2011. All members of the CoP sit on AIPAC’s executive committee.</p> <p>The Conference of Presidents focuses on lobbying the Executive branch while AIPAC concentrates on Congress.</p>
<p><i>The American Israel Education Foundation (AIEF)</i></p>	<p>AIEF is a subsidiary of AIPAC that takes Congressional Representatives on all-expense-paid trips to Israel. In August 2011, 81 members of Congress from both parties took trips to Israel with the AIEF.</p> <p>Roll Call reports that in 2012 “The American Israel Education Foundation spent more than \$650,000 last year - more than any other group - to send more than 60 lawmakers and staffers to Israel for tours of Jerusalem, seminars on Israeli politics and discussions of asymmetric warfare.”</p>
<p><i>The Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP)</i></p>	<p>WINEP is a highly influential think tank that pushes Israel-centric Middle East policies. It was founded by a former AIPAC employee, and while it claims to promote a “balanced and realistic” understanding of the Middle East, it is “funded by individuals deeply committed to advancing Israel’s agenda.”</p> <p>It is frequently called upon by both the government and the media to provide “expert” analysis on Middle East issues. Its 2010 revenues were \$09.4 million, and its net assets total \$23.5 million.</p>
<p><i>Anti-Defamation League (ADL)</i></p>	<p>The ADL bills itself as a civil rights institution devoted to stamping out anti-Semitism. But in practice, it regularly works to promote Israeli interests and attacks virtually any prominent person who criticized Israel and labels them “anti-Semitic.”</p> <p>It has also been involved in a large spying operation against American citizens who opposed the policies of Israel and the Apartheid regime in South Africa. It is an architect of “hate crimes legislation” that may effectively criminalize criticism of Israeli policies.</p> <p>The ADL is a member of the CoP with revenues of around \$60 million and net assets of over \$115 million.</p>
<p><i>International Fellowship of Christians and Jews (aka Stand for Israel)</i></p>	<p>Founded in 1983 by Rabbi Yechiel Eckstein to promote understanding between Jews and Christians and build broad support for Israel, it promotes advocacy for Israel among mostly right-wing Christians. It has annual revenues of nearly \$100 million.</p>
<p><i>Christians United for Israel (CUFI)</i></p>	<p>CUFI is a right-wing Evangelical Christian organization founded by John Hagee to advocate for American support for Israel based largely on Biblical prophecy. It has a nationwide membership of over one million advocates for Israel. CUFI has high-level contacts within the Israeli government, including with the Prime Minister, who sometimes speaks at their events.</p>

<p><i>The Israel Project</i></p>	<p>Founded in 2003, the Israel Project specializes in pro-Israel propaganda targeting the press and the American public. The organization has 70 employees and an \$11 million annual budget. In 2011 it opened additional bureaus in India and China and launched a website in Arabic.</p>
<p><i>Friends of the Israeli Defense Forces (FIDF)</i></p>	<p>This American organization supports the Israeli armed forces. It hosts lavish fundraisers and has fourteen regional offices in the U.S. and one in Latin America. FIDF also brings hundreds of Israeli soldiers to the U.S. every year to lecture at synagogues, universities, and schools in order to increase American support for Israeli policies. It has annual revenues of around \$60 million and net assets of \$80 million.</p>
<p><i>America's Voices in Israel (AVI)</i></p>	<p>A project of the Conference of Presidents, AVI works to "strengthen American understanding of and support for Israel by inviting U.S.-based radio talk show hosts to see Israel and broadcast their programs live from Jerusalem." It also brings celebrities and other "opinion makers" on guided tours of Israel.</p>

Source: Weir. Introduction to the Israel Lobby

3-3-2. The Impact Levels of the Israeli Lobbies on the U.S.

According to Mearsheimer and Walt, the Israeli lobby pursues two broad strategies to promote U.S. support for Israel. First, it wields significant influence in Washington, pressuring both Congress and the Executive Branch to support Israel down the line. Whatever an individual lawmaker or policy maker's own views, the lobby tries to make supporting Israel the "smart" political choice.

Second, the lobby strives to ensure that public discourse about Israel portrays it in a positive light, by repeating myths about Israel and its founding and by publicizing Israel's side in the policy debates of the day. The goal is to prevent critical commentary about Israel from getting a fair hearing in the political arena. Controlling the debate is essential to guaranteeing U.S. support, because a candid discussion of U.S.-Israeli relations might lead Americans to favor a different policy (42).

