الاداء التشريعي والرقابي للبرمان الجزايري في ضل نضام الغرفتين

Abstract

This study revolves around how much, after the amended constitution of 1996, the bicameral parliamentary system in Algeria has contributed towards the efficiency of both writing legislation and governmental oversight, while comparing it to the Moroccan parliament which has been arguably more effective in the implementation of bicameralism in accordance with their 1996 constitution. In order to achieve its goals, the study would showcase and compare the overall performance of both the Algerian parliament and its Moroccan counterpart in terms of writing legislation and governmental oversight. As for the former, the focus was mainly on identifying who is authorized to write legislation and what steps are involved in doing so. Afterwards, the focus shifted towards governmental oversight of the executive branch, ranked for political responsibility and unranked for the government’s political responsibility. Ultimately, a conclusion was drawn about how the Algerian constitution’s founder(s) was heavily influenced by the principle of limiting and “rationalizing” the institutional authority of the parliament, particularly in regards to writing legislation. A very clear feature of the philosophy behind the French 1958 amended constitution. Writing legislation is no longer exclusive to parliamentary institutions, but rather a shared responsibility with the executive branch under an initiative to promote cooperation between them with an advantage for the latter. A similar approach was introduced in Morocco after the 2011 constitution, however, unlike in Algeria the parliament retains greater legislation writing privileges. Regarding governmental oversight, the Algerian parliament, similar to others around the world, is equipped with a multitude of oversight mechanisms, in particular the lower chamber. Nevertheless, the effectiveness of such mechanisms has been severely limited due to constitutional restraints. At the same time, the executive branch, especially the president, enjoy greater powers and privileges than ever before which led to a limited governmental oversight, a practice that the Senate cannot even engage in despite being perfectly suited for; given that unlike the lower chamber, it cannot be dissolved. On the other hand, the Moroccan constitution’s founder(s) has made it abundantly clear, in the 2011 constitution, to prioritize governmental oversight, and that it is to be carried by both the upper and lower chambers (with a greater emphasis on the role of members of the lower chamber) of the parliament as a mechanism to keep the executive branch in check