3-3-2 -A. On the Foreign Policy Level

The core of the Israeli lobby consists of American Jews who make a significant effort in their daily lives to bend U.S. foreign policy so that it advances Israel's interests. Their activities go beyond merely voting for candidates who are pro-Israel. But the lobby is not synonymous with American Jews. Israel is not a salient issue for many of them, and many do not support the lobby's positions (Mearsheimer and Walt 40).

Over the past 40 years, there has been an increase in Jewish special interests groups and lobbies that have held powerful influence over the U.S. policymaking apparatus. While support for Israel is a key component that underlines U.S. foreign policy, there is a constant pressure applied by the Israel lobby and the Christian Zionist movement.

To mitigate the external pressure from various hard-line lobbies, Washington must work closely with moderate supporters of Israel, pursue new methods of campaign finance reform, challenge the lobby's interests, and call for more open debate that stimulates new solutions for a complex issues such as the Palestinian-Israeli conflict (Jones et al. 04).

Mearsheimer and Walt confirm the fact that Jewish-Americans have formed an impressive array of organizations to influence American foreign policy, of which AIPAC is the most powerful and well-known. In 1997, *Fortune* magazine asked members of Congress and their staffs to list the most powerful lobbies in Washington. AIPAC was ranked second behind the American Association of Retired People (AARP). A *National Journal* study in March 2005 reached a similar conclusion, placing AIPAC in second place in Washington's "muscle rankings" (41).

As an example of the Israeli lobbies is attached with the U.S. policy in general, the (AIPAC) website state that “the United States and Israel have formed a unique partnership to meet the growing strategic threats in the Middle East ... This cooperative effort provides significant benefits for both the U.S. and Israel.” This claim is an article of faith among Israel's supporters and is routinely invoked by Israeli politicians and pro-Israel Americans.

The authors carry on in their analysis The Israel lobby's power flows from its unmatched ability to play this game of interest-group politics. In its basic operations, it is no different from the farm lobby, the NRA, steel and textile-workers groups, and other ethnic lobbies. What sets the Israel lobby apart is its extraordinary effectiveness. But there is nothing improper about American Jews and their Christian allies attempting to sway U.S. policy towards Israel.

The lobby's activities are not the sort of conspiracy depicted in anti-Semitic tracts like the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion*. For the most part, the individuals and groups that comprise the lobby are doing what other special-interest groups do, just much better. Moreover, pro-Arab interest groups are weak to non-existent, which makes the lobby's task even easier (Mearsheimer and Walt 42).

3-3-2-B. On the Espionage Level

Along his famous book, Petras details one of many cases where the Israeli lobbies were involved in proved accusations with espionage. AIPAC, with 60,000 wealthy members and a \$60 million annual budget, had more influence on the political behavior of the U.S. executive, political parties and elected representatives than a federal indictment implicating its leaders for espionage on behalf of Israel (79).

In August 2004, the FBI and the U.S. Justice Department counterintelligence bureau announced that they were investigating a top Pentagon analyst suspected of spying for Israel and handing over highly confidential documents on U.S. policy toward Iran to AIPAC which in turn handed them over to the Israeli Embassy. The FBI had been covertly investigating highly ranked officials for several years prior to their indictment for spying.

On August 29, 2005 the Israeli Embassy predictably hotly denied the spy allegation. On the same day Larry Franklin was publicly named as a spy suspect. Franklin had worked closely with others in fabricating the case for war with Iraq. He was also the senior analyst on

Iran, which is at the top of AIPAC's list of targets for war. As the investigation proceeded toward formal charges of espionage.

The pro-Israeli analysis and 'ZionCon' ideologues joined in a two-prong response. On the one hand, some questioned whether "handing over documents" was a crime at all, claiming it involved "routine exchanges of ideas" and lobbying. On the other hand, Israeli officials and media denied any Israeli connection with Franklin, minimizing his importance in policy-making circles, while others vouched for his integrity.

The Franklin-AIPAC-Israeli investigation was more than a spy case, it involved the future of U.S.-Middle East relations and, more specifically, whether the ZionCons would be able to push the U.S. into a military confrontation with Iran. As a top Pentagon analyst on Iran, Franklin had access to all the executive branch deliberations on Iran (Petras 76, 77).

Conclusion:

The relationship between the U.S. and Israel has always had its ups and downs, its moments of crisis, and periodic tensions. The last years, during the tenure of the Obama administration and Netanyahu government, are no exception. Although it may be politically convenient, it does help to understand what really does challenge the U.S.-Israeli relations in recent years, especially on the following issues:

On two key issues in the Middle East, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the Iranian nuclear program, both the U.S. and Israel want the same things a two-state solution and a termination of Iran's nuclear activities. Where they crucially differ, however, is on how they prioritize these issues. Israel's primary concern is the threat from Iran, not its conflict with the Palestinians which is manageable as far as many Israelis are concerned. For the U.S., by contrast, Iran's nuclear program, although it is a major challenge, is not as great threat as it is to Israel. Hence, stopping it is not quite as urgent or all-important.

The third one concerned the Israeli lobby, that is considered to be more powerful and pervasive than any other lobbies in the U.S. components of it, both individuals and groups, have worked underground throughout its history. And even though the movement for Israel has been operating in the U.S. for over hundred years. Most Americans are completely unaware of this movement and its attendant ideology, a measure of its unique influence over public knowledge. The success of the Israeli lobby to achieve its goals, partly due to the hidden nature of much of its activity has been staggering.

General Conclusion

The health of any alliance relationship depends on the nature of the balance between the contributions of the parties. Given the power of the U.S., in terms of military capability, economic assets, and other factors, the contributions of smaller states in an alliance relationship are often difficult to discern.

Within the U.S. foreign policy, defense, and business communities, some analysts have traditionally viewed the U.S. relationship with Israel primarily as a one-way street, in which the U.S. protects Israel diplomatically and provides the means for Israel to defend itself militarily and financially, but Israel itself contributes little or nothing to American national interests.

others reject this analysis and claim the contrary. They believe that the U.S. and Israel have an impressive list of common national to these U.S. interests; and that wise policymakers and people concerned with U.S. policy, while never forgetting the irreplaceable values and moral responsibility dimensions of the bilateral relationship, should recognize the benefits Israel provides for U.S. national interests. Interests that Israeli actions make substantial direct contributions.

Over the pages of this research, we proved that whereas Israel is a small country in a strategically vital region in the world. And given the power of the U.S., in terms of military capability, economic assets, and other factors, makes Israel highly dependent on the U.S. on all the levels.

From a distance, the American-Israeli relationship might appear to be highly asymmetric, with less of an alliance than a dependency relationship. The U.S.-Israel relationship is a significant asset to U.S. national interests. The potential for even greater U.S. benefits from deeper cooperation is substantial. Even when Israel keeps hoping that the U.S. government should seek for maximizing the advantages that can be derived from its cooperation with

Israel and to expand their partnerships. It is not surprisingly that doubts over the wisdom of the U.S.' close relationship with Israel periodically surface.

Until the recent years, Israel received consistent economic aid from the U.S. Since then, assistance has come in the form of military aid. The two countries still share military intelligence and America pays for the iron dome missile shield, developed by Israel at its own expense. But the ties between them go beyond that. The U.S. view Israel as a democracy heaven in an unstable region that needs protection against existential threats. Jewish-American citizens raise money for Israel and AIPAC provides a sympathetic ear and can be relied on it to argue the Israeli case. The U.S. also provides Israel with diplomatic support at the UN, using its security council veto when it believes that the country's interests are threatened.

In a way or another, Israel's strategic value is that it does not act like a loyal ally. Israeli officials frequently ignore U.S.'s requests and renege on promises made to top U.S. leaders including past pledges to halt settlement construction and to refrain from targeted assassinations of Palestinian leaders.

Moreover, Israel has provided sensitive U.S. military technology to potential U.S. rivals like China. As well as conduct the most aggressive espionage operations against the U.S. of any ally. Israel is hardly the only country that spies on the U.S., but its willingness to spy on its principal patron casts further doubt on its strategic value.

Nevertheless, the U.S.-Israel special relationship would continue to develop, mature, and to define much about U.S. policy in the region. Indeed, of the three original reasons for America's involvement in the Middle East: The Cold War, Oil, and Israel. Only the last two really continue to shape U.S. policy. Regardless of differences between the U.S. and Israel, what binds the bilateral ties has been stronger than what divides them and this is likely to continue.

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